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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Making it Pay to be a Fan: The Political Economy of Digital Sport Fandom and the Sports Media 
Industry 
 
by 
 
Andrew G McKinney 
 
Advisor: William Kornblum 
 
This dissertation is a series of case studies and sociological examinations of the role that the sports 
media industry and mediated sport fandom plays in the political economy of the Internet. The 
Internet has structurally changed the way that sport fans access sport and accelerated the processes 
through which the capitalist actors in the sports media industry have been able to subsume them. 
The three case studies examined in this dissertation are examples of how digital media technologies 
have both helped fans become more active producers and consumers of sports and made the sports 
media industry an integral and vanguard component of the cultural industry.  The first case study is 
of Bleacher Report, a fan blogging platform turned major digital sports journalism company.  
Bleacher Report’s journey from an industry-reviled content farm to major player in digital sports 
journalism is traced to argue that Bleacher Report’s business model relied on the desperation of 
aspiring writers only as long as those writers were unpaid. The second case study is of DraftKings 
and Fanduel, the industry leaders in the fantasy sports genre of daily fantasy sports (DFS). These 
two companies have seemingly overnight taken over the new field but just as quickly thrust 
themselves into legal scrutiny that threatened to shut down the entire field of DFS. The proximity 
to gambling that threatened their legal status also, whoever, belies their relationship to the 
financialized understanding of that all of fantasy sports represents. The third and final case study is 
of ESPN. By far the oldest and most powerful of the three cases, ESPN, the self-proclaimed 
“Worldwide Leader in Sports,” has made the majority of its money off its innovation of the per 
subscriber fee, or the fee that ESPN charges cable companies to carry it that is then passed onto 
individual subscribers whether they watch ESPN or not. As digital technologies have 
revolutionized the delivery of visual images of sport and the cable bundle that ESPN is the most 
expensive part of loses market share, ESPN’s ability to monetize both attention and non-attention 
greatly decreases.  The concluding chapter takes these case studies and attempts to synthesize them 
into a theory of what is termed “contentification,” or the tendency of digital technologies to take 
disparate forms of records (text, numbers, images) and treat them as “content” to be paid attention 
to. Sports are particularly prone to contentification and have helped drive the exponential 
expansion of content to be paid attention to that has resulted in a crisis of attention where the 
amount of content outstrips the human capacity to take it in. The reconfiguration of capital that 
finds its expression in the ending of net neutrality is the response to this crisis.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The development of sports as an industry in the United States has gone hand in hand with the 
development of media industries since the late 19th century.  The early tabloids that ushered in 
the modern era of newspapers had sports sections with written recaps and box scores from their 
inception. The earliest uses of broadcast television included sporting events like baseball, boxing, 
and football.  This is partly because sports as mass entertainment had already become important 
enough to help sell newspapers and television sets. However, without the technological 
developments in mass media, it is undeniable that the sports industry would never have been able 
to reach the level of profit and cultural ubiquity that it came to attain.  Norbert Elias and Eric 
Dunning have argued that “sport” (as opposed to games and other less formal leisure activities) 
and industrial capitalism developed together.  The rationalization of English folk games like 
football into formal associations with set rules and organizations, they argue, was a process 
“interdependent” with the industrialization of the English economy. (Elias and Dunning 
1986:130) Rationalizations of the work process achieved by industrialization were mirrored in 
the rationalizations of non-work time in industrial society’s leisure time activities and, hence, 
organized “sports” were created from less formal folk games. The deeply intertwined 
relationship between cultural practices and industrialization was more generally and famously 
argued for by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, who showed how what they called the 
culture industry had shaped leisure time in the image of industrial production. (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 2007) The development of sports as a wing of the culture industry, as an example of the 
imposition of industrial capital logic into the arts and entertainment activities of humanity, is 
evidence of Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument that “the whole world is passed through the 
filter of the culture industry.” (99)  
	 2	
 
Of that whole world, sport has arguably come to compromise as prominent a wing as film and 
popular music, the fields more traditionally considered as culture industries. But it has come to 
this position much the same way all culture industries are born: through the introduction of new 
technologies. Both the production and distribution of cultural products are elementally changed 
by these new technologies. And just as with the other wings of the culture industry, these are 
often media technologies that record and recombine the events of culture so that they may be 
distributed on a mass scale in true industrial fashion.  By thinking through sport as one of the 
primary outcomes of the industrialization of play and games and as the emergence of a wing of 
the culture industry, we are forced to consider the role that media technologies have played in 
sports industry’s rise to cultural, political, and economic importance.  
 
What is the relationship of media to sport? This question is in effect two questions. Both deal 
with the economic structure of sport. The first question inquires into the role that mediation plays 
in the commodification of sport. How does the recording and broadcasting of sport shape the 
political economy of sport?  What new commodities are produced when new technologies are 
introduced into the sports media production process? The second question looks into the 
resulting composition of the economics of sport. Professional sports franchise owners in the 
United States have enjoyed varying degrees of antitrust exemption since Major League 
Baseball’s victory in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League which granted MLB 
full antitrust protection in 1922 and the Sports Broadasting Act of 1961 which assured that 
leagues could negotiate media rights collectively without violating antitrust law. (Celler 1961; 
Holmes 1922). This monopoly position has allowed them significant power over the rest of the 
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players in the sports media industry. When we use the term “sports media industry,” we must be 
specific about the composition of that industry. “Sports media industry” describes the 
relationship between three groups: the sports leagues, media companies, and sports fans. The 
sports leagues consist of owners and the players, but in relationship to media companies and 
media technologies of production and distribution this functionally means the owners. When 
setting the terms of league relationships with the media, the owners are the decision makers and 
the ones who exchange the commodity of sport directly with their counterparts in the media. 
Media revenue does flow back to players through the collective bargaining agreements that the 
players unions have negotiated with the owners;1 however, media rights themselves are dictated 
largely by the owners.  The media companies that make up the sports media industry profit not 
just from the display of what they have the rights to (broadcasts, highlights) but from the 
production of experiences from the records of sports: accounts of games, opinions about games, 
interviews with participants, the resulting statistics from games, etc. These commodities are 
circulated to sports fans, which consume the live events of sport and the secondary material they 
produce. However, fans aren’t merely passive consumers, but also create experiences from the 
record of sports themselves. For example, fantasy sport began as a fan practice and was mostly a 
semi-formal network of hobbyists for many of its early years. However, once a fan practice that 
creates a new experience of sport becomes popular enough amongst fans, the sports leagues and 
the media companies generally attempt to control and make it profitable for themselves.  This 
tripartite relationship involving the commodification of sports events and records, and the 
experiences made from both is what makes up the sports media industry.  But, what makes the 																																																								1	This	refers	only	to	professional	sports	in	the	United	States.	In	the	amateur	sports	that	are	widely	televised	in	the	US,	the	revenue	generated	from	selling	media	rights	is	prohibited		flowing	back	to	the	athletes	in	any	direct	way.	2	The Wayback Machine is an archive of cached website pages operated by the Internet Archive 
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sports media industry so clearly an example of the culture industry is the fashion in which the 
capitalist actors in that relationship (the leagues and the media) actively shape and reincorporate 
the activities of the fans. As Adorno said, he and Horkheimer first used the more popular term 
“mass culture” before changing to the term culture industry in their writing to indicate that they 
were not talking about culture dictated by the masses: “The culture industry intentionally 
integrates its consumers from above. […] [T]he masses are not primary, but secondary, they are 
an object of calculation; an appendage of machinery.” (Adorno 1991:99)  Under the centralized 
technologies of the era of industrial capitalism, this assertion is certainly true.  However, what 
happens to the configurations of power and production in the sports media industry after the new 
technologies of the late 20th and early 21st century take ahold of the culture industry, 
technologies like the Internet and mobile, networked devices that have the capacity to 
decentralize production and consumption?  When the masses begin to be able use the machinery 
instead of being a passive appendage of it, what changes in the composition of the sports as 
culture industry?  
 
What follows is a series of case studies and sociological examinations of the role that sports 
media and sport fandom plays in the political economy of the Internet in an attempt to answer 
these questions. It is the argument of this dissertation that the Internet has structurally changed 
the way that fans access sport and accelerated the processes through which the capitalist actors in 
the sports media industry have been able to subsume those practices.  Although incomplete and 
often unstable and contested, capital assumes sports fans as laborers who produce surplus value 
via the platforms through which sports fans access the events and accounts of sport. In other 
words, sports fans often can use the machinery of capital to rise above being mere appendages of 
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machinery, but the digital media technologies that they use to do this often lead them to be just 
as valuable if not more to sports industry capital then when fans were passive consumers. Further, 
it is my argument that the sport fan practices and the highly capital invested and profitable firms 
that shape them are informed by the hegemonic ideological currents of Internet enabled 
capitalism. Or, sport continues to be a leading culture industry but one that is no longer 
dominated by a centralized industrial order. Rather it is part of a new, digital order that is much 
more flexible and dynamic in its means of control.  In order to understand the logic of these 
developments and their relationship to contemporary capitalism, this study addresses two 
concerns, one historical and one theoretical.   
 
The historical question addresses the development of technological forms through which sports 
fans access their objects of passionate interest and how the desire for constant contact with these 
objects (from both fans and the sports industry) has driven a rapid development of new practices 
enabled by these technologies. This inquiry has a specific emphasis on the historicities of these 
new practices, these developing means of consumption and production. Therefore, investigation 
into the relationship to these means had by fans and capital and how these relationships have 
changed over time will be imperative. Over the last half of the 20th century and into the first 
decades of the 21st, professional sport fandom in America shifted from a place based and 
therefore centrally controlled social process that carried much of its social relevance through the 
symbolic relationship it held to that place, to an increasingly decentralized relation fully bound 
up with the workings of globalized capitalism wherein space and time became compressed and 
sport’s social relevance became inextricably linked to the ideologies of neoliberal capitalism. 
Although there is a burgeoning literature that understands this shift as a move towards sports as 
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always already mediatized and commodified (Crawford 2004; Elias and Dunning 1986; 
Giulianotti 2005; Horne 2006; Hutchins and David Rowe 2009; Rowe 2004), a historical account 
of the technological and economic changes in sport fandom in America remains a necessary 
project.  
 
The theoretical program is to generate concepts adequate to a critical understanding of this 
historical account, situating the evolutions of mediated sport fan practices and their being-made-
valuable in the larger context of a) the effect that technologies of digital mediation have had on 
the sports media industry and b) the role technologies of digital mediation play in the political 
economy of the internet. In other words, the goal is to develop a set of terms and concepts to use 
as tools of analysis in order to develop a critique of the current political economy of digitally 
mediated sport and explore whether that critique can be accurately applied to the political 
economy of digital capitalism writ large. To that end, I will engage with the tradition of Marxist 
critiques of political economy especially those that focus on the role of technology under the 
logic of capital,  the developing sociological field that studies “digital labor,” critical sociologies 
of sport and sport media, and the business theories that have influenced the particular businesses 
studied herein.  By placing my focus here, I seek to contribute to scholarship that understands 
digital technologies as enabling not only decentralized, non-hierarchical production, but also 
intensified forms of surplus value extraction and how this plays out specifically in digitally 
mediated sport. 
 
Ultimately, this dissertation is an attempt to develop concepts that can come to terms with the 
wider political economic implications of the internet’s role in contemporary capitalism by 
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examining sports fan practices enabled by the internet and how they are presumed as surplus 
value producing labor by and ideologically compatible for capital. The organizing questions for 
that task are: 
 
1. How does technology, generally, and the Internet, more specifically, affect the relations fans 
have to sport, their object of passionate interest? How was it changed over time? What is the 
historicity of those relations? 
 
2.  What is the logic of capital as it approaches mediated sport fan relations as sites of surplus 
value production? Can we locate the labor processes that produce this surplus value in those 
mediated relations? 
 
3. What are the ideologies that inform the technological processes through which capital assumes 
sport fan as laborers? What are the origins of these ideologies and how are they articulated 
through the technological relationship that fans have to sport? 
 
4. How do we understand these mediated sport fan relations as a part of contemporary 
capitalism? Are they indicative of trends to come in media industries writ large? How do they fit 
into more general theories of the political economy of the Internet? 
 
5. Can we use these practices as ways to discuss the changing meaning of “labor” in 
contemporary capitalism? 
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I apply these questions to three forms of sports media that have faced ineluctable change from 
digitization and the network capacity of the Internet and the digitally constituted fan relations 
these media enable. These forms operate at the level of the textual, the numerical, and the visual: 
blogging, fantasy sports, and live broadcasts of sport. I will drill down into these forms by using 
case studies of three business enterprises that approach fans as surplus value producers in 
varying, sometimes contradictory ways.  I choose these case studies because not only are these 
firms industry leaders, they have been at the forefront of the transmutation of fan practices into 
labor. It is the argument of this dissertation that the businesses in the case studies and the more 
general fields they belong to approach fan practice as labor in unique yet related ways that make 
sports media a vanguard of digitally mediated capitalism. The chapters progress from the textual 
to the numerical to the visual because the labor considered progresses from concrete to 
increasingly abstract. In other words, blogging can rather easily be understood as labor as it is 
merely work that was once paid now being done unwaged, fantasy sports follows the logic of 
work and “management” in practice but the manner in which it produces surplus value for capital 
is more obscured, and the practice of watching sports itself appears to be passive consumption 
therefore requiring a more abstract analysis of value production in order to consider it as labor. 
Proceeding in this way, from concrete to abstract as it were, I hope to come to a general theory of 
surplus value production in digitally mediated capitalism that can take into account the deep 
abstracting logic of sports media and capital writ large. 
 
Although each chapter focuses on contemporary businesses and the practices they enable, they 
are placed in the historical continuum of their own development. For example, when discussing 
fan’s relationships to the statistical understanding of sports it is important to situate 
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contemporary practices like fantasy sports in relation to both the inherent statistical nature of 
sports (once we keep score, statistics are produced) and the development of fan counter 
narratives like that of baseball fan extraordinaire Bill James and his Baseball Almanac. It is only 
with a historical understanding of these fan relations that we can truly understand the impact that 
digital interfaces and the Internet have had on practices that build off of those relations.  
 
Chapter 2 investigates the Internet’s effect on the textual relationship to sport. It begins with a 
history of sports writing in print and its relationship to the political economy of sports to 
contextualize the way that the Internet has altered not only the nature of the writing that worked 
so symbiotically with sport throughout its history but has also altered the nature of the labor that 
produces that writing. The political economy of sports writing is, of course, tied to the political 
economy of the medium that it inhabits and even a brief history of sports writing reveals that not 
only were sport and sports writing in a symbiotic relationship, but so, too, were sport with 
newspapers and magazines. After a consideration of the forms of writing that were prevalent 
during the print era of sports writing, a brief sketch of the figure of the columnist and their role in 
shaping the tone and ideological function of sports writing is utilized to show how opinion 
gained prominence as a form in the face of the increasing importance of radio and television in 
the sports media landscape.  Finally, before moving on to the case study, an example of the 
vitriol of the sports writing establishment towards the figure of “the blogger” and an example of 
a particularly successful blogger are given to further contextualization the notion of the mass 
amateurization of the profession. The case study for this mass amateurization thesis is Bleacher 
Report, a website that from its inception in 2005 till a year before its Turner Sports buyout in 
2012 was a much discussed (and much reviled) “content farm” know more for its use of slide 
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shows and questionable content (misogynistic language, unverifiable claims, general barroom 
argumentation styles) than as a journalistic outlet. However, as waves of venture capital rolled in, 
Bleacher Report made great strides to clean up their reputation and become a viable company 
worth acquiring. Bleacher Report’s business model, however, only changed slightly. Its method 
of growth always entailed maintaining the massive output of content regardless of quality. It did 
this by building and replenishing a massive roster of unpaid “fan” bloggers, many of which were 
young aspiring writers, pumping out content at an extremely high rate even while it made 
overtures toward legitimacy by hiring established sportswriters away from major outlets,. 
Utilizing a close reading of Bleacher Report’s promotional materials, their in-house blog, and the 
ever growing corpus of critiques from other outlets and former writers, I argue that Bleacher 
Report’s narrative about itself and its actual practices were an accumulation of value from 
exuberance in desperation wherein fans with aspirations toward making their passions their 
living became the digitized raw material of a content production empire. In the last analysis, 
what Bleacher Report accomplished was the mobilization of what can be called “disruptive labor” 
in a play on the business theory of “disruption.” (Bower and Christensen 1995; Christensen 
2013) 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the numerical relation to sport and its development into the game within the 
game of fantasy sports, or the development of what I call “statistical fandom.” Sports are 
inherently quantifiable once a winner and loser are determined. Indeed, part of what determines a 
game from a sport is this binary opposition, the 0 or the 1 of the loss or the win. This inherently 
quantified relationship is dependent, however, on the mediums and manners of data collection 
and a history of statistical fandom shows that these mediums and methods are sites of contention 
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between competing interests.  Fans who value statistical experiences of sport and the capital 
interests who produce sport often have a contentious relationship. By examining the figure of 
Bill James, the baseball fan whose Bill James Baseball Abstracts and statistical innovations can 
be seen as the impetus for the rapid development of statistical fandom, this contentious 
relationship can been seen to be about not only who owns the numerical records of sport but 
what should be done with them. As James is often given credit for being the inspiration for the 
game of fantasy sports, understanding his approach to data is important.  Once the history of 
statistical fandom in the pre-fantasy sports era is understood, the development of the game itself 
appears less like a strange obsession that becomes wildly popular and more like a logical 
extension of years of work and focus.  The early years of fantasy sports, although burgeoning in 
popularity, could only create a minor industry out of intensive fan labor.  Without the 
computerization and the network capacity of the Internet, the popularity of the game and the 
industry it would birth would not have been possible. The explosion of the fantasy sports 
industry made possible by computers and the Internet caused the contentious relationship 
between the stakeholders of statistical fandom to flair up again and numerous legal battles 
popped up around the question of who owns the numerical records of sport and who can 
determine how they are distributed. Ultimately, the courts decided that these records could be 
released and recombined at will and with the help of a new lobbying industry built up around 
fantasy sports, the game flourished and became even more popular.  This need for state 
intervention in the production of a new market continues to be a major concern throughout the 
case studies in this chapter, DraftKings and FanDuel, the two leading purveyors of daily fantasy 
sports or DFS.  While traditional fantasy sports brought together groups of people to play a 
statistical game that mapped onto an entire season, DFS contests are begun and resolved in the 
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course of either a day or a week depending on the sport. This new, faster form of fantasy sports, 
however, pressed at a crucial legal distinction between fantasy sports and gambling that the 
fantasy sports industry had fought long and hard for, culminating in the carving out of federal 
approval for the game in the 2006 Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA). 
UIGEA determined, albeit rather obliquely, that what differentiated fantasy sports from 
gambling was that it was a game of skill rather than a game of chance. As DFS was developed 
after the passage of UIGEA and in some ways was dependent on mobile telecommunications 
technology that didn’t exist before 2006, entrepreneurs who ran the DFS companies and the 
players who played the game were able to create a community around DFS before the regulatory 
apparatus could react. And it may not have reacted if not for DraftKings and Fanduel’s fall of 
2015 ad blitz that blanketed the sports broadcasting airwaves during the beginning of that years 
NFL Season. After catapulting itself into the public consciousness with these ubiquitous ads, a 
wave of negative attention and legal scrutiny put the entire industry into question. By close 
reading these ads and examining the legal actions taken against DraftKings and FanDuel in New 
York State, the ideological function of statistical fandom  in the age of the Internet becomes clear 
and the distinction of “skill” and “chance” can be seen as indicative of a financial logic taking 
over the numerical relationship to sport. Fantasy sports and DFS specifically are a form of the 
financialization of daily life, a process that seeks to imbue the relationships that people have with 
numerous aspects of their daily life to the logics of finance capital. (Martin 2002) Although not 
necessarily clearly understood as labor, the financialization of daily life is a way that capital can 
produce surplus value from the everyday and DFS is an example of how exploitative this process 
can be. 
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Chapter 4 examines the visual relationship to sports.  In the history of the moving image, sport 
has always been present at moments of innovation. From Edison’s kinetoscope, to television 
broadcasts, to cable television, and Internet streaming, sports has been an early subject and driver 
of capital investment.  The history of sport and the moving image makes a radical break, 
however, at the advent of television. Broadcast’s liveness marks the moment when the live event 
of sport is available in at least an approximation of full verisimilitude, thus expanding the space 
and time of the live event both auditorily and visually. Sport was an early subject for broadcast 
television not just for its popularity but also for the ease of its production. Early broadcasts were 
done with single cameras with no actors or writers to pay and no lighting production needed. 
Like textual accounts of sport, however, sport’s popularity did factor into the choosing of 
sporting events as early subjects. Broadcast stations that transmitted them were also the makers 
of television sets.  By the post-war era and the television boom, sport had become a staple of 
television. However, this was not without significant pushback from the owners of sports 
franchises and the leagues that represented them. Many leagues instituted blackout policies or 
simply refused to show games in local markets without written policies, using the argument that 
broadcasting games would cause local fans to not attend games. These policies are in many cases 
still alive today even though these policies have been continuously challenged on both logical 
and legal grounds. However, as television became more and more a part of daily life in the 
United States, leagues began to understand the value of television broadcasts and sought to 
maximize their market power by negotiating the rights to these broadcasts collectively. This is, 
of course, a form of cartelization and this move required an exemption from anti-trust law. The 
eventually granted exemption laid the ground for the solidification of both the National Football 
League and the future of sports and sports media in the United States. Hence, a history of sport 
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and the moving image shows that television and sport are intertwined in a similar but even more 
powerfully symbiotic fashion as sport and the print media were. This relationship was, much like 
the print media, supported by sale of broadcast time during games to advertisers, creating a 
nexus between television broadcasters, sports, and capitalism writ large.  However, the case 
study for this chapter shows that live, over the air, ad supported broadcasts could only produce so 
much value. ESPN, the self-proclaimed “world wide leader in sport,” shows again that sport is at 
the forefront of all developments of televisual transmission. Their pioneering of the per 
subscriber fee, or, in an inversion of the traditional broadcast model, the fee that carriers pay to 
programmers for their content that is then passed on to consumers, drove exponential growth and 
put them in a position to drive up the cost of live sports rights, subsequently infusing leagues 
with more and more capital and increasing the overall ubiquity of sports on the screens that 
proliferate in daily life.  By tracing ESPN’s history from its inception in the late 1970s to its 
eventual dominance of the cable television ecosystem to its too big to fail status in the 
contemporary moment, the importance of live sports in the political economy of televisual media 
comes into full relief.  However, without significant state intervention into the regulatory 
environment of both televisual transmission technology (specifically satellites) and cable 
television pricing and market control, ESPN’s rise would not have been possible. Just as with the 
statistical relationship to sport, the visual relationship to sport is dependent on the state to assure 
its stability.  As ESPN became a dominant player in sports media, however, the development of 
the televisual capabilities of the Internet and the digitization of televisual transmission in general 
began to threaten its market position. Having built its empire off of the per subscriber fee, the 
destabilization of the cable television market created by internet delivered television represented 
an existential threat to ESPN’s attempt to subsume the attention of sports fans while making a 
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hefty profit from fees paid by cable television watchers who never watched ESPN in the first 
place.  ESPN’s current problem with so called “cord cutters” and the changing ground of the 
television ecosystem can be seen as the limits of what has been called the attention economy. As 
cable television and ESPN go into crisis, the contradictions inherent to the subsumption of 
attention under capitalism can be seen.   
 
The concluding chapter to this dissertation attempts to bring together these three case studies and 
understand what they mean for the political economy of the Internet as a whole. In each chapter, 
both the political economic and ideological functions of the technologically mediated 
relationship to sports have been considered as historical processes that underwent rapid and 
major change when forced to reckon with the Internet.  These changes are indicative of what can 
be called contentification or the way that different Internet enabled activity and data is 
objectified into an articulated but homogenous substance known as “content” across the digital 
culture industries.  By theorizing the effects of the Internet on the political economy of sports 
media as contentification, as the objectification and valorization of the knowledge and 
experience of sports, the hope is to grasp how the textual, numerical, and visual records of sport 
(and in fact of all cultural production) have not only produced so much value for capital but have 
done so to the point of a crisis of accumulation. This crisis is a crisis of the accumulation of 
attention. As more and more media objects, whether they be statistics or images or text or audio 
or video, are produced and distributed and observations of these objects produce more objects in 
an almost infinitely recursive chain, the attempts by capital to valorize them become less and less 
effective. Here the finite live event of sport has its analogue in the finite capacity for human 
attention. The finiteness of live sport presents a challenge to capital as it can only produce an 
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equally finite amount of surplus value. One possible strategy to overcome this challenge is the 
proliferation of live events but this has its own human and spatio-temporal limits. The other 
approach to the challenge of finiteness is the approach that has been catalogued in this 
dissertation, the technologically produced proliferation of ways to access the live event itself, 
records of that event, and methods of recombining and reconfiguring those records.  These 
approaches can be seen as forms of Marx’s famous categories of absolute and relative surplus 
value and, following from that, examples of Marx’s related categories of formal and real 
subsumption. Absolute surplus value, the surplus value attained from extension of the workday, 
is seen in the proliferation of live events themselves, a process that does not elementally change 
the value producing process itself, as in how Marx describes the formal subsumption of the labor 
process by capital. Relative surplus value, the extraction of value from the intensification of the 
work process, is seen in the technological intensification of points of attention via more content 
and more screens.  As the process of reaching the event and records of sport has been 
elementally changed in this process this qualifies as an example of real subsumption, or the stage 
of capital’s real control over the work process. (Endnotes 2010; Marx 1990) The general drift of 
sports media, especially in the age of the Internet, is this transition from formal subsumption, a 
reliance on the live event and its ad supported model, to the real subsumption of attention, the 
filtering of all experiences of sport through the platforms and interfaces of capital so as to shape 
them in capital’s image. Ultimately, this attempt to really subsume attention has its own absolute 
limits, as human attention is finite, increasing wage stagnation will prevent humans from being 
able to access that which produces value from attention labor, and machines cannot produce 
value on their own. (Caffentzis 2013) What comes at the end of this attempt to really subsume 
attention and what happens to all the speculative capital that has been invested in not just the 
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firms studied here but sports media and the digital culture industries writ large? The answer to 
that question is beyond this dissertation but it will be argued that the Internet has driven sports 
media into a crisis that requires, like all capitalist crises, a reconfiguration of capital. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Disruptive Labor: Bleacher Report and the Monetization of Mass 
Amateurization 
 
 
Introduction: 
It is not a controversial assertion that the Internet has drastically affected print media.  As we will 
see later in this chapter, print media circulation and the labor force necessary for that circulation 
have been in steady decline since the advent of the Internet. Of particular concern for the 
traditional print media industry was not just the move from paper to screens but the ease with 
which non-professionals could distribute their own thoughts and ideas to a mass audience once 
reserved for only the biggest papers and magazines.  This development has been described as 
“mass amateurization” or the manner in which web 2.0 technologies like blogs and media 
sharing sites have opened the door for amateurs to threaten the relative monopoly that 
professionals have on knowledge and creative production and distribution. (Jenkins 2008; Shirky 
2008) From perspectives outside of these professions, mass amateurization is part and parcel of 
the liberatory nature of the Internet itself. As “information wants to be free” (Wark 2006) how 
can the producers of that information be the professional gatekeepers of old who tax you on your 
way to that information?  From within these professions, however, it would make logical sense 
that mass amateurization would be seen as delegitimizing both a profession’s quality and its 
economic stability.  In addition, what many mass amateurization theses often miss is the 
tendency for amateurs to not only want to challenge professional authority, but to also desire that 
authority and the economic gains that stem from these professions.  
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In this chapter, I will use the case of Bleacher Report (shortened as B/R in this chapter and in 
their branding), a sports blogging site founded in founded in 2006 and fully launched in 2008, to 
examine how this mass amateurization phenomenon took hold in the profession of sports writing.  
B/R entered the market at a ripe moment in the digitization of sports journalism. ESPN and 
Yahoo were pioneers digitally, but were still primarily national networks, unable to offer the 
focus on local teams that newspapers provided. Most major newspapers, however, had not been 
able to embrace a more digital format or reliably expand their national coverage beyond 
Associated Press and wire reports. Bleacher Report’s gambit was that providing the breadth of an 
ESPN with the team and region specific coverage of local news was a viable business model that 
could scale exponentially.  Key to succeeding at this goal was the production of a crowdsourced 
workforce that could pump out content at an unprecedented clip while not being a part of a 
tightly funded startup’s payroll.  Hence, from its origins as a small San Francisco based start-up 
in 2006 to its estimated $200 million acquisition by Turner Sports in 2012 to its current status as 
the fifth most popular sports website on the Internet (Alexa 2017), B/R has continued to utilize 
two interlocking narratives about itself. First, its founders and boosters proclaim it is a 
“disruptive” force in sports media and media in general because it harnesses the passion of fans 
to unseat the incumbent, professional class of sports media producers. Second, it has sold itself 
as a place where aspiring writers and sports media professionals could get a foot in the door, 
building a resume while getting the exposure the site afforded. Major competitors, independent 
sports journalists, and former writers have actively challenged both of these narratives. Utilizing 
a close reading of Bleacher Report’s promotional materials, their in-house blog, and the large 
corpus of critiques from other outlets and former writers, the analysis of these interlocking 
narratives is deepened to argue that they ultimately served to justify an accumulation of value 
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from exuberance in desperation wherein fans with aspirations toward making their passions their 
living became the digitized raw material of a content production empire. In the last analysis, 
what Bleacher Report has accomplished is the mobilization of what can be called “disruptive 
labor.” However, in order to contextualize B/R in the larger movements of sports writing in the 
United States and the impact that the Internet has had on this, a brief overview of the history of 
sports writing in the US and its political economy will be necessary. B/R did not just occur from 
the uncontrollable effects of the Internet on print media writ large, but is a particular response to 
some consistent issues that have been a part of sports writing since its early moments. 
 
A Brief History of the Textual Accounts of Sports 
Although print media and sport in the United States don’t have quite the intertwined relationship 
as television and sports do, sport has been an important part of print media since at least the 
middle part of the 19th century.  Print media in the early US republic were generally directed 
towards the upper tiers of society and sports were a lower class concern for much of the pre-Civil 
War era. However, by the late 1830s, magazines such as American Farmer, American Turf 
Register, and Spirit of the Times had begun to focus on sports like horse racing, cricket, hunting, 
and yachting.   Boxing was generally left out as it was associated with working class, saloon 
style events that these magazines’ upper class readership were uninterested in. By the 1850s, 
New York Clipper had become the premier sports magazine. (McChesney 1989) New York 
Clipper did much to establish specifically baseball in the American consciousness, employing 
the “Father of the Game” Henry Chadwick, an Englishman who after reporting on cricket for the 
New York Times became the leading advocate for baseball in the United States. Chadwick’s 
nickname stemmed not only from his success as an early baseball promoter but from his efforts 
	 21	
to rationalize the game by promoting more consistent scorekeeping (he is sometimes credited 
with inventing the box score) and his involvement with the National League’s rules committee. 
(Schiff 2008) By the 1880s the National Police Gazette, a predecessor to the men’s magazines of 
the 20th century, had become a mostly sports periodical with circulations numbers over 100,000 
and a publisher, Richard Kyle Fox, who became invested in the popularization of sport via the 
mail order sporting equipment business that was run in the back pages of the magazine. 
(McChesney 1989; Reel 2006) 
 
While these magazines had begun to flourish and produce the first notable sportswriters like 
Chadwick, newspapers took slightly longer to warm to sports as a topic. However, as innovations 
in printing and the rapid growth in cities created a mass market for newspapers in the late 19th 
century, sports took hold in the major metropolitan newspapers of the country.  Joseph Pulitzer’s 
New York World established the first ever sports department in 1883, reporting on mostly boxing 
and horse racing, and William Randolph Hearst, in an attempt to cut into Pulitzer’s circulation, 
created the first dedicated sports section in his New York Journal in 1895. (Betts 1953) The 
general uptake of sports in the major newspapers and the explosion of sports as popular 
entertainment in the early 20th century was a codetermining process that allowed both to become 
increasingly lucrative businesses. By the 1920s, sports writing had become a legitimate and 
lucrative wing of an increasingly conglomerating but flourishing industry.  Sports, as mass 
entertainment, were a perfect fit for newspapers as they entered their era of mass production and 
circulation. The argument that the 1920s were the golden age of sports has been supplemented by 
the argument that the 1920s were also the golden age of sports writing (Lipsyte 1977; 
McChesney 1989) as it was in this era that sport writing truly developed its symbiotic 
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relationship with both the newspapers and the burgeoning sports industry. Newspapers, having 
gone through an era of conglomeration and a shift into being more and more ad revenue 
dependent, required a large enough readership to both justify the capital investment in 
conglomeration and be attractive to potential ad buyers. An emphasis on sports was a quick way 
to a larger audience as it shied away from the partisanship that characterized the yellow 
journalism era of the late 19th and early 20th century and provided entertainment value that has 
always sold more than hard news.  By the end of the 1920s, sports writing and reporting had 
become a staple of the newspaper industry, having increased to 12%-20% of newspaper content 
from .04% in 1880. (McChesney 1989) This era, like the late 19th century influence of Henry 
Chadwick, led to the rise of the sports writer as both literary figure (Grantland Rice, Ring 
Lardner) and influencer of sport itself. For example, Arch Ward, sports editor at the Chicago 
Tribune, helped introduce such staples as the Golden Gloves amateur boxing competition, the 
baseball All-Star Game and the college football all-star game.  
 
Even with the subsequent introductions of radio and television into the media landscape from the 
1920s into the 1950s, print media’s emphasis on sports remained.  In the post-war era, magazines 
like The Sporting News and Sports Illustrated became major parts of the magazine industry and 
newspapers continued to rely on sports coverage as revenue leaders. But the dominance of the 
print media in the sports media landscape had been usurped and was subsequently was forced to 
change its general approach. As will be discussed more in chapter 4, the importance of radio and 
television to sports media has been its ability to expand the space and time of live sporting events, 
offering the experience of the sporting event to those who could not attend the event themselves 
for whatever reason.  Print media has obviously never been able to match this attribute of radio 
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and television but had been able to offer a diminished version of this experience by offering after 
the fact recaps.  Although the recap was often handled by wire services, the vivid storytelling of 
the more famous sports writers of the early 20th century like Grantland Rice was born out of 
attempts to bring fans closer to games they had no ability to attend. This form remained 
important to the print media but mainly as record.  Generally print media came to rely on two 
particular types of content to fill pages: records of the events themselves or analysis. The record 
of the event, whether that be written recap of the game, a box score, photos, or interviews after 
the game, continued to have a role in the print media into the modern digital era. The Gannet 
Company’s (a massive multi-media empire of print, radio, outdoor advertising, and television 
companies) USA Today, a national daily newspaper oft compared to television for its sound bite 
like stories, was deeply criticized by the newspaper industry upon its arrival in 1982. However, 
its extremely thorough sports page, a full 25% of the paper, was generally well received by the 
sports world as it became the first national newspaper to publish box scores and recaps of all the 
major professional and collegiate sports leagues.  Once again, sports were a major factor in the 
continuing success and changing functions of the print media.   
 
The other content type that came to dominate print media sports coverage after radio and 
television was analysis or feature length writing. Feature length, mainly a magazine format, 
drove the careers of numerous sports writing figures like Frank DeFord, George Plimpton, David 
Halberstam, and W.C. Heinz. These longer, more literary pieces often attracted writers from 
outside the sports writing genre, most notably Plimpton, Halberstam, and Hunter S. Thompson.  
However, this format was not as popular nor as ubiquitous as the other analytical format: the 
column.  The figure of the newspaper columnist looms large in the history of the writing about 
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sports. They wrote general interest columns, generally appearing less than daily, and were mostly 
mid career writers who had often been junior beat reporters before they came to the columnist 
position. (McCleneghan 1997) As newspaper conglomeration continued apace from the pre-war 
era, columnists were often syndicated across papers, an even more prestigious position. The 
nature of a sports columnist’s writing style and subject matter varies across columnists but their 
position as pundits is nearly universal. Their job is not to report records or write deeply reported 
features but to offer authoritative opinions based on their experience and viewpoints. This can, of 
course, go in a variety of ways, from leftist political leanings (take for example Lester Rodney, 
famed writer for the CPUSA’s Daily Worker) to moralizing, reactionary musings. However, 
regardless of the political or moral subject matter, the columnist is often attempting to draw 
attention to their work by generating controversy. (McCleneghan 2006) The use of the op-ed 
form, one based more in argumentation than in the reporting of fact, is what makes the columnist 
generally unique in the news media but very typical of common fan practices. It is with the 
advent of the Internet that this situation became particularly apparent and a business model in 
and of itself. 
 
The developing world of Internet news publishing has both drastically changed the political 
economy of traditional news organizations and created a flourishing new media ecosystem 
(Andrejevic 2013; Berkowitz 2010; Shirky 2011; Tapscott and Williams 2010) The Internet’s 
effect on print media  by the mid 2000s had been well documented (Jenkins 2008; Shirky 2008; 
Smolkin 2006; Sullivan 2006) and the sports pages of these newspapers were also suffering the 
same effects.  According to data from the Pew Research Center, circulation amongst daily 
newspapers was in steady decline all throughout the 00s (Barthel 2016). This general downturn 
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in the business of the industry was matched by a downturn in the labor force over that same 
period. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that newspaper industry employment was down 
38.4% over that decade. Much was said about the impact of internet publishing on that decline 
and the amount of jobs counted in those BLS statistics as “Internet publishing and broadcasting” 
did increase from its bottom following the after affects of the dot com bubble crash to the end of 
the decade by 29.4%. However, in terms of the overall numbers for these two categories 
newspapers still employed nearly 3x as many people by 2010. (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016)  
However, the vitriol against Internet based publishing was extremely strong, particularly 
amongst sports writers.  
 
The quintessential example of this was an argument in 2008 on sports writer and broadcaster 
Bob Costas’s HBO show Costas Now between noted sports writer and former Philadelphia 
Inquirer investigative reporter Buzz Bissinger (most famous for his book on Texas high school 
football Friday Night Lights) and Will Leitch, founder and at the time editor in chief of 
Deadspin.com, a sports oriented website whose tagline “ Sports news without access, favor, or 
discretion” was the object of much derision on the show. Costas’s framing of the debate belied 
his own biases by setting up what had become known by then as the “blogosphere” in his 
opening comments toward Leitch. Costas first praised the Internet for its speed and ease of 
access to sports content but argued that “the reasonable criticism is of the tone of gratuitous 
potshots and mean spirited abuse.”  Given sport writing’s history in the early 20th century as 
comingled with sports business so much as to have been charged with promoting it in the public 
culture, one can understand Costas’s accusation about the blogosphere as particularly damning.  
Sports writing was used to elevate and promote sports not bring it down to earth like the yellow 
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journalism of the same era. After Leitch was given a moment to fumble on his words, Bissinger 
interjected: “I feel very strongly about this. I really think you’re full of shit. Because I think 
blogs are dedicated to cruelty. They’re dedicated to journalistic dishonesty. They’re dedicated to 
speed.”  The segment went for another nearly 15 minutes, most of which was Bissinger cursing 
at and browbeating Leitch while Costas sat in approval.  (Anon 2008; Sandomir 2008) Although 
extreme, this was indicative of print sports media’s view of their newer, younger rivals.   
 
The “blog,” a truncation of the term weblog, had by that Bissinger outburst become a regular part 
of the media world. It’s a slippery term that only really denotes a certain practice of regular 
updating (or “posting”) and a lack of institutional backing (at first, at least, as we will see) rather 
than any kind of genre or stylistic form, contrary to Bissinger’s assertion. (boyd 2006) Sports 
blogging had also by that 2008 interview already been in practice for at least a decade. The most 
famous sports bloggers, who would go on to become both a model of success and general 
punching bag for other bloggers, was Bill Simmons. “The Boston Sports Guy”, Simmons went 
from an unsuccessful and unfulfilling stint at the Boston Herald after getting a master’s degree in 
print journalism from Boston University to bartending to a sports writing job for Digital City 
Boston, one of America Online ‘s (AOL) city specific sites accessible only to AOL subscribers, 
in 1998.  Although not fitting to a “blog” definition in most senses of the term, Simmons’s style 
of long winded and winding prose was of a distinctly digital variety as he had no concern for 
print inches, only the amount of scrolling a reader was willing to do. As Simmons gained in 
popularity he was offered a job at ESPN’s new “Page 2,” its attempt to offer both left of center 
commentary (Hunter S. Thompson was early writer for the site, as was Ralph Wiley, a well 
respected black sports writer who focused on the politics of race) and adapt to a kind of blog 
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style of writing that Simmons embodies. Shortening his “Boston Sports Guy” moniker to “The 
Sports Guy”, Simmons’s unabashed Boston sports fandom and deep love of 80s popular culture 
set him apart from “journalists” and embodied a great deal of what the sports blog ethos of that 
era advocated for, namely “sports news, without access, favor, or discretion.”  Simmons, 
Deadspin, and others relished in their “outsider” status, setting themselves apart from the 
professional journalists whose objectivity and authority they saw as granted from and beholden 
to the leagues themselves. (Cohan 2013) And given the history of sports writing and its general 
boosterism, the bloggers were not entirely incorrect. This outsider fan position, however, in the 
form of both Deadspin, which had become by the end of the 00s one most heavily trafficked 
sports sites on the web, and Simmons, who by the end of 00s had written two New York Times 
best sellers, was a bit of misnomer. What it denoted more than anything was that they were not 
journalists in the traditional sense but a new breed of digitally native writers.  It was into this 
environment, both reviled by traditional print media, but sought after by the major players in 
sports media industry, that Bleacher Report would enter. 
 
History of BleacherReport.com and Its In-House Blog 
   
Founded and launched in beta in 2006 and “formally” launched in 2008 by four “ lifelong friends 
who were not satisfied by local coverage of their favorite sports teams,”  B/R began its life as a 
bare bones publishing platform with the intent of becoming a crowd-sourced content farm. The 
website’s “About” page (bleacherreport.com/about) and co-Founders Bryan Goldberg, Dave 
Nemetz, Zander Freund, and Dave Finocchio have stated the original vision of the site variously, 
but their business model was to attempt to solve a very specific problem:  how to cover as many 
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teams as possible with as little paid staff as possible.  Their initial proposition was to produce a 
platform that was entirely open. In beta they referred to themselves as “the web's first Open 
Source Sports Network” (Bleacher Report 2007; Google Developers 2007). By this they did not 
particularly mean what is traditionally understood by the term “open source.” As it commonly 
applies to software and licensing,  “open source” denotes a piece of software that allows for a) 
access to its source code, b) its free distribution c) works derived from its source code and d) an 
open license system that fights against proprietary intellectual property amongst other more 
contested traits (Open Source Initiative 2015). By “Open Source Sports Network,” however, B/R 
meant to describe a platform that was open to submission by writers with no prior vetting or 
application process. The labeling of this as “open source” and later as “an open platform” will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, but note here that access to source code and open 
licensing were not a part of B/R’s version of “open source.” 
 
Their “open platform” was framed as a means towards giving fans with undervalued expertise a 
voice in sports media. It is certainly true that sports media at the time (and to this day) is largely 
dominated by professionals whose expertise is understood by media companies to be very 
valuable, but by 2006 Simmons was already working at ESPN.com and would soon become one 
of the dominant faces of ESPN on multiple platforms. B/R competitor SBNation, also explicitly 
catering to fans and their opinions, beat B/R to launch by a solid year, as well. However, no one 
argued as combatively as B/R for the importance of the fan voice. In an early version of their 
“About” page from late 2006 they write:  
At BleacherReport.com, we know that the real experts aren’t the stiffs with the 
journalism degrees and the empty catch phrases...they’re the fans who’ve been 
following their teams since age four, painting their faces since age five, and 
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holding onto their old Topps cards for longer than they care to admit. (Anon 
2006) 
 
This oppositional stance combined with a deep reverence for the fan is typical of this era. On a 
page recruiting writers from the beta version of the site they state:  
In a marketplace dominated by corporate outlets, the site aims to provide 
something different, an alternative to the stifled funk of the mainstream. Too often, 
great editorial work never sees the light of the day, either because it's too edgy or 
because its creator doesn't have the right credentials. That's where we come in. 
(Bleacher Report 2006) 
 
As displayed here, the Open Source Sports Network’s openness was primarily an openness 
towards submissions and to the fan experience as a valid form of writing. “Openness” also 
functions as a kind of code word, like many contemporary terms for activity on the Internet, for 
unpaid labor.  
 
Bolstering the sense of openness and community was integral to B/R’s strategy of encouraging 
their writers to continue to create content at a continuous clip. To that end, from August of 2007 
till 2017, B/R operated an in-house blog that was publically accessible but generally aimed 
inward at their writers’ community. In the early era of B/R, from the 2006 launch till the June 
2010 hiring of Brian Grey and early 2011 hire of former Salon.com editor King Kaufman as 
Manager of Writer Development, the blog focused on a kind of cheerleading for the identity of 
the site. Co-founder Zander Freund characterized B/R users who “live on the site” as “Bleacher 
Creatures” in such a rah-rah post in 2007:  
 
The Bleacher Creatures are the lifeblood of the Bleacher Report network. Without 
them, the community would collapse at the seams. The Creatures set the tone for 
the network at large. They spark the debates that make Bleacher Report the 
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thriving community that it is. They engage the network’s user base with their 
thoughts and opinions. Overall, they make Bleacher Report the place where 
internet users seeking fan-driven sports journalism want to be. (Freund 2007) 
 
This kind of incitement to act via praise is typical of the early rhetoric of the blog, as is the rather 
shaky writing (“collapse at the seams”). It is important to note that the primary blog authors in 
the pre-Brian Grey and King Kaufman era were the co-Founders themselves Freund, Goldberg, 
Nemetz, and Finocchio (accounting for 51% of all blog posts between 2007 and 2010, not 
individuals trained as writers but rather as entrepreneurs. Hence, their emphasis towards building 
the morale of the platform and its business goals is understandable.  Other posts by writers and 
editors from the site also did the work of morale building and positive PR for the platform by 
promoting new site features, showcasing particular writers, and writing more general posts meant 
to pump up the writer base.   
 
Brian Grey’s hire in 2010 and King Kaufman’s in early 2011 marked a very important new stage 
for B/R, the company and site. Grey’s background at Yahoo and Fox Sports had positioned him 
well to take Bleacher Report into more of a money making direction (Swisher 2010), important 
because B/R had gone through two rounds of venture capital funding by mid 2010 reaching a 
valuation of $8 million, but was looking to raise a significantly larger sum in their series C round 
(Kafka 2010). Also of particular interest was Grey’s position at Silicon Valley VC firm Polaris 
Venture Partners. Sports media industry writer Ben Koo wrote of the hire at the time that the 
“Bleacher Report team is in great hands and their investors must be ecstatic that they have 
someone very well suited to steer the company to a lucrative exit.” Koo also correctly pointed 
out at that this hire was nearly coterminous with a drastic change in the editorial policy of the site. 
(Koo 2010) Although not available on the site any longer and not available through the Wayback 
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Machine,2 a summary of the policy was posted to the blog by co-Founder and then VP of 
Content Finocchio in early June before the Grey hiring was announced. In the post Finnochio 
lays out the basics of the change: writers must now apply to be writers; once they become writers, 
they must “have a cogent writing style, provide detailed analysis, and display solid sentence 
structure and command of the English language”; publishing unsubstantiated rumors, not citing 
sources properly, and crasser forms of aggregation would not be tolerated. (Finocchio 2010) In 
two interviews given around the time of his hire, Grey made special care to mention the new 
“editorial layer” that B/R had installed. (DVorkin 2011; Swisher 2010) After all of these changes 
and Grey’s hire, B/R raised $10.5 million in series C funding on December 20th, 2011. 
(Crunchbase 2015). Also, as Grey mentions in his interview with Lewis DVorkin on the Forbes 
Magazine website, 7000 contributors were going through that “editorial layer,” 1% of which 
were paid (DVorkin 2011). Even more reason for venture capital to fund the site. 
 
With that new money in hand B/R made another major move by hiring Kaufman. Kaufman’s 
introductory post on the site itself, “Bleacher Report: I Don’t Give a Damn About Our Bad 
Reputation”, laid out his bonafides, his goals for the site, and even poked fun at public 
perception of Bleacher Report. After sharing a story about how a writer friend had asked him if 
there was a way he could make his browser refuse to go to B/R, he pledged to spend some time 
just writing like all the other writers at B/R and ended on this note: “If you do know me, you 
																																																								2	The Wayback Machine is an archive of cached website pages operated by the Internet Archive 
that has been in existence since 1996.  Pages are crawled by the Wayback Machine and 
snapshots are taken at semi-regular intervals depending on the traffic on each individual page.  It 
is important to note that these cached pages will not necessarily show a website exactly how it 
appeared when a snapshot was taken. Some sites block web crawling and some elements of the 
page may be reliant dynamic Javascript that requires a live server that an archived page has been 
disconnected from.	
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might guess that I'm excited to be working on one of the frontiers of what a year or two ago we 
were calling the future of journalism, at a startup, a disruptive business that's trying to rethink 
how things are done. I’m hoping this is the start of great conversation”  (Kaufman 2011a). He 
continued that conversation on the company blog. Kaufman posted a statement of purpose for the 
blog: “One of the main jobs of the Bleacher Report Blog is going to be to serve as a kind of 
classroom. I’m hoping it’ll be the good kind. You won’t have to sit still or be quiet and you can 
bring candy” (Kaufman 2011b). This would inaugurate the blog as Kaufman’s podium from 
which to lecture as writing instructor. In the sample of the blog, Kaufman’s posts total 641 of the 
1074 in the sample, 59.79% of all posts, even though his posts come nearly 4 years after the 
inception of the blog.  Kaufman’s posts followed a couple of different templates. His most used 
form was the “Quote of the Day” posts (14.95% of total posts), followed by “How It’s Done” 
(14.71 %) that were more functional and pedagogical in nature, and “Shoutouts” (8.66%) which 
highlighted other writers on the site That the most popular category of all posts on the blog was 
“Writing Tips,” only appearing after Kaufman started in 2011 (32.68% ) is generally indicative 
beyond any specific examples.  Kaufman represented the public face of B/R’s “editorial layer” 
and he meant to make that face a professorial, mentoring one. 
 
By the time of their buyout by Turner Sports on August 3rd, 2012 (Kafka 2012), B/R had taken 
major steps to revamp their reputation. These steps were rewarded with a final funding round in 
August of 2011 totaling $22 million (making a total of $40.5 million in venture capital raised) 
(Crunchbase 2015), a year before the eventual buyout of somewhere between $175 and $200 
million. (Bercovici 2012) Clearly, venture capital and Turner were assured by these steps that 
any content quality questions that might scare off potential advertisers had been dealt with 
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thoroughly. However, B/R’s self characterization and VC’s confidence did not go unchallenged. 
In fact, that challenge has a history almost as long as B/R itself. 
 
The Changing Critiques of B/R 
  
It is undeniable that until throughout much of its pre-and post-buyout existence, B/R was one of 
the most reviled sites in the sports blogosphere. Frequent targets of other blogs like the Gawker 
Media sports site Deadspin, USA Today/MLB Advanced Media property Sports on Earth (run 
by Deadspin Founder Will Leitch) and sports media focused blog Awful Announcing (now part 
of the larger Bloguin network run by Awful Announcing founder Ben Koo), B/R was cited for its 
schlocky content, it’s over use of the slideshow and list formats or “listicles,” the search engine 
optimization (SEO) gaming often associated with the over use of slideshows and listicles, the 
rampant misogyny of such slideshows like “The 20 Most Boobtastic Athletes of All Time” (McD 
2010), and the argumentative yet poorly argued style of many of its writers. This style, like a 
good deal of other “bad” internet based opinion writing has been generally referred to in the past 
few years as the “hot take” (Reeve 2015). Much of that criticism, according to even King 
Kaufman and B/R’s co-founders was justified. Although it is unclear just how much the criticism 
pushed B/R to change and how much was the expressed concern of investors, in the start-up 
world, however, public relations are of paramount importance when seeking to be acquired or 
IPO (Crain 2014). B/R’s shifting standards over the years have often followed on the heels of 
continual negative coverage by other new media sports outlets.  
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Deadspin, whose content model includes a heavy dose of sport media criticism, has written the 
most consistently negative coverage of B/R.  As of mid-2017 there were 39 articles tagged 
“Bleacher Report” on Deadspin.com, nearly all of them harsh critiques.  Deadspin is known for 
its profane editorial stance, but some of its more brutal headlines were reserved for B/R. For 
instance: “Bleacher Report Editors Demand Bleacher Report Writers Be Less Retarded” from the 
Fall of 2010, after the house keeping of the new editorial standards and Brian Grey’s hire, details 
an anonymous former B/R writer’s tip about the changing editorial policy. At the time Deadspin 
editor-in-chief A.J. Daulerio’s lede was indicative of the general tone:  
 
If you are one of those unlucky sports fans who has to slog through Bleacher 
Report's Google-raping SEO "stories" when you do a general news search for a 
topic about an athlete, team, or 
topseventeensidelinereportersthechileancoalminersshouldhavesexwith, this is 
great news. (Daulerio 2010)   
 
Daulerio hits several of the major critiques in the same sentence (SEO gaming, sexism, and 
listicles) and does it with a sort of gleeful disgust. After B/R’s final venture funding round won 
them $22 million in late 2011 future Deadspin editor-in-chief Tommy Craggs posted the 
gleefully dismissive “The 27 Hottest Employees of the Venture Capital Firm That’s Investing 
$22 Million in Bleacher Report: a Slideshow.”  Deadspin, as a competitor, had a very clear 
reason for attacking B/R along content quality lines, arguing implicitly that their readers are 
discerning enough to never sully their days with the pablum being spewed from B/R’s writers. 
The concern was less for the future of sports journalism, since Deadspin as a competitor could 
hold itself up as a more shining example, and more for the state of readers and investors who 
would consider such a thing to be worthwhile. The mockery comes from a place of assumed 
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superiority, specifically that of content and intellect. So in the face of B/R’s meteoric rise and 
continued monetary success, Deadspin chose to mock the people bankrolling that success.   
 
Interestingly, the publicly available record of B/R critiques is relatively blank until 2010. Before 
that most mentions of B/R in the media press are merely accounts of press releases (Koo 2009) 
or hiring moves (Swisher 2010). Other than Deadspin’s coverage, the public critique of B/R 
doesn’t really take off until after the buyout.  First amongst this wave was a long, heavily 
reported piece that made the cover of San Francisco Weekly (Eskenazi 2012). Generally 
characterized as a “hit piece” by several aggregating outlets who picked up the story, the early 
October publishing date makes it clear that most of the reporting for the story happened before 
the buyout and therefore acts as a kind of snapshot of the general displeasure with which a 
majority of the media world viewed B/R during it’s rise to prominence.  However, the piece 
spends ample time where others had not yet, on the gamified and unpaid nature of writing for 
B/R.  Eskenazi writes that “some [writers] earn a monthly stipend many told us was in the 
ballpark of $600” and further quotes a former editor that “estimates that, even with continued 
editorial hiring, at least 90 percent of Bleacher Report's gargantuan writing roster remains 
unpaid.” Or course, contrast that with Brian Grey’s much bleaker figure quoted at nearly the 
same time as 1% of 7,000. Eskanazi’s primary concern, however, is less the low pay or total lack 
thereof, but the lack of autonomy for even writers who have worked their way up the chain.  He 
quotes a Featured Columnist who laments about learning that “his new job largely consisted of 
providing copy for his editors' pre-written headlines” and points out that even the higher profile 
writers hired from outside the system (the first of which, baseball writer Rob Neyer, arrived 
shortly after King Kaufman’s hire) were subject to the same issues (Eskenazi 2012). This 
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concern is still in the vein of the Deadspin critique, however. It does start to approach the issue 
as a problem of labor, but still from a position of assumed superiority of content, a pearl 
clutching at the lack of “real” writing going on.  
 
Starting in 2013, the year after the buyout, criticism of B/R shifted further towards arguments 
about shady labor practices, written without the condescension of the earlier critiques. In early 
2013 Nick Bond, writing for the left of center, more literary style sports outlet The Classical 
(founded in part by the writer Nathaniel Friedman, who wrote under the nom de plume 
Bethlehem Shoals and would briefly be one of B/R’s major outside hires) wrote about his 
experience enrolling in Bleacher Report University, a tutorial program that was the entry point 
for writers going through B/R’s new “editorial layer.” The piece breaks down the “assignments” 
that each new writer has to complete in order to be allowed to start working at B/R and the writer 
highlights specifically the sections of it related to the planning of headlines, keyword focusing, 
and the imperative to have a “take.”  Bond’s detailed and immersive (essentially ethnographic) 
approach allows for a sense of empathy with the person who actually creates the content that 
Deadspin and others so gleefully denounced (Bond 2013). 
 
Secondly, The Bleacher Report Report, an anonymously written blog on Gawker Media’s Kinja 
platform (which experimented itself with the kind of gamified ranking system that B/R used) 
carried a mission statement to “exist solely as an answer B/R’s very powerful PR Machine.” The 
B/R Report is written by “Bleach” who does not disclose his relationship to B/R but structures 
the blog as a place to fact check and critique their PR. Bleach also highlights critical pieces from 
other outlets about B/R. Much of the blog was devoted to this kind of secondary reporting and 
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analysis although it is clear that Bleach has contacts within B/R.  Again, like Bond’s piece for 
The Classical, the focus is on the interior of the institution with several posts devoted to 
internally faced documents like 2013’s e-book Playbook: The Basics of Writing for Bleacher 
Report by the Bleacher Report Quality Control Team and BR’s confidentiality clause (Bleach 
2013b, 2013a). Bleach reports with a generally woeful air of disgusted resignation at B/R 
milestones and achievements.  Bleach’s angle is a critique of B/R’s business model, one whose 
disruptive model had filtered up into the mainstream media, making millions of dollars for its 
founders while it continued paying a miniscule fraction of its content producers.  This anger at 
their labor practices stems not just from a lack of payment (payment for writing on the Internet in 
general is in a deeply degraded state) but because Bleacher Report positioned itself as a gateway 
to the world of sports journalism. Bleach argues that this pedagogical rhetoric to be just, in fact, 
rhetoric; a university brick and mortar façade over a factory of aspiring laborers. 
 
Implications of B/R For a Theory of Disruptive Labor 
 
In an article published by Deadspin entitled “The 200 Ways Bleacher Report Screwed Me Over,” 
former Bleacher Report Featured Columnist Tom Schreier explained how the Featured 
Columnists, the top tier in the gamified ranking system for B/R writers, are themselves tiered:  
You were a FCI, FCII, FCIII, or FCIV. On a page titled "Writer Rankings," 
Bleacher Report wrote that the Featured Columnist I got "Featured placement on 
B/R Team pages; Eligibility for media interviews and credentials for major 
events." At FCII, writers got "a free B/R Featured Columnist hooded sweatshirt." 
Level III Featured Columnists got "an interview for a B/R staff job," and FCIVs 
received "access to a custom-built, author-specific publishing template for all 
articles.“ (Schreier 2014) 
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In this system based almost entirely on page views (not coincidentally the most common metric 
of value that websites use to sell ad space), any mention of payment is missing entirely.  Schreier 
detailed the manner in which B/R’s business model systematically worked to short writers on 
pay while keeping the carrot of possible full time employment in play until the very end.  
Comments on the article were predictably harsh, but a comment from a fellow former BR writer 
posting as “mets31” mirrored Schreier’s experience (this comment was also highlighted on the 
B/R Report). Of note was his very clear distillation of the young writer’s lack of expectation for 
payment and the importance of attention: “I was getting big read counts. I had several articles top 
the 50,000 mark and a couple over 100,000. I could go tell my friends, "Yeah 100,000 people 
just read what I wrote today." That was almost, in my eyes, as good as being paid, and it would 
assuredly lead to me getting a job”(Mets31 2014).    
 
It’s no wonder that companies like B/R either publicly report their writer’s analytics or give them 
to their writers so as to fully cement the notion that the recognition that a writer receives is in 
fact “something.” The quantitative nature of this “something” allows for the hope that after 
accumulating enough of this “something” a tipping point will be reached that leads to paying, 
full time employment. The speculative nature of this labor is akin to what Gina Neff has referred 
to as “venture labor” in her ethnography of late 90s Silicon Alley (Neff 2012), only in the 
intervening 10 years of start-up culture, the stakes have changed. Crowdsourced labor, or what 
Trebor Scholz has evocatively referred to as crowd-milking (Scholz 2014), combined with the 
declining prospects for entry level positions in the fields best suited to crowdsourcing 
(journalism, publishing in general, media production in general), has created a massive surplus 
army of venture laborers. Bleacher Report built a structure to scoop up this labor. They 
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benefitted from a saturated labor market and squeezed it like a sponge. Young people raised on 
lowered expectations, both from the medium and the economic reality were utilized in order to 
run a “lean” start-up, meaning one with as little fixed capital and labor costs as possible (Ries 
2011). B/R’s internally and externally facing discourse normalized the radical extraction of value 
from workers by selling the work experience as both valuable as education and as recognition of 
having been published, a kind of credential resulting from that education.  By utilizing a 
pedagogical tone in its in house blog and ranking its writers via a page view metric, they 
hammered home the connection of between gaining experience and gaining attention. B/R was 
also able to apply the model of experience and attention to sports fandom by capitalizing on the 
devaluation of writing about objects of fandom and by selling itself as a platform where fans had 
a voice that could be noticed, where both the fan experience and fan attention could be seen as 
valuable (if not monetized for fans themselves). Schreier noted that he wrote for B/R initially 
since it positioned itself as locally focused in a way that other large sites wouldn’t or couldn’t.  
This is fitting as B/R’s original stated content model aimed towards depth of localized coverage. 
The reward for the writer here is recognition, not just for them but also for the relevance of their 
team or sport or university or city or region. In addition, B/R leveraged a sense of “community” 
in these fandoms. This community rhetoric folded into the recognition system, allowing writers 
to build prominence within their own niches.  All of that activity was in some way valuable to all 
those who participated in it, just only monetarily valuable to a scant few. Recognition does not 
necessarily and in fact rarely equals payment for writers at B/R.  
 
This is a publisher scraping off the top of an excess of desiring subjects whose desire is for 
recognition, a recognition that works as a credit system (an IOU) for a eventual payment, a desire 
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that makes their labor particularly easy to exploit. That the Featured Columnist’s in-house 
recognition does not culminate in payment is illustrative of this situation. There, in a seeming 
paradox, the taint of having written for Bleacher Report (of having helped build the brand) 
decreases your ability to be paid for writing at Bleacher Report.   The Bleacher Report stigma 
must be overcome by both the writers and management. B/R’s management strategically moved 
towards outside hires and a rebranding made possible by the buyout and entrance into the upper 
echelons of sports media industry. However, daily uniques and page views could not maintain 
their steady growth without a consistent influx of new content. Hence, some kind of work force 
had to be retained that could cover local teams and produce the slideshow page view juggernauts.  
The community centered Newsletter that beat writers like Schreier manually assembled was 
replaced by Teamstream, a mobile app that aggregates AP, ESPN and major newspaper beat 
writer content. The Writer’s Program and B/R blog continued to exist, as did their rhetoric of 
uplift and resume building without an increase in paid positions.  
  
B/R representatives have made numerous attempts to address the issues of payment and in-house 
promotion. The founders generally argue that B/R’s model has been adjusted numerous times, an 
agile business model quick to adapt to changing conditions. Both Bryan Goldberg and Dave 
Finocchio have made references to the “old Bleacher Report” of 2008-2009. (Klimk 2014; The 
Street 2013)  Goldberg theorized one such adjustment: “At launch, it was an open platform. 
Today, it functions much more as a true media company, while still opening the door to some 
talented contributors.” (Goldberg 2013a)This of course is an echo of the old tagline “The Open 
Source Sports Network” from the early days of the site, but following the clearer logic of “open 
platform” that Goldberg lays out here is worthwhile. By using the terminology of “open” and 
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“platform,” Goldberg means to describe a website and content management system that is owned 
privately and funded by venture capital with the aim to monetize the content (platform) but takes 
submission from unpaid (and possibly unvetted) content producers (open).  Goldberg’s use of 
“open” is akin to what Evgeny Morozov has identified as the Trojan horse of a neoliberal regime 
on the Internet, and what in the 90s Langdon Winner and more recently David Golumbia have 
identified under the term “cyberlibertarianism” (Golumbia 2013; Morozov 2014; Winner 1997). 
By claiming “openness” as a value, the radical accumulation of wealth from the activity of 
unpaid labor appears as the fostering of opportunity, the “open platform” is the space from which 
a career can be launched and to curtail that openness would be akin to curtailing freedom. 
Tiziana Terranova’s influential “free labor” argument also applies here (Terranova 2000). As she 
defines it, “free labor” is “voluntarily given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited” (33) and “a 
fundamental moment in the creation of value in digital communities” (36).  Both exploited and 
given, one can also look to an earlier era’s distinction between free labor and slave labor, free 
labor being that which had freedom of movement and opportunity but only “free” when it was 
set into motion by being circulated as waged labor.  In that sense, Terranova’s “free labor” is that 
labor which has the ability to be circulated and the role of the “open platform” is to ensure the 
free circulation of that free and creative labor.  By maintaining an emphasis on “openness” B/R 
linked itself to the cyberlibertarian, open source labor regime that Morozov, Winner, Golumbia, 
and Terranova all cite as being integral to the understanding of the ideology of capital in the 
digital era.  In more practical terms, however, beginning as an “open platform” was necessary 
because the funds were not available to pay writers, a point that Goldberg makes in a column 
ironically titled “Writers Should Be Paid” (Goldberg 2013b). The money that they had was spent 
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on things like the platform itself and putting together an ad sales team.  That is, on an 
infrastructure that allowed for the “openness” of the platform.  
 
When he was hired, King Kaufman said he wanted to work for a “disruptive business.” And he 
did.3 The “open” platform stage of BR is the first stage of the disruptive technology model, one 
constantly evolving and slowing only when a stable, paid workforce emerges (Christensen 2013). 
In this first, disruptive phase, Bleacher Report built a “product” that allowed for the publication 
of “content” without the need for the official employment of the “content producer.”  This 
element of the content management system (CMS), the product, is a very common issue in 
contemporary media organizations as they adjust to the dominant employment policy of 
precarious freelance contracts.  The New York Times, legacy print company of all legacy print 
companies, has said as much about its new CMS Scoop that it rolled out in mid 2014  (Vnenchak 
2014). Bleacher Report’s platform, like a lot CMSs with strong role control and user friendly 
interfaces that restrict access to only the most basic of functions, can swiftly collect a mass of 
content that can be pushed out continuously, again and again, without having to have every 
author in office or have any direct contact with the editorial staff.  However, one of the primary 
indicators of a “disruptive technology” in the literature (Bower and Christensen 1995; McQuivey 
and Bernoff 2013) is the lower quality of the technology itself. It offers fewer features or 
services, and is, at least at first, of far less quality than the product it seeks to disrupt. The 
technology could often  be described as aiming down market, at a group of consumers who do 
not offer enough profitability to warrant attention and R&D outlays from the larger incumbent 
firms in the industry.  The lower-quality, down market character that disruption theory’s 																																																								3	Kaufman	was	laid	off,	along	with	50	other	employees,	in	February	of	2017.	B/R	stated	it	was	going	to	pivot	to	more	video	and	social	media.	(Casselberry	2017)		
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founding father Clayton Christensen outlines as the necessary marker of the disruptive 
technology in this instance is less the platform itself, but the labor and content it affords.  This is 
what could be called “disruptive labor” or the marshaling of lower quality workers who can 
produce a lower quality product that will appeal to a nascent audience afforded by a digital 
platform. This is the monetization of mass amateurization built upon a formula: enough people 
who produce out of “hobby” or “passionate interest” or just a desire for recognition would be 
enticed by an “open platform” that the open platform itself can be the site of monetization.  Once 
that platform is shown to be possibly profitable, venture capital continues to invest in order to 
recruit and train better writers and launch a public relations campaign. This is indicative of the 
second phase of disruption in the literature, a period of swift increase in quality of the product 
due to the influx of capital from sales and investment. In the disruptive labor case, the new influx 
of capital is not spent on wages, but on the infrastructure (the training apparatus and PR). The 
labor is disruptive here because it does more with less as it gets more and more popular. It stays 
“lean.” And what is disrupted is not sports journalism or sports media industry, but sports 
journalists and media workers themselves. 
 
In this way, it is my argument that this model should be distinguished from broader concepts of 
“digital labor” (Fuchs 2014a; Scholz 2012) and Terranova’s “free labor” which are influenced at 
least in part by the Autonomist Marxist conception of the “social factory” (Gill and Pratt 2008) 
and have been mobilized as a way to understand how the “social” of “social media” has been 
made to produce value. The labor of disruptive labor is certainly digitally enabled and is itself a 
form of the monetization of everyday life, just as the sports media industry in general represents 
the colonization of non-work time by capital as outlined in the introduction to this dissertation. 
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However, what distinguishes the disruptive labor of B/R writers is the promise of recognition 
and the possibility of the making of passionate interest into a viable career.  The pedagogical 
nature of the B/R writer’s blog and its gamified ranking system serves to pull potential writers 
into the system and keep them producing with a future in mind.  One of disruption theory’s most 
important theorems is the s-curve of development (Bower and Christensen 1995) in which the 
quality of the technology itself is at first poor, slowly increases, and then rapidly increases 
(ideally surpassing the quality of the technology or service it seeks to disrupt). In the case of 
B/R’s disruptive labor, the pedagogical approach of the B/R Writer’s blog and the “editorial 
layer” put in place were the vehicles through which the initial incremental growth up the 
developmental s-curve was made. With the carrot of possible employment in front of them, 
unpaid content producers produced enough content properly formatted to pull in the page views 
necessary for the second phase of the disruptive labor of B/R: the series of outside hires that B/R 
made starting in 2011 with the hiring of Rob Neyer, a former ESPN baseball columnist.  With 
the venture capital they had secured by the end of their series C round in August of 2011($40.5 
million) and the money from the Turner buyout in 2012 ($175-200 million), B/R now had the 
money to available to hire more and more outside, established professional writers and to 
develop the product that would automate content aggregation from outside the disruptive labor 
pool. This allowed them to reach the exponential growth in quality that is indicative of the 
second phase of the s-curve.  The disruptive laborers themselves, however, are, like the 
technologies produced in the earlier phases of the disruptive technology s-curve, cast aside and 
forgotten.  Instead of “free labor” the disruptive laborers of B/R are more akin to the manner in 
which Christian Fuchs has theorized “digital labor” (Fuchs 2014a). Fuchs argues that digital 
labor is more than the social factory made digital via social media but should be thought as a way 
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to include all of the labor that produces the conditions for that social factory to exist. Disruptive 
labor does not exist solely as “voluntarily given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited” but is part 
of a chain of labor and its circulation that capital call into existence and then discards when it is 
unneeded.  
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Chapter 3 
Making It Pay to be a Fan: Statistical Fandom, Daily Fantasy Sports, 
and the Financialization of Everyday Life 
In this chapter, I’ll argue that what I call “statistical fandom,” the fan activity that abstracts the 
material accomplishment of sports into numbers, has undergone a trajectory from amateur 
obsession into a quasi-professional field. After some further explication of what I mean by 
“statistical fandom” I’ll trace the outline of its history in the 20th century as it went from the stuff 
of baseball cards and box scores to the obsession of an outsider class of mathematically inclined 
intellectuals to a multi-billion dollar industry fueled by a game within a game.  That game, 
fantasy sports, has become by far the most popular form of statistical fandom. Its most recent 
incarnation, however, has burst onto the scene and quickly become a lightning rod for criticism. 
Much the same way that Bleacher Report represented a new iteration of an increasingly popular 
form of digitally enabled sport fandom, daily fantasy sports (DFS) is a new form of fantasy 
sports that compresses the timeframe of the game, normally mapped onto the majority of the 
season, and ties it to single days or weeks (depending on the sport). DFS comes under a lot of the 
same criticisms that content farms like Bleacher Report did. In theory, they offer excitement and 
opportunity for the participant. In reality, they are often exploitive and operate under terms of 
service that by nature value the interests of the platform over that of the user. Like Bleacher 
Report relied on speed and volume to grab precious eyeballs, DFS relies on the speed and 
volume of its model to leverage statistical understanding of sport into profit. Just as Bleacher 
Report and the discursive fan labor it made profitable could be understood through the business 
ideology of disruption, DFS and the statistical fan labor it calls forth can be understood through 
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the lens of what many scholars have identified as financialization. Financialization, or the 
inclusion of financial logics into the fabric of social life, is not as much a clearly stated theory of 
business as disruption. Rather, it is a description of the manner in which an activity or time or 
knowledge that was once thought to be unproductive or unprofitable is reframed and reformatted 
as always already potentially valuable.  Just as disruption tries to predict what will undo a stable 
market and then invests in order to profit from that prediction, financialization supposes the 
measurability of all things and attempts to take those measures and profit from them.   
 
My case studies for this chapter are the daily fantasy sports companies DraftKings and their main 
competitor and oft-rumored merger partner FanDuel. There are numerous other DFS companies 
in operation and many of the major season long platforms have dabbled in DFS, but DraftKings 
and FanDuel are the acknowledged leaders, both in market share and in general public 
consciousness. This is primarily due to their status both as first to market (which greatly affected 
the amount of capital they could raise) and their ad blitz at the beginning of the 2015 NFL season. 
This ad blitz, in particular its ubiquity during nearly every NFL broadcast during the first four 
weeks of the season, would garner unwanted attention for the companies from many state 
regulatory and legal bodies across the country. This ubiquity paired with a coterminous scandal 
involving employees from the competing companies engaging in play on each others platforms 
with what seemed like insider knowledge combined to bring the full scrutiny of state 
governments down on DFS. Through a visual discourse analysis of those ads and an examination 
of the legal reaction to DFS, I’ll show that the DFS providers and their government foils’ 
argument around whether DFS constitutes a game of skill or a game of chance reveals a deeper 
relationship between fantasy sports and statistical fandom writ large’s financialized logic. 
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Following from that debate, I’ll investigate what the stakes for both the state and the players 
themselves are in this distinction between what Roger Caillois referred to as agon and alea. The 
importance of this debate is not just one of regulation but of the very ideological underpinnings 
of fantasy sports itself. Ultimately, I’ll argue that statistical fandom and the advent of DFS both 
represent the financialization of everyday life. 
 
A Brief History of Statistical Fandom 
It is important to situate the statistical relationship to sport in the general push towards 
quantification that thinkers like Michel Foucault and Ian Hacking have identified as the one of 
the defining characteristics of modernity. (Foucault 1995; Foucault et al. 2009; Hacking 1990) 
Either by measuring individual bodies and their performances against a statistical norm or using 
that statistical norm to manage populations at a distance, statistical thinking is essential to both 
the individualizing and the generalizing tendencies of modernity’s drive towards the 
objectification of human activity.  As Hacking points out, however, the marked increase in 
quantification in the 19th century had a practical, material basis: an “avalanche of printed 
numbers. […] Before the Napoleonic era most official counting had been kept privy to 
administrators. After it, a vast amount was printed and published.” (Hacking 1990:2) The 
physical keeping of records and the sharing of those records with the public combined with the 
growing bureaucratic apparatuses of burgeoning new nation states that crafted new categories 
with which to classify and observe their populations to fully push the ideas of probability and 
social norms into the mainstream of Western thought by the early 20th century.  It is in this 
context of the prediction of outcomes and the management of populations that statistical sport 
fandom is born. 
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Statistical fandom, like all statistical thinking, is a process of abstracting quantities from qualities 
for the purposes of evaluation. Sports lends itself particularly well to this as the qualitative 
aspects of sports are so easily quantified. Results occur after finite actions, all of which can, 
ostensibly, be recorded and quantified. In simpler terms, once we start keeping score, statistical 
fandom is born. The box score and then later the baseball card are the earliest forms of publicly 
available statistics, printed numbers as Hacking would say, functioning as analog databases with 
which to access sporting events either unseen or remembered. The Elias Bureau, the venerable 
institution of sports statistics founded in 1913 by Al and Water Elias, sold baseball scorecards 
with player and team statistics directly to fans and then to the New York Telegram before 
becoming the official statisticians for most professional baseball leagues by 1919. By mid-
century, Elias was the official record keeper for all the major sports leagues in the United States. 
(International Jewish Sports Hall of Fame n.d.; Jennings 1996; Kaufman 2009) But by the 1970s, 
Elias’s stranglehold on how the data of sport was circulated would be challenged from an 
unlikely outsider source.  
 
As Elias grew its monopoly on statistical sports knowledge, the nature of its monopoly became 
apparent to a man named Bill James. Freshly out of the Army and working as a night shift 
security guard in Lawrence, Kansas, James published his first article in Baseball Digest, 
“Winning Margins: A New Way to Rate Baseball Excellence” in 1975 and began what would be 
one of the most influential careers in sports. (Gray 2006:25-26) However, even in his early days, 
before he began publishing the popular Bill James Baseball Abstract series, before he began 
consulting on salary arbitration hearings, before he became the mascot of a statistical fandom 
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movement known as Sabermetrics, James found himself at odds with Elias. When James began 
researching work that would be come the original 1977 Bill James Baseball Abstract (the first of 
12), he reached out to Elias: “At first I couldn’t get an answer from them, and when I did, it was 
along the lines of ‘We don’t deal with people like you.’” (Gray 2006:30)  James trudged on, 
getting his statistics from directly calling baseball teams and self-calculating from newspaper 
box scores. As he wrote in an early Abstract “the answers that I arrive at  - and thus the methods 
I have chosen – are never wholly satisfactory, almost never wholly disappointing. The most 
consistent problems that I have arise from the limitations on my information sources. All I have 
is the boxscores.” James’s primary complaint with Elias, however, was economic: “The problem 
with the Elias Bureau is that the Elias Bureau never turns loose of a statistic unless they get a 
dollar for it.” (quoted in Lewis 2011:82)  
 
Data collection is a time consuming business and James’s only recourse was to leverage the 
community of amateur scholars of baseball statistics that had coalesced around himself and the 
Society for Baseball Research (SABR est. 1971) to help further the quest for what James referred 
to as “objective knowledge about baseball.” (McGrath 2003) As a network of baseball scholars, 
they set out to solve the problems of data that Elias refused to elucidate.  As James’s profile 
began to get larger (national coverage of the Abstracts had started by 1981) his feud with Elias 
even elicited an on the record response from Elias CEO Seymour Siwoff who told the St. 
Petersburg Independent’s Glenn Miller “Bill James needs an education” and that the painstaking 
detail that James believed Elias had the power to record was actually beyond their scope. (Miller 
1984:5-C) Siwoff was responding to the James helmed Project Scoresheet, a grassroots volunteer 
network created to collect more advanced baseball statistics. The project’s participants would go 
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to games or watch them on television and keep score with custom score sheets. James saw the 
enforced scarcity of statistics as an illogical attempt to limit objective knowledge and envisioned 
that upon Project Scoresheet’s birth “all previous measure of performance in baseball [would] 
immediately become obsolete, and an entire universe of research options [would] open up in 
front of us” further arguing that “there is no need for the next generation to be as ignorant as we 
are.” (Quoted in Miller 1984:5-C) For James, this was a benevolent process that furthered 
baseball knowledge for fans, players, teams, broadcasters, or anyone who had in an interest in 
the optimization of the game. To be sure, Elias’s relationship with MLB (and other leagues) and 
the leagues’ relationships with amateur and competing professional statistical operations was less 
than friendly, but Siwoff was correct in that James’s major issue with both MLB and Elias was 
less about a lack of sharing and more about their method. Project Scoresheet wasn’t so much 
liberating records from a money hungry partnership as it was creating a whole new approach to 
the understanding of the game.  That method, however plagued by the disorganization that was 
sure to stem from a pre-Internet volunteer network of amateur statisticians, was able to collect 
data systematically and innovate enough that many of its network volunteers went on to help 
propel Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Systems (STATS) into a major competitor for Elias’s 
market share and a partner with leagues themselves.  As will become clear later, STATS, aside 
from its association with the godfather of statistical fandom and one of the major inspirations for 
fantasy sports, has a major role in the development of fantasy sports because of a legal precedent 
it set in the mid 1990s.  However, for now it is important to recognize that James, Project 
Scoresheet, and STATS’s shared goals were to challenge what they saw as a paucity of data, data 
that could deepen the understanding of sports in general. This effort to increase the amount and 
types of statistical categories in order to proliferate the number of possible analyses of sport is 
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made much easier once the computer is introduced to that effort, and is made infinitely easier 
when the internet is introduced. As that proliferation is made available at a mass level, it 
influences other statistical forms of fandom, one in particular that became a major industry: 
fantasy sports. 
 
The use of statistics and probabilities to create epiphenomenal sports based games is not unique 
to fantasy sports nor does it require computerization. Baseball board games, known collectively 
as “tabletop baseball games” in the industry, date back to the 19th century. However, the first 
game to really simulate game play was released in 1930 as “National Pastime.” National Pastime 
began the tradition of using actual statistics from real players to weight the probabilities of 
certain game outcomes as determined ultimately by a dice throw. In the post war era, these 
games gained more popularity with more famous names like All-Star Baseball and Strat-o-matic 
Baseball appearing in the 50s and 60s and selling well. (Baseball Games 2017) James himself 
played Ball Park (Gray 2006:30), a version that took the dimensions of stadiums into account. 
All these games have a common basic structure where past season(s) statistics are used as 
probabilities from which an element of chance like a wheel spin or a dice roll determines an 
outcome, generally a single game and all its events.4 However, an early Bill James acolyte and 
journalist would in 1980 establish what was the first form of what would later become know as 
fantasy sports. 
 
The Development of Fantasy Sports 																																																								4	According	to	tabletopbaseball.org	Sports	Illustrated	Pennant	Race	(debuted	in	1981,	discontinued	in	1984)	was	the	only	tabletop	game	that	dealt	with	simulating	game	outcomes	in	relatively	few	dice	rolls	and	was	geared	more	towards	simulating	entire	seasons.		(Tabletop	Baseball	n.d.)	
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The history of fantasy sports is generally traced to a game called “The Baseball Seminar” run by 
sociologist William Gamson where participants would choose a roster of players who “scored 
points based on their final standing in batting average, RBIs (runs batted in), wins, and ERA 
(earned run average). When Gamson taught at the University of Michigan, one of the seminar’s 
participants, a professor named Bob Sklar, taught a young student named Daniel Okrent who 
would go on to found what would become a multi-billion dollar industry. (Schwarz 2005:175) 
The Rotisserie Baseball League, so named in homage to La Rotisserie Francais a defunct eatery 
in Manhattan where the league was first formed over lunch, held its first draft in the spring of 
1980. Okrent, the self-appointed commissioner of the league, had been one of the 75 buyers of 
the original 1977 Bill James Baseball Abstract, purchasing it after seeing an ad in the classified 
sections of The Sporting News. (Lewis 2011:81)  He had also written what would have been the 
first national feature on James in 1979 until Sports Illustrated killed the story because its 
statistical narrative was rejected by the fact checkers because, according to Okrent, James’s 
analysis was counter to too much received baseball wisdom. (Lewis 2011:86) The structure of 
the first league resembles most modern day season long fantasy leagues regardless of sport: a 
group of people come together and “draft” a group of available players (mostly all players in a 
certain league in a certain sport), those players would fill out a league member’s team, and then 
those teams would compete against each other by dint of the aggregate statistics of each team. In 
some formats, there is a win/loss record from weekly matchups, in some others year long 
statistical aggregates of a team is the measure of success.  The first league was the latter.  In the 
book that the Rotisserie League members would write that would begin the popularization of the 
game, they laid out an “Official Constitution.” 20 pages long, it had rules for roster composition, 
trade regulations, dues fees, imaginary player salaries, and most importantly required statistical 
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categories.  One of those statistics was Okrent’s own creation: WH/IP or Walks and Hits over 
Innings Pitched, a different methodology for assessing pitcher effectiveness than the standard 
earned run average (ERA) that is effectively runs allowed per nine innings pitched. (Waggoner 
1990) WH/IP continues to be used to this day. 
 
Rotisserie League Baseball: The Greatest Game For Baseball Fans Since Baseball, published in 
1984, makes it clear that roster management and statistical intrigue were both the most exciting 
and challenging aspects of their newly created game. Okrent writes in his introduction to the 
book: “It wasn’t enough to watch baseball, or to study it in the boxscore and leaders lists: we all 
wished, in some way, to possess it, to control it.” (Waggoner 1990:4) This desire to possess the 
game is roughly translated into two related major themes throughout the book, subsequent 
interviews and profiles of the league, and the ESPN produced documentary Silly Little Game. 
First, the league was intended to mirror the structure of the business of baseball, ie. by turning 
each member into what in most sports is the position of the general manager. Second, in order to 
perform this general manager position all those involved had to be obsessed, willing to withdraw 
from all social niceties and obligations in order to maximize their baseball knowledge.  To wit, 
from the book: “As a Rotisserie League owner, you begin each day with the morning paper, 
much like a normal person. But while more stable readers causally scan the news and go about 
their business, you turn straight to the sports page to confront the facts that will make or break 
your day.” (Waggoner 1990:107) This professional roleplaying combined with obsessive fan 
attachment found a natural common ground with statistics.  The management of bodies at a 
distance, even at the level of simulation, is made possible by the statistic and the abstraction from 
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the original events whose records make up the statistic. Like all management since Taylorism, 
the Rotisserie League broke up the labor of baseball into individual, measureable chunks 
 
That provenance of fantasy sports seems so clear cut and has such a specific origin story owes 
less to a provable “first to market” record and more to the fact that Okrent and his group were 
very well connected journalists and editors.  By early 1981, Okrent had written about the league 
for Inside Sports (run by John Walsh, who would go on to be the architect of ESPN’s flagship 
show Sportscenter) and the New York Times (Ferretti 1980) and the NBC’s Today Show had 
already reported on the league in its inaugural season. (Jansen and Kurland 2010) With the 
publication of Rotisserie League Baseball in 1984, they had solidified their place in the canon. 
However, they were never ever able to solidify their place in the market. By the late 80s, the 
game had taken off nationwide and cease and desist letters from the original group in defense of 
the name “Rotisserie League Baseball” were met with the simple solution of calling the new 
game something different: fantasy baseball. (Jansen and Kurland 2010) As publications like 
USA Today and the Sporting News put out daily and weekly compilations of box scores and 
statistics for all of MLB, there was nothing stopping other enterprising individuals from offering 
advice and analysis for the obsessive fans of fantasy baseball. By the late 1980s, fantasy had 
expanded into football and numerous writers and publishers had gotten into the game, even 1-
900 lines had opened up shop to sell advice for $2 a minute. (Schwarz 2005:176) 
 
As the late 80s and early 90s were coterminous with a major boom in personal computing and 
the mid 90s would bring the Word Wide Web, fantasy’s relationship to computing and the 
Internet would become very important.  The major labors of the early fantasy league participants, 
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compiling their own stats, served as a significant barrier to entry for most potential players. The 
level of time commitment was just too much for average fans. Fantasy sports would remain a 
relatively niche interest even if that niche was by the early 90s over a million players strong. 
Internet access would change this forever. The access to easily sortable stats and self-published 
advice made the game even easier to play and the Internet’s ability to bring people together from 
all over the world made it easier to find other participants.  As Internet access increased 
exponentially beginning in the late 90s, so too did fantasy’s uptake resulting in a fantasy sports 
player base of nearly 15 million by the beginning of the new millennium. (Fantasy Sports Trade 
Association n.d.) 
 
This explosion brought about changes and challenges to the burgeoning industry. The first legal 
challenge was centered around the statistics themselves. In NBA v. Motorola, (United States 
Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit 1997) the NBA sued Motorola and STATS, Inc for 
making its Sportstrax paging device which offered real times stats and game results straight to 
mobile phones. The crux of the league’s argument was that statistics represented the league’s 
intellectual property, making Motorola and STATS, Inc’s use of them a violation of copyright. 
Had the NBA won the case, this would have spelled doom for the fantasy sports industry writ 
large. If leagues owned the rights to the stats and could sell them at prices that they determined, 
they could effectively push out any competitors. The NBA lost the case, however, in the federal 
appellate courts in 1997 as the court found that only the broadcast of the games were eligible for 
copyright and that the statistics were, like written reports from the games themselves, merely 
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facts of the game.5 A ruling that found that statistics were the intellectual property of leagues 
would have crippled the burgeoning fantasy sports industry. This narrow miss of a death blow by 
established sport capital woke the fantasy sports industry up. 
 
Partly in response to NBA v. Motorola and partly due to concerns about state legislative efforts to 
associate fantasy sports with gambling, the Fantasy Sports Trade Association was founded in 
1998 at the Fantasy Insights Convention during a meeting amongst major stakeholders in the 
industry ((Fantasy Sports Trade Association n.d.) The FSTA functions as an industry lobby, “the 
voice for the companies that provides services, news, information, and competition to support the 
growing fantasy sports industry.” (Fantasy Sports Trade Association 2017) As lobbies generally 
do, this voice generally speaks to lawmakers and seeks to secure beneficial legislation.  The 
FSTA’s most prominent win in this regard was the provisions for the legalization of fantasy 
sports at the federal level written into the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (or 
UIGEA) of 2006.  (31 U.S.C. §5362 2006)  
 
UIGEA’s primary focus was on the regulation of online gambling, specifically online poker 
which was booming during the early 00s.  However, as fantasy sports had been subject to 
legislative attempts to lump it in with more traditional sports gambling , the FSTA saw the act as 
a moment in which to put into federal legislation a clear distinction between fantasy sports and 																																																								5	Litigation	of	this	nature	would	continue,	however,		as	C.B.C	Distribution	and	Marketing,	Inc	
v.	Major	League	Baseball	Advanced	Media	(November	2007)	shows.	The	case,	in	which	MLBAM,		a	subsidiary	of	MLB,	was	given	an	exclusive	contract	by	MLB	to	carry	statistics	and	subsequently	sent	cease	and	desist	letters	to	all	companies	providing	statistics	to	fantasy	baseball	providers.		The	court	found	in	favor	of	CBC,	arguing	that	like	in	NBA		v.	
Motorola	the	statistics	were	publicly	available	information,	and	extended	NBA	v.	Motorola	to	call	this	a	first	amendment	issue.	The	FSTA	filed	an	amicus	brief	in	the	case	on	behalf	of	CBC.	(United	States	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	Eighth	Circuit	2007)	
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sports gambling. To that end, they were able lobby for what has been known as “carve out” 
(Fantasy Sports Trade Association n.d.)  language that exempted fantasy sports from regulation 
and allowed providers and participants to argue against new state regulation. Under section 
101.6.ix, the act exempts from regulation “participation in any fantasy or simulation sports game” 
as long “all winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge and skill of the participants and are 
determined predominantly by accumulated statistical results of the performance of individuals 
(athletes in the case of sports events) in mulitiple real-world sporting or other events.” (31 U.S.C. 
§5362) This crucial distinction between the game of chance (gambling) and the game of skill 
(fantasy sports) and the intellectual property cases decided in the FTSA and the industry’s favor 
by 2007 combined with a rapidly expanding mobile market to ensure a relatively stable industry 
that overcame a mid-2000s decline (estimated 15.2 million players in 2003 and12.6 million by 
2005) to achieve explosive growth in the latter part of the decade (18 million in 2006 and 32 
million in 2010). (Fantasy Sports Trade Association n.d.) By the end of the 00s, fantasy sports 
had become a part of the public consciousness. Every major sports media outlet devoted at least 
some print space or TV time to fantasy related content. The major digital sports media players 
like ESPN, Yahoo, CBS Sports, and the leagues themselves had set up fantasy platforms that 
managed millions of leagues for football, baseball, basketball, hockey, and even sports like 
racing and golf. Secondary advice sites were popping up and a scripted cable television show 
centered a group of friends and their fantasy football league (fittingly if not blandly called The 
League) ran for seven seasons. Fantasy sports were now part of mainstream American sporting 
and popular culture. 
 
Daily Fantasy Sports Enters the Market 
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After growing its participant base by 30% in the first 5 years of the 2010s, 2015 saw a dramatic 
increase in fantasy player activity with a one year 37% increase from 2014 (41.5 million players) 
to 2015 (56.8 million players). (Fantasy Sports Trade Association n.d.)This increase can be 
directly attributed to the development of a new type of fantasy sports game, daily fantasy sports 
or DFS, and the aggressive entry into the market DFS companies executed in the early fall of 
2015. This aggressive entry, characterized by the ubiquitous ad blitz that leading DFS companies 
DraftKings and Fanduel unleashed on the sports watching world during the first four weeks of 
the 2015 NFL season, drew enormous attention to an already fast growing sector of fantasy 
sports industry. The differences between traditional, season long fantasy and DFS are many and 
go beyond the self-explanatory difference in temporality wherein a contest cycle in DFS is either 
a single day of games (baseball, basketball, hockey) or a week’s worth of games (football).  
Season long and DFS also differ in the amount and kinds of game types. In season long, there is 
some variation in how the scoring is set and how rosters are assembled but generally there is a 
certain quorum of teams in a league (generally 8) and contests are won either as a season long 
measure of aggregate stats or a season long wins and losses tally of weekly head to head 
matchups. In DFS, however, there are multiple different kinds of games to be had. Both 
DraftKings and Fanduel offer head to head matchups that users are either assigned at random or 
choose themselves (allowing for users who know each other to matchup), slightly larger pools of 
players like in season long, or large contests of more than 100 and often over 1000 or 10,000 
participant entries. The latter game type exists for season long as well, but are generally large 
sponsored events, not embedded in the basic gameplay itself. Although both season long and 
DFS are played for money, the handling of money is a major difference between season long 
providers and DFS providers. Major season long platforms like those run by Yahoo! and ESPN 
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do not generally offer dues paying services. DFS providers, however, generally allow for money 
processing in app, as the money for contest entry is the basis of the profit model for DFS. This 
aspect of the DFS business model will be discussed more at length below, but all of the above 
differences combined to give early entrants into the DFS market Draftkings and Fanduel 
significant enough points of distinction to convince venture capital to invest over $1.1 billion in 
the two companies even in an already crowded fantasy sports marketplace.  Before we look at 
the controversies that erupted around DFS in 2015 and 2016, a brief summation of Fanduel and 
Draftkings history up to those points will be useful as a way to further situate DFS in the broader 
history of the political economy of fantasy sports. By examining why Draftkings and Fanduel 
came to dominate the DFS industry, specifically who contributed that $1.1 billion and why, we 
can get a clearer picture of how the relatively stable and lucrative fantasy sports industry became 
such a flashpoint of controversy and legislative interest. 
 
The founders of FanDuel were initially not interested in DFS. Their original business was called 
Hubdub, an “online parlor for playful betting on the news.”  Betting on non-sports outcomes is a 
relatively common occurrence in the United Kingdom (Fanduel’s founders are Scottish), as odds 
on presidential elections in the US in the large UK betting houses are regularly reported in the 
US press. However, Hubdub used ‘Hubdub US dollars,” a fake currency that had no real world 
value and merely served a social ranking function for the users of the site.  However, as Hubdub 
had no discernible business model, CEO Nigel Eccles pivoted towards fantasy sports, 
specifically mobile fantasy sport as the market wasn’t “particularly mobile friendly as at time 
[2008-9] when the smartphone and accompanying app ecosystems were starting to snowball.” 
(Sawers 2016) After a time running both Hubdub and Fanduel as a joint business, Eccles and his 
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team dropped Hubdub altogether, shuttering the site in 2010.  Although FanDuel was not the first 
daily fantasy sports site, the focus on mobile gave them an early advantage. Virtually unknown 
at this time in the US, doing the vast majority of its business in the UK, its Series A (2009) and B 
(2011) venture capital rounds where funded by entirely UK firms.6 This is not necessarily 
strange as online gambling is not illegal in the UK. It was not until late 2012/early 2013 and its 
Series C round ($11 million) that it found investors state side. Leading this round was Comcast 
Ventures, the venture capital wing of the Comcast Corporation, the world’s largest media 
corporation and cable service and internet provider, owner of national cable television stations 
including the NBC Sports Network, the Comcast Sportsnet regional cable sports network (now 
called the NBC Regional Sports Networks), broadcast giant NBC, the NHL’s Philadelphia Flyers, 
and until 2011 the NBA’s 76ers.  Comcast’s deep presence in sports media capital made their 
interest in this new form of fantasy sports unsurprising, but it would mark just the first of many 
investments that firms with ties to sport and sport media capital would make. As discussed above, 
however, this relationship to fantasy sports is a marked reversal from the previous stance. Instead 
of trying to sue FanDuel after they had built a successful business (in CBC v. MLBAM, the 
plaintiff had waited till a third contract with the defendant had expired to sue under copyright 
grounds), Comcast engaged with DFS at a very early point. Instead of watching profits leak out 
from under its grasp, they chose to invest and guarantee a share of those potential profits going 
forward.  In the fall of 2014 Series D round of $70 million Comcast once again invested along 
with NBC Sports Ventures (a subsidiary of Comcast). That same fall, the NBA announced a four 
year deal with Fanduel that would make the company the exclusive daily fantasy partner of the 																																																								6	All	venture	capital	round	information	for	both	Fanduel	and	Draftkings	comes	from	each	companies	Crunchbase	profile.	Crunchbase.com	is	database	of	startups	and	the	venture	capital	firms	who	invest	in	them	run	by	technology	industry	publisher	Techcrunch,	which	is	owned	by	AOL.	(Crunchbase	2017a,	2017b)	
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league and would give the NBA an undisclosed equity stake in Fanduel. (Lombardo 2014) This 
further legitimating move from the sports media industry would lead to the July 2015 Series E 
round of $275 million that would fuel Fanduel’s side of the NFL ad blitz. In that round, Comcast 
and NBC Sports increased their investments and Time Warner Investments joined the fray. 
Another investor of note in this round were Tusk Ventures, a firm that “strategically invests in 
high-growth technology startups operating in highly-regulated industries” (Cruncbase 2017), 
revealing an understanding already that DFS was dangerously close to gambling, a highly-
regulated industry. By the 2015 ad blitz, FanDuel had raised $361.2 million in capital and signed 
a strategic partnership with the NBA and multiyear sponsorship deals with 15 NFL and 13 NBA 
teams. These were both announced on the heels of the $275 million dollar round.  Eccles noted 
in an interview with USA Today that any trepidation that leagues had about DFS’s relationship 
to gambling (an early admission of problems to come) had been quickly and surprisingly eased: 
“It’s amazing. It’s surprised us how quickly everything moved.” (Atkins 2015; Schrontenboer 
2015) The impact of the sports media industry’s investment into Fanduel was surely a factor here 
and coming into the 2015 NFL season, Fanduel was riding high even with the murky nature of its 
legal outlook looming. 
 
Draftkings entered into the DFS market three years after Fanduel in 2012. By then there were 
already at least 15 different daily fantasy providers, so Draftkings was entering at time where 
venture capital was open to the idea of DFS being profitable.  In an early interview cofounder 
Matthew Kalish argued, “Estimates are that there are something like 30 million fantasy sports 
players, and only about 50,000 of them have tried daily so far. That’s a huge opportunity.” 
(Kirsner 2012) Starting out as only baseball but moving quickly onto other sports by 2013, by 
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early 2014 they had raised $76.4 million and had established themselves in the market, reporting 
50,000 daily users. At this point, it trailed only FanDuel in daily users. Attempting to catch up, it 
later that year acquired competitor DraftStreet reportedly increasing its user base by 50%. 
(Business Wire 2014) As FanDuel had in 2014 with the NBA, DraftKings also signed an 
exclusive deal with the NHL and followed that deal up with a similar 2015 deal with MLB. 
(Schrontenboer 2015)  Also like FanDuel, their summer 2015 venture capital round was a 
blockbuster full of sports media industry companies and their venture capital wings. Leading that 
round was Fox Sports who invested $150 million for an 11 percent stake. Fox Sports was half of 
the $300 million round while other sport media capital investors were MLB Ventures (MLB’s 
venture capital arm), the NHL, New England Patriot owner Bob Kraft’s The Kraft Group, Major 
League Soccer (the top tier North American soccer league), and Melo7 Tech Partners LLC, a 
small venture firm founded by then New York Knicks small forward Carmelo Anthony. An 
owner, three leagues, a big 4 broadcaster and an athlete. A very complete round. However, 
reports earlier that July had linked DraftKings and Disney (parent company of ESPN) in a $250 
million dollar investment deal. In exchange for this deal DraftKings would commit to $500 
million worth of advertising. (Ramachandran and Sharma 2015) ESPN backed out of their end of 
the deal at the last minute, however, and DraftKings only committed to a $250 million ad spend 
starting in 2016  (this deal also fell through before it was set to start in 2016, as well, with ESPN 
agreeing to DraftKings request likely put forth because of the increased scrutiny discussed 
below). (Wagner 2015b) In less than month Fox Sports had stepped in. (Wagner 2015a) Neither 
ESPN nor DraftKings have not commented on why the initial deal fell through but it is likely 
that Disney was spooked by the relative uncertainty of DFS’s legal footing or it was skeptical of 
the business model in general.  
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Regardless, DraftKings now had a venture war chest as large as FanDuel’s and both would enter 
into the last days of the  summer of 2015 with official stamps from some of the largest players in 
sports, ready to spend $200 million dollars combined on television ads alone to grow their 
business. (Kang 2016) Generating as much attention as possible was not just the goal but also an 
urgent necessity.  DraftKings and FanDuel’s business models are dependent on massive scale. 
The need for attention at scale is of course not unique to DFS as this is a requirement across the 
sports media landscape. However, DraftKings and FanDuel’s reliance on the large payout 
contests where an unlimited number of participants pay an entry fee (somewhere generally from 
$5-$25) to compete against each other for large cash prizes (total payouts per contest often 
around $1 million) makes it particularly dependent on scale. If the payouts are guaranteed, then 
for $20 entry fee $1 million cash payout contest, at least 50,000 entries are needed to break even.  
If scale is achieved, however, the real profit for DFS lies in the spread between what’s paid into 
the house and what’s paid out. DFS providers do pull in transactions fees for head to head games, 
but the spread between total entry fee and total payouts is the bread and butter of the industry. 
And these flashy payouts increased at very rapid rates. For example, in 2013 DraftKings paid out 
$50 million  in prizes (Dyal 2014) and another $200 million in 2014. (Lawler 2014) Given that 
only 50,000-75,000 players were on the platform in 2014, that spread was more than likely 
deeply in the negative. Hence, the need to drum up attention and bring in new players was a 
survival necessity. Also, it is clear that the cash infusions that venture capital provided were 
necessary for both Fanduel and Draftkings to stay afloat.  With the 2015 NFL season 
approaching and fantasy football having far outstripped fantasy baseball as the most popular 
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fantasy game for over a decade, it was an obvious move for the DFS companies to blitz the early 
season and prime the pump for rapid growth. 
 
Hence, coinciding with the start of the 2015 NFL season, both Draftkings and Fanduel blanketed 
CBS, FOX, NBC, and ESPN during game broadcast times with a seemingly endless barrage of 
30 and 60 second spots. These ads were intended to produce a new market, one that required 
both playing fast and loose with verifiable claims and taking a comradely, reassuring tone. 
Draftkings and Fanduel required both in order to entice new users into its higher stakes game but 
also to reassure this potential new market that its resemblance to gambling and all the social ills 
that brings were but mere appearances. All the while, representing as diverse as possible a 
potential user base (diversity is good business when it comes to scale) with the need to deeply 
reinforce gender roles and the masculine presentation of heavily invested sports fandom. This ad 
blitz pushed statistical fandom not as statistical per se but as superior knowledge, good natured, 
homosocial domination, and the ecstatic release of victory.  
 
When numbers appear there are always dollar signs in front of them. A string of ads from 
Fanduel took a talking head approach, where actual Fanduel players give short 2-5 second 
testimonials with their names and winnings as captions. (Fig 1) The number amounts vary from 
the $100s to over $2 million. All the winners are men who speak in similar platitudes about “If 
you think it can’t be you, it can be you” and “every single week I can make money on Fanduel.” 
The idea here is a soft “anyone can do it” sell that looks to entice users onto the platform. In 
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“Beat Your Buddies” (Anon 2015d)7 Arman K. (Winnings: $22,298) says “Even a novice can 
come in and spend $1 and win $10,000 or $20,000” directly followed by Chris P. (Winnings: 
$762.388) who says, with a head nod for emphasis “Little bit of time, and a little bit knowledge.” 
	Figure	1:	“Beat	Your	Buddies”	
 	
This emphasis on how little knowledge it takes to make a small investment grow big is tied to a 
related theme in these spots (most of which use the same interviewees like Arman K. and Chris 
P.). the excitement of the playing the game. Once again, Armand K. says “It’s like the best 
adrenaline rush ever.” The excitement and ease are the reasons you should download the free app 
and starting winning immediately. Fanduel also, much more than DraftKings, emphasizes the 
ease of the money transfer. Quick payouts are a common theme, pointing out that money 																																																								7	All	FanDuel	and	DraftKings	ads	were	viewed	and	archived	from	iSpot.tv,	a	website	that	catalogues	television	commercials.	Information	on	directors	and	ad	agencies	was	not	available	for	Fanduel,	but	agencies	for	the	DraftKings	was.	
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wagered on Sunday morning will be deposited to your account on Monday morning.  Again, 
speed and ease.  
 
These testimonials are almost entirely men, and when women do appear they appear as the 
partners of men (Fig 2). One ad featuring Scott H. (Anon 2015c), who appears in other ads and 
has won over $2 million on the app, and his wife Danielle H., Danielle introduces Scott as the ad 
opens and praises him for his winnings. “He turned $35 into over $2 million on Fanduel. Good 
job, baby.” 
 Figure	2:	“Scott	and	Danielle”	The	praise	reassures,	followed	up	in	the	next	shot	by	Danielle	sharing	that	“You	don’t	have	to	make	a	huge	investment	to	get	started	and	I	think	that’s	what	gave	me	comfort.	And	it	worked	out	great.”	Explicitly	addressing	the	risk	of	the	game	and	the	idea	that	wives	will	be	worried	about	money	going	out	the	door	on	sports	betting,	Danielle	and	Scott	give	us	a	feel	
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good	story	of	domestic	happiness	built	off	the	husband’s	instant	success.		This	ad	ends,	like	many	of	this	blitz,	with	the	idea	that	by	not	playing	you’re	missing	out.	
 
FanDuel’s informative campaign was supplemented by a more narrative style documentary ad 
called “Gameday in America.” (Anon n.d.) Opening with shots of highways, cows at pasture, 
and a public park with the caption “Filmed over one Sunday in the United States” the ad plays as 
a day in the life of average American football fans. There is no mention of money here and the 
emphasis is on collectivity, “We join a league, we pick a team, and we compete like never 
before.” Shots of groups (Fig 3) are the norm. This is in direct contrast to the talking head mode 
of the other ads. 
 
Figure 3: “Gameday in America”	
The benevolence of this particular ad came with a promo code (a fixture of all the ads from both 
companies) that promises the refund of the entry fee if you don’t win. The collective, feel good 
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tone of this ad makes us forget about the money, even if we need to be reminded by small print 
that “This is not a gambling website.” 
 
DraftKings ran two distinctly different campaigns in the same manner that FanDuel did. 
The more informative, cash heavy ads are shots of large cash game tournaments, mostly in hotels 
or bars and focused on several individuals were are to understand by their at first nervous 
motions and then exuberant joy as contestants in the large cash games. In the aptly named “Giant 
Check,” (Anon 2015b) nervous contestants are interspersed with jubilant ones (Fig 4) 
	
Figure 4: “Giant Check” 
while a voiceover says “At DraftKings we play for glory, for bragging rights, for fantasy football 
supremacy. But we also play for this: the giant check. The giant check is no myth, no mirage no 
fools gold, it’s our trophy. And many hoist it playing our one week games.” The voice over then 
lists out the names of actual winners, one assumes the same individuals featured in the ad. This 
nod to the “glory, bragging rights, and supremacy” pits the money ($10 million total prizes a 
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week) against the more social prizes, foreground the reality of the winners and their joy and their 
giant checks. Whereas the Fanduel informative ads worked as a kind of soothing, smoothing 
agent to ease entry, this ad functioned in the same register as a movie trailer, hyping the potential 
players up for the excitement and profit ahead.  
 
The other more information based Draftkings ads were decidedly more stylized, although also 
focused on the large payout winners.  Structured around a spokesman type actor, dressed in a 
“DraftKings” blazer, vest and tie, seated in a large wingback chair in a marbled hall  (Fig. 5), the
 
Figure 5: “Milking a Two-Legged Goat	
“Hall of Fame” series has the actor speak in a smirking style about the legendary winnings of 
Draftkings players.  In “Milking a Two-Legged Goat” (Butler, Shine, Stern & Partners 2014) our 
spokesperson assures that “Fantasy football isn’t over, in fact the winnings are still legendary. At 
least they are if you still play at DraftKings.com.” No mention of actual numbers just “giant cash 
	 71	
prizes every week” and “a shot to win millions.” The over the top preppiness of the spokesperson 
evokes a confident, fraternity type of atmosphere that implores the viewer to be as crassly erudite 
as the spokesman and play DFS at Draftkings and start making money. To miss out would be 
stupid.   
 
The “Hall of Fame” series functioned as a kind of halfway point between the more informative, 
large contest focused games and the most narrativized of the 2015 ads, a series of four 30 second 
spots (three voiced by actor Ed Norton) that focus not on money but the sociality of DFS.  In 
“Only One Bull,” (Figure 6) (Butler, Shine, Stern & Partners 2015b) four friends (3 white, 1 
black) are watching a game at local sports bar while the background music plays flamenco guitar.  
	Figure	6:	“Only	One	Bull”	
“Food, football, and fantasy. What it’s all about. This is a Draftkings league among friends, but 
there’s room for only one bull in this ring.” While the others celebrate one man remains stoic 
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while another (the man on the far right) quickly becomes unsure. Then these two make eye 
contact. The stoic man shows the uncertain man his phone and it is clear that he has beaten the 
unsure man. He nods and then takes the french fries away from the unsure man, squeezing 
ketchup on them and maintaining eye contact. This kind of friendly homosocial domination and 
the dogged focus of the stoic man is typical of this run of ads.  	
 
In “The Sleeper”  (Figure 7) our protagonist walks through a suburban backyard party, focused 
on only his phone.  
 
	
Figure 7: “The Sleeper” 
Ignoring everyone at the party walking through a volleyball game, stopping only to consult his 
“Uncle Vito” (a seemingly bizarre nod to Italian mobster bookie knowledge), the narrative 
concept of the ad is that the “Sleeper”, the player no one else chooses but you and that becomes 
the difference that makes you win. The ad closes with our protagonist in a respectful moment of 
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eye contact with a man holding his phone in one hand and his infant baby strapped to him, each 
man trying to find their sleeper pick. Wordless camaraderie in the quest to win. In both ads, the 
men are silent, focused not on their surroundings but with the game itself. 
 
In “Welcome to the Big Time,” (Butler, Shine, Stern & Partners 2015a) a more group narrative is 
used. Like “The Sleeper” the focus is on the addition of DFS into the everyday. This time 
however we see not individual scenes but scenes of everyday life in aggregate. The fanatical 
focus remains however, a man is sprayed in the crotch by a child with a water gun at backyard 
child’s party while he looks at his phone, a man at a wedding pauses behind the wedding party to 
check his phone, a woman checks her phone while jogging, and so on. In the first half of the ad, 
everyone is tense, anticipating. In the second part of the ad, the release comes as people celebrate 
their wins, still oblivious to their surrounds. The man at the child’s party raises his hands, still 
ignoring the child spraying him. A man on the bus celebrates and spills his coffee while 
screaming with delight (Figure 8). The voiceover says, “There’s a game within the game that 
requires a different set of skills. There’s no offseason. This is a play as much as you want 
whenever you want fantasy league. And we don’t just play, we are players. We train. And we 
win.” The tension in the beginning is the “training,” the preparation.  Playing as much as we  
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Figure 8: “Welcome to the Big Time” 
want whenever we want is the entrance into the quotidian that the ad shows. The rhetoric of the 
“game within the game that requires a different set of skills” functions to equate the DFS 
participant as on par with the athlete, “”We don’t just play, we are players.” This mirroring of the 
athlete lends both a bit of tongue-in-cheek hyperbole that is indicative of the Draftkings ads in 
general but also hints at the idea that DFS is a kind of profession that like much work in the 21st 
century is mediated by one’s digital devices and never ends.   
 
Picking up on that tendency is “Week One,” (Butler, Shine, Stern & Partners 2015c) which 
opens with man getting out of bed, walking down the hall and slapping framed footballs over the 
door entry (a reference to athletes walking out of the locker room on the way to the field), 
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opening his laptop and focusing on picking his team (Figure 9).
	
Figure 9: “Week One” 
The narrator implores us to “showcase your skill and exploit the matchup . . . . You like football, 
you like winning. How about you like them both at the same time and make this week the week 
you get it done.” The second half of ad is the same man on his coach between his friends 
celebrating and taunting one of his friends who it is implied he has beaten head to head.  Again, 
the money is only mentioned not as “money” but as “winning” and the structure of the ad has the 
same preparation-success model that nearly everyone of the ads catalogued here have used. In 
this one, however, the preparation feels like work. Get up, slap your alarm, open your computer 
and fill out the spreadsheet.  As in “Welcome to the Big Time,” our protagonist isn’t just playing, 
he’s a player. But instead of being a player, he’s almost like a worker making “this week the 
week [he] gets it done.” The get it done rhetoric has the same tone as home improvement ads that 
are fixtures during sporting events, as well, a hallmark of weekend hegemonic masculinity. But 
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our protagonist is working not on home improvement, in manual labor, but in intellectual labor. 
Halfway through the ad, he spins in his desk chair and dramatically clicks a button on his 
computer, leaning back to take in the action afterwards. This move is a stereotypical dramatic 
“working at a computer” gesture that evokes in this particular instance the execution of a stock 
market trade. 
 
All these ads taken together drive home several points that are crucial to both the cultural 
understanding of fantasy sports and the trouble that DFS specifically would get itself into 
subsequently. The interplay between the two is instructive, however, as to how DFS understood 
its potential problems with regulators. On the first point, the comradely domination amongst 
obsessive men who become so focused on leveraging their sports knowledge, generally coded as 
either frivolous or useless, against one another is essentially the normative understanding of 
fantasy sports.  The tongue-in-cheek, narrative of the Draftkings ads play this up to absurd levels, 
where absent the mention of the actual money that DFS players stood to gain the prevailing tenor 
is similar to comedic movies whose male leads are lovable idiots who succeed despite 
themselves.  This aspect, combined with the emphasis on collectivity, even if there is agonism 
with that collective, makes for a benevolent experience where fans can congregate and decide 
whose sports knowledge reigns supreme. This is an old trope as Daniel Okrent and the Rotisserie 
League players talk about wasted time and pointlessness.That this kind of activity mirrors the 
work done by executives in sports is eschewed, however, for an identification with the players 
themselves: “We don’t just play, we are players. We train and we win.” This equating of 
statistical fandom with the athleticism itself serves to legitimize DFS as competition, even if it is 
done with a bit of self-conscious hyperbole. The drive of the narrative ads towards friendly 
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agonism and collective experience combined with their general lack of emphasis on money is 
supplemented by the more informative ads that show actual DFS players and their winnings. By 
assuring the potential new DFS participant that with “a little bit of time” and “a little bit 
knowledge” they, too, can be winners, the ads enjoin us to a collective experience of competition 
that is low stakes and fun. The risks involved are low, recall Danielle H’s reassurances, and the 
rewards are so high that we would be foolish to not participate. What is better than the nerves of 
preparation and anticipation and their release in victory?  The testimonial structure of the 
FanDuel ads give an extra credibility to these claims and by giving the viewer a wide range of 
possible winnings totals (David won $579, Bradley won $349, Arman won $22,298, Chris P. 
won $762,388) we see that there are multiple different levels of success in DFS. The bottom line 
for all of these ads is, as FanDuel’s “Win Big” ad tells us, “it can really pay to be a fan.” 
 
However, even before this ad blitz, this assertion was already coming into question. In fact, just 
as news was breaking that ESPN had pulled out from its funding pledge with DraftKings in late 
July of 2015, prominent poker player Ed Miller and senior adviser to McKinsey & Company’s 
division on Sports and Gaming Daniel Singer published an op-ed in the Sports Business Daily 
that pointed out what would be understood by both the general public and state regulators as the 
fatal flaw in DFS’s business model. (Miller and Singer 2015) Titled “For Daily Fantasy Sports 
Operators, The Curse of Too Much Skill” and later expanded into a report on McKinsey’s 
website, the article laid out the damning evidence that many DFS players had no doubt already 
understood. Crucial to the legality of DFS under UIGEA is the distinction of fantasy sports as a 
game of skill (“all winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge and skill of the participants”) 
and not of chance. However, according to Miller and Singer, the essential problem for DFS is 
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“the risk that the skill element of daily fantasy is so high that DFS pros will wipe out recreational 
players in short order.” Or in other words, there is a need for too much skill. They argue that for 
“real-money contests” to catch on and remain sustainable a balance must be struck between skill 
and chance and this balance is absent from DFS. To wit, they offer some rather damning 
statistics: by the writing of the op-ed 91% of player profits from MLB contests had been won by 
1.3% of players. Of that 1.3%, described in gambling parlance in the article as “the sharks,” the 
top 11 players (those who had won the most cash) paid an average $2 million in entry fees” ($22 
million total or 17% of the $129.4 million in total entry fees in that MLB sample) and won an 
average $135,000, a 7% return on investment. The second tier of sharks spent an average of 
$9,100 (23% of entry fees) and won on average of $2,400, a 27% ROI. That the sharks were only 
1.3% of players and accounted for 40% of entry fees necessarily reveals another secret of DFS. 
Although it is arguably humanly possible for 11 players to enter in 17% of total entries manually 
if a sample size was relatively small, in this case, the sample was not. Given that average entry 
fees are relatively low (large guaranteed prize pools, the lifeblood of the industry, have entry fees 
of around $25) and only half a baseball season is represented in the sample (roughly 3 months of 
game days) then the amount of entries to reach an average per person total of $2 million at $25 
per entry is 80,000. Hence, some automation must be involved, meaning that these sharks are 
using algorithms to enter in varying entries. In fact, automation is even more important as the 
nature of lineup arrangement in multiple entry cash pools requires subtle variations. The 
difference between winning and losing in large pool games is the unknown, obscure player, ”the 
sleeper.”8   Algorithms must be written to find the players that maximize the value of the team 
																																																								8 Rosters are constructed with players who are assigned values in dollars by the platform and 
each roster has a consistent but arbitrary value, say $20,000. Each roster has to fill out a certain 
set of players or positions (like season long fantasy always has) and the assorted players cannot 
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and then code must be written to send entries as batches to the DFS platform. Batching these 
entries requires third party API9 access, which is by no means a web based industry standard. 
API access is only allowed when it is profitable to the platform. So, FanDuel and DraftKings are 
making a conscious decision to allow the sharks to write scripts that interact with the app, that 
give them a clear knowledge and volume advantage over the smaller players or fish, because the 
big sharks are putting the most money into the pot.   
 
The fish, on the other hand, are getting taken. According to Miller and Singer they are getting 
negative ROIs. In their typology, the big fish represent 5% of total players and contributed 36% 
of entry fees in the sample at average of $3,600 in and a -31% ROI. The small fish represent 
80% of total players and only 5% of total entry fees with an average spend of only $49 dollars 
and $25 loss,  a -51% ROI but not all that much money in the long run.  Hence the bottom 85% 
of total players are getting taken by the sharks at an alarming rate. In Miller and Singer’s analysis 
the issue here is with the big fish, “They had a staggering loss rate . .  and accounted for 75% of 
losses. […] The entire DFS economy depends on these few players.” When phrased in this way, 
of losses and ROIs and big fish and minnows and sharks, DFS starts to look like one of two 
things. First, it could be construed as a financial market. Miller and Singer suggest adjusting the 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
go over that $20,000 limit. In the dominant daily fantasy game structure, there is no draft of 
available players amongst the pooled participants where each participant has sole possession of a 
player. In large pools, that’s not possible because there aren’t enough players to go around.  It’s 
also entirely possible that a participant would have entered the same team as you, especially if 
several sharks are entering in lineups in automated batches. There is even some debate as to 
whether or not sharks might do this as a strategy to maximize winnings across head to head and 
large pool contests.	(jshilling09	2016)		9 Application programming interfaces or APIs are software protocols that allow one application, 
like a DFS app, to speak to another, in the case here an algorithm built to feed entries into 
another program. 
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pricing system to fix some of the “inefficiencies,” making a direct link between DFS and a 
financialized market. Also, the way that “skill” appears in their analysis is primarily a 
technological advantage, one where the data processing skill of the sharks far outweigh the skill 
of the fish.  This is not dissimilar to the difference between large investment houses or hedge 
finfunds and average individual investors or between the high frequency trader and the day trader. 
All of the larger traders have technological advantages both of speed and of knowledge, just as 
the sharks do. 
 
And this was, in fact, the vision of DFS that started to catch on by October of 2015, that of 
imbalanced, possibly fraudulent market that didn’t deliver on its claims of big cash prizes 
available to anyone with a “little bit of time” and a “little bit of knowledge.” This burgeoning 
realization about Draftkings and Fanduel operating as a shark/fish operation that was possibly 
exploiting the UIGEA loophole too liberally was only reinforced by a scandal that the New York 
Times broke on October 5th of 2015. (Drape and Williams 2015) In their story, they detailed the 
activity of one DraftKings employee who had been engaged in what the Times found “amounted 
to allegations of insider trading.” The accusations revolved around a leak of lineup data for a 
“Millionaire Maker” guaranteed prize pool before the contest had officially started. This leak 
would have given an unfair advantage to anyone who had spotted it before the relevant football 
games had started that Sunday.  The employee claimed that this leak had happened after lineups 
were locked (lineup changes are not possible after the first game of a night or week starts), so it 
was little more than a harmless, after the fact data security breach.  However, it was later 
revealed that this employee had been an active player on FanDuel and had won a similar 
guaranteed prize pool contest that same week and taken home $385,000.   The employee was a 
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“written content manager” meaning that he had access to lineup data on a regular basis before 
lineups were locked in order to write up trends and advice for players on DraftKings.  To go 
back to our sharks/fish dichotomy, the employee was a shark exercising his knowledge 
advantage over the fish at FanDuel.  
 
As the scandal moved from the pages of the Times and rippled throughout the DFS community 
and beyond, it led to an inquiry being filed by New York State Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman’s office on October 6th, the day after the Times story broke, indicating that DFS 
was already on the office’s radar before the official inquiry began.  And it would only get worse 
for DFS, as this knowledge imbalance and concentration of skill at the very top of the food chain 
profoundly troubled the “skill” clause of UIGEA. Hence, the second of the two possible visions 
painted by the shark/fish dichotomy came into view, that DFS had become just another form of 
gambling. While Schneiderman’s office conducted its inquiry, a little over a week later the Wall 
Street Journal reported that the FBI and the Justice Department had opened their own inquiry 
into not the scandal but whether or not DFS writ large was in violation of UIGEA. (Reagan and 
Barrett 2015) On the same day as this report, the Nevada Gaming Control Board determined that 
DFS operators would have to file for gaming licenses in Nevada, in effect labeling DFS as 
gambling. (Draper 2015) As Nevada is one of four states where sports betting is legal with a 
license and is the state with the most prominent gambling industry, the Gaming Control Board’s 
decision sent shock waves throughout the DFS industry. If Nevada thought it was gambling and 
therefore needed to be regulated, than the unregulated era of DFS was more than likely over. 
Whether a fraudulent financial market or, as AG Schneiderman would call DFS “totally 
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unregulated gambling venues” (CBS interview), the industry would have to submit to a wave of 
legal scrutiny. 
 
The New York case progressed from a cease and desist order from AG Schneiderman in 
November of 2015 (Anon 2015a), to a temporary stay on this order shortly thereafter, then to a 
lift of that stay in December (Patten 2015), then to an agreement by DraftKings and FanDuel to 
cease operations in New York until legislation was passed (Terlep 2016), and finally to 
legislation that legalized DFS by late summer 2016. (Gouker 2016a) A rather stunningly rapid 
turn of events that was seemingly set off by the ad blitz, one of AG Schneiderman’s primary 
complaints.  The Attorney General argued that regardless of whether or not DFS was gambling 
and therefore illegal, the claims made in the ads about how easy it is to win (“make it pay to be a 
fan”) could meet the legal standard of fraud.  The insider trading scandal (almost uniformly 
referred to as such) had peaked Schneiderman’s interest and picking up on the argument in 
Miller and Singer’s report for McKinsey about the vulnerability to shark behavior skewing the 
winning percentages towards the very few, the Attorney General’s office focused on the 
knowledge deficit or what Schneiderman called “no guarantee of no data advantage.” (CBS 
News 2015) Without a reasonable guarantee of a level playing field, the unregulated market of 
DFS was ripe for abuse. So, regulation was needed to curb the advantage of the sharks, but the 
focus of much the AG’s ire was on the ads. The AG’s office called out the false advertising of 
the ad blitz for promoting “DFS like a lottery, representing the game to New Yorkers as an easy 
path to riches that anyone can win.” (McGee 2015) Even in the settlement, wherein the Attorney 
General and DraftKings and FanDuel agreed to cease litigation and wait for legislation that had 
been written to be approved or voted down, the Attorney General did not relinquish it’s right to 
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initiate new false advertising charges.  In fact, after the legalization bill was passed in 2016, both 
DraftKings and FanDuel settled the false advertising charges for with the state for $6 million 
each, the “highest New York penalty awards for deceptive advertising in recent memory.” 
(Gouker 2016b) 
 
Also in the New York case was the crucial UIGEA distinction between the game of chance and 
the game of skill and therefore the essential question of gambling. By remaining so vague about 
the difference between chance and skill, UIGEA had left this up to individual states to hammer 
out. The Attorney General’s office laid out its case on the basic grounds of chance consisting in a 
lack of player control. In The People v. FanDuel (Supreme Court of New York, New York County 
2015), the individual cease and desist cases and its subsequent appeals, the NYAG argued that 
DFS contests are “’contests of chance’ because although the skill of the contestants is a factor, 
the outcome depends substantially on chance and factors not within the DFS player’s control, 
including whether the athletes chosen are injured, or the game is ‘rained out.’” (McGee 2015) 
The DFS industry and the state were at odds over what was and wasn’t “within the DFS player’s 
control” as the basic rhetoric of DFS is that because anyone can control line-ups while the state 
argued that line-up control didn’t take into account enough factors of chance. In the resolution of 
this debate, New York Senate Bill S8153 (Bonacic 2016), the DFS industry won out. The bill 
declares DFS not a game of chance because a) “simulation sports teams are selected based upon 
the skill and knowledge of the participants” (essentially the UIGEA skill provision) and b) 
because “contestants have control over which players they choose and the outcome of each 
contest is not dependent upon the performance of any one player or any one actual team.” It is in 
the disaggregation and recombination of teams that participants have “control.”  
	 84	
 
But as everyone involved in the process knew, this “control” meant little for average players if 
there was no attendant regulation of the sharks.  What is control when the (non-gambling) deck 
is stacked against you? New York’s legislation took this problem on by prohibiting employees of 
DFS operators from playing DFS at all (1401.14.A), requiring the identification of “highly 
experienced players” (1404.1.G), disclosing the number of entries that a single player can submit 
per contest (1404.1.H-I), and ending automated scripts that used third-party API access to the 
platforms (1404.7).  By November of 2015, DraftKings had already adjusted to pending 
legislation in Massachusetts that demanded caps on entry volume and capped the amount of 
single player entries into the guaranteed prize pools at 3% of total entries. (Gouker 2016c) On its 
face this sounds like a major regulatory win, but if we notice there is no restriction on how many 
entries globally a shark can enter and remember that the top 11 players in the Miller and Singer 
sample were submitting 17% of entry fees and taking an average of $135,000 of profit then we 
can assume those 11 players are in almost all the guaranteed prize pools on any given day and 
therefore each pool is at least 33% sharks. And regardless of API access, a technical knowledge 
advantage still exists for the sharks versus smaller fish as roster composition via algorithmic 
analysis of probabilities and statistical patterns is a time intensive process only really practiced 
by DFS pros or “grinders” (hence, RotoGrinders, the popular DFS website). This situation 
combines with the aforementioned business model reliance on the high volume sharks makes this 
regulation rather toothless for the protection of the smaller players. In fact, the only thing it 
might do is accelerate what Miller and Singer had already warned of, ie. the growth potential for 
this kind of model was limited from the start. The platforms need the sharks and the sharks need 
the fish but the sharks will inevitably deplete the available stock of fish unless the platforms take 
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action that limit the amount of sharks, which would limit their amount of entries which would 
make the major contests, the real money makers for the platforms, into loss leaders. Of course, 
one solution would be to merge the two oceans, cut overhead costs, and consolidate all the 
available sharks and fish. And by late 2016 this was already being discussed and by May 2017 
was in the review process at the FTC. The boom and bust cycled reached its final conclusion, the 
concentration of wealth. 
 
The turbulence in the DFS market that culminated in this concentration is quite similar to that of 
the various financial crises, scandals, and controversies of high finance in the 21st century. These 
problems were often problems of new, unregulated markets, the speed with which they could 
move and scale, and the rising dominance of technologically enabled quantitative and 
algorithmic practice. The financial crisis of 2008’s basis in the proliferation of mortgage backed 
securities was born out of the deregulation of the banking industries much the same way DFS 
was born out of UIGEA. The forms of speculation that were created in response to these 
regulatory changes were more intensified versions of their predecessors. High finance 
speculation was alive and well before the abolition of Glass-Steagall, but the methods of 
speculation intensified and multiplied after. Speculative wagers on the statistical competition 
between simulated sports teams had been going on for two and half decades before UIGEA, but 
the response of sport media capital was to fund its drive towards new methods that intensified the 
pace and volume of these wagers.  Over leveraged banks making enormous bets and 
mathematician and computer scientist designed quantitative methods have their analogues in the 
sharks of DFS, flooding the market with advantages of volume and technologically enabled 
knowledge. And just as the deregulation of finance led to new, more intensive forms of capital 
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accumulation that were so successful that they actually overleveraged themselves into crisis, 
UIGEA led to a financialized fandom that was so good at concentrating knowledge at the top of 
the food chain that it led itself into its own crisis. 
 
Financialization is often posited as a purely political economic form, the securitization of assets 
that are made to flow in the exchange of markets. (Hudson 2010; Lapavitsas 2014) The logic of 
DFS’s expansion, its need to become a part of the daily life both to normalize itself as an 
reputable industry and it’s dependence on sociality to make that possible, shows how it works as 
an ideological form as well, weaving its way into the logics of our everyday interests and thought 
patterns, producing a form of mastery that is determined by the financial imaginary. Ultimately, 
statistical fandom and especially fantasy sports, the management of the ebbs and flows of records 
of sport, is financialized not just when it becomes about the amassing of wealth, but also when, 
as Randy Martin says of finance itself, “it presents itself as a merger of business and life cycles, 
as a means for the acquisition of self.” When we make it pay to be a fan, as the commercial says. 
And financialized fandom, as the evolution of statistical fandom that reaches its apotheosis in 
DFS, fits the definition of what Martin calls the “financialization of daily life”: “a proposal for 
how to get ahead but also a medium for the expansive movement of body and soul.” (Martin 
2002:3) Recall the intense focus on display in the commercials, the tension and release of 
preparation and victory, the theme of collective excitement, and the more intense social bonds 
created. As a game embedded into the daily life of sports fans, fantasy sports financialized the 
relationship of sports fans to numbers by making it into a game that played the line between 
games of agon and games of alea, of skill and chance, between domination in play through 
competition and games of surrender to the uncontrollable odds of the physical world. 
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 In	Roger	Caillois’s	Man,	Play,	Games,	he	creates	a	taxonomy	of	the	games	of	human	society	in	four	categories:		agon	(competition between individuals or teams), alea (chance), mimicry 
(becoming someone else), and ilinx (fear based or perception changing games). Although it is 
should be clear that fantasy sports and particularly DFS might fall into all of these categories 
(elements of all of these are played at in the DFS ad blitz commericial), it is agon and alea that 
neatly map onto the distinction of skill and chance so crucial to fantasy sports as an industry 
Games of agon require control, what Caillois refers to as “sustained attention, appropriate 
training, assiduous application, and the desire to win.  It implies discipline and perseverance.” 
(Caillois 2001:15) The ads often featured an extremely focused protagonist, ignoring all of daily 
life around them. “We train, we win.” For defenders of DFS, the requirement of a deep 
knowledge of the players and sport on which their game is based meets the standard of 
“sustained attention, appropriate training, assiduous application.” Through this expertise, the 
player attains superiority over their foe. However, DFS detractors argue that the sheer volume of 
factors beyond the players control (head coaching decisions, player injury, weather conditions, 
etc) put DFS into the realm of alea or “games that are based on a decisions independent of the 
player, an outcome over which he has no control, and in which winning is the result of fate rather 
than triumphing over an adversary.” (17) This language is extremely similar to the language of 
UIGEA and all the legislation that sought to determine just was “control” meant. As the ads 
feature tremendous moments of nervousness and anticipation before the victorious result, 
Caillois, too, adds that the player in the game of  alea only waits “in hope and trembling, the cast 
of the die.”  
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The separation between agon and alea embedded in the games of chance or skill dichotomy is 
further seen in this passage from Caillois: “In contrast to agon, alea negates work, patience, 
experience and qualifications. Professionalization, application, and training are eliminated.” (17) 
Here is the definition of the game of chance before the professionalization of the gambler and his 
direct comparison and commingling with the world of finance. The math of the event of 
gambling and the mathematicians who masters that event (the card counter, the quant, the writer 
of algorithms) have become not only the dominant whales of the worlds of alea but also cultural 
icons.  However, Caillois points out that the player in a game of alea is a lucky one granted 
“infinitely more than he could procure by a lifetime of labor, discipline, and fatigue. It seems an 
insolent and sovereign insult to merit. It supposes on the player’s part an attitude exactly 
opposite to that reflected in agon.  In the latter, his only reliance is upon himself, in the former, 
he counts on everything, even the vaguest sign, the slightest outside occurrence, which he 
immediately takes to be an omen or token - in short, he depends on everything except himself.” 
(17-18) This insult to merit that is embedded in chance is at the root of the objection to the game 
of chance from both sides.  For the state, the role of chance cannot be allowed to undermine a 
technico-rational ideology that remains hegemonic. For the fantasy industry and both its minor 
players (the majority) and its whales (the mathematicians) to lump the game itself in with alea is 
an insult to their own merit. The companies need the players to believe that merit is what wins, 
this is the ideological function of any emphasis on the knowledge or expertise of the everyman 
sports fan. However, it should be telling that the vast majority of their advertisements emphasize 
the agonistic aspects of the game. Win against your friends, there will be no sharing of french 
fries, you will dominate your friend and celebrate in their face. The players need to be connected 
to the personal, to the dependence on one’s own expertise or will (and the similarity between 
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their own expertise or will with those who have won, to the athlete) in order to enter. If it were 
pure chance, the attachment to “fantasy sports” and their fantasy of managerial control would 
evaporate and the possibility for winning at the “sport” would evaporate with it. Who wants to 
play a game that portends to be about knowledge that is itself not winnable? This divining of the 
outside world is also a part of what states have identified as part of the game of chance rubric, a 
lack of control over factors that impact the games outcomes.  However, the position of both 
players and companies in relation to this is what truly ties it to financialization. The world out of 
the player’s control can be speculated about. The very nature of fantasy sports has always 
already been a speculative relation. Events are as equally out of the control of the broker (and if 
they become in control then we have a violation of the game of finance) as they are out of the 
fantasy sports player. Risk must be managed but to manage it into absence ruins the profit of 
system. 
 
DFS smooths the process of statistical fandom out, making all of your fantasy transactions 
happen within the app. Computerization and then the internet took statistical fandom and 
simplified the labor of rotisserie, handling the database and score keeping problems, increasing 
the speed and ease by which new players and new leagues could form, and making it much easier 
for players to be in multiple leagues. In the end, the rapid growth in statistical fandom into the 
mid 00s was thanks to computerization and the network effects of the Internet.  DFS, as part of 
the mobile app explosion in the digital economy, only picked up on the process and amplified it 
by simplifying the process of payments while also accelerating the game. Like every introduction 
of machinery into the work process, this acceleration is an increase in relative surplus value. As 
we will see in the next chapter and in the conclusion, this relative surplus value created in the 
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technological intensification of the work process will ultimately meet its limit in crisis of the 
attention economy. 
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Chapter 4 
The Limits of Liveness: ESPN, Cable Television, and Attention 
Labor  
Introduction  
In the two industries developing around written and numerical accounts of sports that were 
considered in the last two chapters, we saw two processes where fan communities and their 
practices were captured and made profitable by businesses striving for ever larger shares of the 
sports media market. When blogging presented a challenge to the dominance of established 
sports news media, firms with more capital and larger market share either employed the most 
popular bloggers or monetized and bought out platforms that were built with largely unpaid labor. 
When fantasy sports represented a new site of value produced from numerical records, sports 
leagues and older and larger purveyors of statistics attacked it in the courts before attempting to 
invest in and profit from it. The story in this chapter, however, is a slightly less straightforward 
tale than creative and passionate amateurs crafting a new way to relate to sport getting taken over 
by corporate interests.  The industries that bring images into the homes of spectators have been 
less susceptible to amateur threats as their sports media brethren. The first four decades of sports 
broadcast television saw an extremely capital intensive and highly regulated industry lead to a 
concentrated market where the big 3 networks emerged to dominate the scene by the late 70s.  
The emergence of a true challenger to that big 3 (by the 80s a big four with Fox’s entry into the 
over the air network game) could only happen with the help of a shift in regulatory policies 
around new telecommunications technologies and major capital investment from the last vestiges 
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of an industrial empire. Even then that challenger’s independence from the broadcast giants was 
a short-lived affair.  
 
It is the story of that challenger that is the focus of this chapter. ESPN, the self-proclaimed 
“World Wide Leader in Sport,” fundamentally changed the economics of the sports media 
industry. This change was not, like the changes described in the last two chapters, a change from 
below. Even now, as ESPN struggles to maintain its perch atop the sports media industry, the 
challenges don’t come from below, either. As web 2.0 and the participatory platforms it 
engendered put power in the hands of fans to remix and rebroadcast images of sport at levels 
never before seen, the actual value built from these practices has been minuscule or has been 
folded seamlessly into the practice of the capital interests of the sports media industry. For 
example, leagues have largely tolerated short video loops native to social media sites as they 
increase interest in the sport and all the major sports league franchises and major sports media 
outlets have social media managers who regularly post such video. Attempts to deter teams and 
outlets from using this video have been criticized and quickly abandoned. In a recent case, the 
NFL targeted their own franchises’ social media accounts for posting .gifs (short looping video 
files native to the Internet) during games but were criticized so intensely that the policy was 
abandoned after half a season. (Fingas 2016)  
 
Challenges from below have been quickly recuperated at a speed that far out strips the rate of 
assimilation and corporatization of blogging and fantasy sports. Recuperation is Henri 
Lefebvre’s term for the process though which something that introduces a discontinuity in the 
accepted or enforced ways of a system is brought back into that system, sometimes making that 
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system stronger. (Lefebvre 2006) Although perhaps not fitting to the more political or explicitly 
anti-capitalist contexts in which Lefebvre and others have used the term, fan practices that create 
new relationships to their objects of passionate interest create both dissenting interpretations that 
trouble official wisdom about the object of fandom and become reincorporated into mainstream, 
commercialized relationships. In the cases of blogging and fantasy sports, the length of time that 
they existed outside of the mainstream of the going system allowed the dissent they fostered to 
force change in the system.  Newspapers and other more traditional writing and news outlets 
mocked and derided blogging as a form for so long that they only realized how much change 
blogging had wrought in the industry after it was too late to save many companies.  Leagues 
unsuccessfully fought fantasy sports through the courts for years throughout the 1980s and 90s 
only to acquiesce and try to profit from it in the 21st century.  The speed with which visual styles 
were recuperated cut down their ability to challenge the mainstream, not allowing an alternative 
market to really bloom around user generated visual styles the way that it did around blogging 
and fantasy sports.  The reasons for this are many, most of which will be dealt with in this 
chapter, but in the main they revolve around the importance of liveness to the political economy 
of visual fandom and the prohibitively high fixed capital costs requirement to produce liveness.  
This infrastructural need effectively blocked challenges from below. However, challenges from 
other capital interests with access to this infrastructure loom large. As noted in the introduction, 
the sports media industry is generally a tripartite relationship between fans, media companies, 
and leagues. In the case of visual sports media, the relationship skews heavily towards the 
players with the most capital. In addition, the neat triangular scheme is troubled in visual sports 
media by the importance of infrastructure companies, in this case the telecommunication giants 
whose drift towards monopoly has given them increasing power in the culture industry. 
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So, rather than look to fan remediation practices that account for very little of the total revenues 
generated in visual sports media and have already been folded back into sport media capital’s 
repertoire, the focus here will be on ESPN as one of the dominant players in visual fandom. I 
will trace the history of the relationship between sport and the moving image through the pre- 
and early television era, showing the interconnected although often-contentious relationship 
between sports leagues and the moving image. Of particular importance is the interplay between 
leagues and broadcasters had around granting and refusing rights to live broadcast. From there, 
I’ll move onto the history of ESPN, its relationship to the cable television industry writ large, and 
its dependence on state deregulation and this deregulation’s underwriting of ESPN’s key 
innovation: the per subscriber fee that passes on to the cost of its live rights contracts onto each 
cable subscriber regardless of whether they tune into ESPN or not. In the conclusion, I will argue 
that what the political economy of visual fandom and visual sports media follows is not the logic 
of recuperation but the logic of what Marx called subsumption, or the process through which 
capital subordinates the labor process to its own ends. In the case of blogging and fantasy sports, 
capital approached fan practices and subordinated them technologically by building platforms 
that collected the activity of fans and made it valuable. For Bleacher Report, their custom CMS 
smoothed the labor process of unpaid bloggers and the attention that their posts gained was used 
to build capital for B/R’s investors and founders. For fantasy sports after the Internet in general, 
the digitized versions of the game similarly smoothed the labor of the game itself by allowing it 
to obtain a scale and speed that made it vastly more profitable than before. By analyzing ESPN’s 
rise to dominance and its current problems adjusting to the shifting technological ground beneath 
its feet with subsumption in mind, we can greater understand how the empire that ESPN has built 
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and the industry it influences has subsumed sports spectatorship so well that it belies its essential 
contradictions and limits. Ultimately, visual sports media offers examples of the successes and 
failures of capital to really subsume attention. 
 
A Short History of Visual Sports Media Before Cable Television 
 
The development of motion picture technology always leaned on sport and the body in motion as 
an early subject.  Quoted in the New York Sun in 1891, Thomas Edison was very clear about 
what his new invention, the kinetoscope, could be used for: “To the sporting fraternity I can say 
that before long it will be possible to apply this system to prize fights and boxing exhibitions. 
The whole scene with comments of the spectators, the talk of the seconds, the noise of the blows, 
and so will be faithfully transferred.” (Streible and Musser 2008:22)  The kinetoscope would 
never achieve this goal and it would be several more decades before Edison’s dream of audio and 
image syncing up to achieve full verisimilitude, but this use of sport to gain interest in a new 
motion picture technology is a theme that is repeated throughout the history of moving images.  
However, before the advent of broadcast television, all moving images of sport were after the 
fact records, lagging behind print and later radio as mediums for getting information about the 
result of a sporting contest. Although telegraphic transmission of fight results were a common 
practice in the 19th century (Sowell 2008) and live radio broadcasts began in 1921, liveness with 
the full access to the visuals of the game was only an option for those in physical attendance until 
the advent of television. As Raymond Williams noted, the dominance of radio throughout the 
second two decades of the 20th century made the development of motion picture broadcast a less 
pressing concern. (Williams 2003:10-11) Although being developed throughout the 1920s and 
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30s by individual inventors and then RCA (the largest maker of radios and through their 
subsidiary NBC, the leading broadcaster), the capacity for live transmission of visuals would not 
arrive until the end of the 1930s and commercial broadcast television would not achieve any kind 
of relevant scale in the country until several years after the war ended.  But at the very beginning, 
sports were there. 
 
The first television sports broadcasts coincided with some of the earliest programming available. 
The nature of certain sports was both technologically convenient and economical for TV 
producers. Early cameras required strong lighting to get a decent picture so boxing and wrestling 
(in centrally lit locations) and football and baseball (occurring during the day) were perfect 
subjects. In a New York Times article in 1937 headlined “The Radio Eye Favors Baseball” RCA 
engineers were quoted as saying that for broadcasting of outdoor events, baseball was by far the 
best subject as it was played during the afternoon in the brightest summer months and in 
generally fair weather. (Anon 1937) Also, boxing and wrestling were especially perfect for early 
broadcasts because their action occurs within a very small, fixed space not requiring multiple or 
moving cameras.  Production costs were also kept at a bare minimum since there were no writers 
or actors to pay.  Profit from the broadcast was, however, not the primary goal of the first few 
years of televised sports. NBC, CBS, and the Dumont Corporation (holders of the first NFL TV 
contract) were all manufacturers and sellers of television sets and demand for sports viewership 
is generally understood to have played a major role in the remarkable explosion of television’s 
uptake in American society. (Walker and Bellamy Jr. 2008) The first broadcast of a sporting 
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event in the United States10 was a Columbia/Princeton baseball game shown on NBC’s 
experimental station W2XBS, broadcast to less than 400 TV sets in the New York area  on May 
17th, 1939. (Koppett 1999) The first MLB game, also on W2XBS, was the afternoon game of a 
doubleheader between the Brooklyn Dodgers and the Cincinnati Reds on August 24th, 1939. 
(Walker and Bellamy Jr. 2008:12) The first NFL broadcast would follow later that year, a 
Brooklyn Dodger/Philadelphia Eagles game from Ebbets Field October 22nd on that same NBC 
experimental station.(Cressman and Swenson 2007:480) However, the first network broadcast (ie. 
not on experimental station) of a sporting event was NBC’s Gillette’s Cavalcade of Sports, 
which featured a featherweight championship bout between Willie Pep and Chalky White in 
1943.11 (The Museum of Broadcast Communications n.d.) In the period before the post war 
boom and the explosion of television set sales in the late 40s, sports dominated the airways by 
some estimates accounting for 1/3 of television programming. (The Museum of Broadcast 
Communications n.d.) 
 
There was, however, no live coast-to-coast signal until 1951. Televised sport in the decade and a 
half before was thoroughly confined to local broadcasts, expanding out from the under 400 sets 
figure of 1939 (Koppett 1999) significantly but nowhere near the scale it would reach by the 
peak of the post war boom in the 1950s. Sponsorship of events by single advertisers was the 																																																								10	The BBC had been able to televise Wimbledon matches two years previous and the 1936 
Olympics in Berlin had been telecast to public viewing theaters in Berlin and Potsdam.	11	Although	this	fact	is	repeated	in	numerous	contexts,	it	appears	that	this	is	an	inaccurate	representation,	as	a)	there	is	no	boxer	named	Chalky	White,	rather	his	name	is	Albert	“Chalky”	Wright	and	b)	although	he	did	fight	Willie	Pep	four	times	(1942,	1944	twice,	and	1946),	he	did	not	fight	Pep	in	1943.	This	telecast	was	either	of	the	11/20/42	fight	or	the	9/29/44	fight	as	these	were	both	at	Madison	Square	Garden	and	it	would	have	been	much	more	likely	to	have	been	broadcast	from	New	York	than	any	other	American	city.	(Fight	data	from	boxrec.com,	an	extremely	thorough	database	of	fights	in	the	US	dating	back	to	the	19th	century)	(BoxRec	n.d.)(BoxRec	n.d.)	
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norm and business was good. By the TV boom of the ‘50s, televised sports had begun its move 
towards nationwide scale but the nature of its economics had not yet evolved. For example, when 
MLB and the NFL sold the rights to televise games, these deals were made between individual 
team owners and networks and affiliates.  It was not until the mid-60s that this changed, but not 
without significant governmental scrutiny and compromises that would alter the political 
economy of the sports media industry forever.  That the early days of the image’s path to 
dominance over the political economy of sport fandom were localized and often contentious was 
a reflection of the limitations of early television as a technology. When the only fans who could 
access the broadcast of your game were fans within traveling distance of the game itself and 
when the cost of a television makes it the type of semi-luxury affordable by the same consumers 
who have the disposable income to attend games, it is unsurprising that the those who stand to 
profit from the event itself would be occasionally hostile to something they couldn’t monetize at 
such a high rate of profit. The argument that in-person attendance would be effected by 
television became a prominent aspect of team owners’ arguments amongst themselves and with 
television providers, fans, and regulators.   
 
Several MLB baseball teams, especially in small markets (most notoriously the Pittsburgh 
Pirates) went through large chunks of the 1950s without televising any games at all. However, 
most major metropolitan (the New York Yankees, the Brooklyn Dodgers, the Chicago White 
Sox, the Chicago Cubs) and some smaller market teams (the St. Louis Cardinals, the Cincinnati 
Reds) embraced television, although both the Reds and the Cardinals went through lean periods 
in the mid-50s where they drastically reduced the amount of broadcast The Cardinals, for 
example, televised 30 games in the inaugural televised season in 1949 but reduced that number 
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to 5 till 1953 when the team was sold to Anheuser-Busch who subsequently began regular 
broadcasts but only of road games.12 Another important group were the teams that moved west in 
the 50s (the Giants, the Dodgers, the Athletics) who ceased almost all television broadcast upon 
their moves.  These varying approaches to television are partly born out of the extremely local 
focus that baseball owners took. This approach continued into the end of century as over half of 
broadcast revenues came from local and regional broadcast, far more than any other league. (all 
figures here come from James Walker and Robert Bellamy, Jr.’s excellent Center Field Shot: A 
History of Baseball on Television in their very useful appendix, pgs. 323-334).  
 
Professional football was also intertwined with the development of television as both a medium 
and an industry. In contrast to baseball, however, it could be argued that football’s approaches to 
sports rights and contracts changed the political economy of sports and eventually of television 
all together. Throughout the 1950s, the NFL had a similar relationship to television that MLB 
had with individual teams: signing individual contracts for widely varying levels of revenue. 
Having large disparities in revenues between teams hurt competition and threatened less earning 
teams with closure creating a threat of instability, a less than ideal situation for a league trying to 
establish itself and surpass college football, boxing, horse racing, and professional baseball. In 
order to maintain this competitive balance and league stability, new NFL Commissioner Pete 
Rozelle convinced NFL owners to negotiate as a group, giving them more leverage, and to share 
those revenues equally amongst themselves. (Fortunato 2006) This profit sharing was subject to 
government scrutiny and took another two years to be approved. The passing of the Sports 
Broadcasting Act of 1961, a landmark piece of legislation that legalized joint broadcasting 																																																								12	It should be noted that Cardinals continued this practice until 1981, joining only the Houston 
Colt .45s/Astros franchise and the Pirates as the only teams to enforce an only road game policy.	
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contracts for the major sports league in the United States, guaranteed the NFL an extremely 
lucrative advantage upon which the political economy of sports media still relies.   
 
The act itself functioned as exoneration from several different allegations of antitrust violations 
against the NFL beginning with a 1953 Justice Department’s investigation into the NFL’s 
blackout policy. (Mitten and Hernandez 2013) The NFL’s original blackout policy required that 
games could not be televised coterminously with games being played in local markets, applying 
to both games in other cities as well as the game being played in that market. Hence, a fan’s only 
option for football watching was in-game attendance anytime a game was being played with 75 
miles of their televisions. (Fortunato 2006:58-59) Owners felt that any televised game would 
take away from box office sales. This included playoff games and, after the 1964 AFL-NFL 
merger, the Super Bowl. In fact, the AFL, which had filed several antitrust suits against the NFL 
including one arguing that the NFL had conspired against them by negotiating rival television 
contracts, had been able to come to such prominence because the NFL’s blackout rule did not 
apply to them, letting them poach viewers who otherwise would not be able to watch football on 
a Sunday.  However, after the 1966 merger, this new source of televised football would be put 
under the same restrictions.  It would not be until 1973 that the blackout policy would be revised 
in order allow for home games to be televised if games were sold out with 72 hours before game 
time. (Fortunato 2006:87-88) Selling out the game then becomes de rigeuer and an almost threat 
to the rest of the fan base. With that carrot and stick in place, the profit guaranteed, the owners 
were able to fully embrace television.   
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By the late seventies and early eighties, television contract antitrust exemption in place, major 
leagues once again were able to capitalize on a new format to expand both the reach of their 
product and the profit they took from it. With the advent of pay cable, new networks like TBS 
and ESPN were desperate for first run content that could draw in new subscribers.  Just as NBC, 
CBS and Dumont’s vertical integration drove them to sports as a means to increase TV sales, pay 
cable television used sports to increase subscription rates and normalize their business model.  
Heavy competition for broadcast rights contracts in the early eighties from both traditional 
networks and pay cable networks saw enormous increases in revenue streams for both collegiate 
and professional sports in the US. Pay cable’s entrance into the sports media ecosystem 
accelerated revenue growth exponentially and began a relationship between cable companies and 
sports ownership that would accelerate the changes in the political economy of sports media that 
television had begun. 
. 
Cable television, however, had been a part of the television industry for decades before it really 
began to take off in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In its inception, cable television was “cable” 
television because it was a system in which a central antenna was the hub from which coaxial 
cable ran into individual homes. The television signal itself was still broadcast over the air and 
was hence was subject to geographic limitations. (Parsons 2008) Regulations pertaining to cable 
television reflect this history as the majority of them prior to deregulation in the late seventies 
were aimed at preventing the delivery of “outside of area” channels into a given broadcast area 
via cable. This emphasis on local broadcast monopoly gave way in a deregulatory regime that 
lifted restrictions on the importing of distant signals combined with the impact of developing 
satellite technology that had come about since the deregulation of that industry in the early 1970s. 
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The collapse of time and space made possible by satellite technology far outstripped anything 
that had been possible before. And just as sports were instrumental in the transformation of 
television into a mass-market phenomenon, ESPN was there at the beginning of what would 
become cable as we know it. 
 
Early History of ESPN  
 
According to the many accounts of its origins, Bill Rasmussen and his son, Scott, birthed ESPN 
as an idea in May of 1978. (Miller and Shales 2011; Rasmussen 2010) The Rasmussens, both 
recently fired from the World Hockey Association’s New England Whalers, conceived of a cable 
channel that combined both regional Connecticut sports and movies (“ESPN” stands for 
Entertainment and Sports Programming Networks). However, the majority of cable distribution 
business models in 1978 were still tied to the old model of increasing access to locally 
broadcasted programming. AT&T, the primary provider of cable lines, charged by the mile.  This 
had the effect of making anything other than very limited regional networks not economically 
feasible. This situation had been largely created by a series of regulations that benefitted the 
broadcast system of the post-war era. In an FCC ruling in 1966, the burgeoning Community 
Antenna Television (CATV) industry, the precursor to what would become the contemporary 
cable industry, was hit with two regulations: a) any CATV system would have to carry local 
programming and was forbidden from duplicating programming (i.e. a non-local affiliate of a 
major broadcaster that was already served in the area) and b) there would be no importing of 
signals from outside the top 100 urban areas at all. These regulations effectively choked off the 
growth of the cable industry in anything but rural areas as long as the coaxial cable distribution 
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system was used. (Parsons 2008:229) However, by the late 1970s, deregulation of the previously 
tightly regulated commercial satellite industry combined with a number of deregulatory moves in 
the mid 70s aimed at saving what had been a stagnant industry, creating a situation that greatly 
expanded the realm of possibility for cable programming. (Corrigan 2015) Chief amongst these 
deregulations was a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals finding in favor of HBO in a series of suits it 
filed against the FCC and other defendants (including NBC and Paramount Pictures) which 
allowed HBO to broadcast recent run movies and sporting events (Anon 1977) and the 
subsequent decision by the FCC to remove the urban expansion ban. (Corrigan 2015:41)  These 
moves along with the Nixon administration’s “Open Skies” policy towards commercial 
development of satellite communication laid the ground for ESPN to exists in the first place.   
 
This situation was, according to the Rasmussens, unbeknownst to them.  Bill Rasmussen has 
admitted to having no real knowledge of the cable industry, having done local broadcasting of 
high school games in Hartford and PR for the Whalers. Their initial idea was to broadcast 
Connecticut collegiate sports13 via AT&T’s coaxial system. However, after being introduced to 
an RCA representative in charge of selling cable programmers on the twofold benefits of satellite 
broadcast over terrestrial wires (much cheaper and almost instant nationwide distribution), the 
Rasmussens were suddenly at the forefront of what would lead to the full blown cable boom of 
the mid 1980s.  As Scott Rasmussen said, “All of a sudden we had this distribution technology, 
but we had no idea about anything else.” (Miller and Shales 2011:9).  What was left for the 
Rasmussens was to find the money to actually pay for all of it.  As with the other case studies in 
																																																								13	Also	unbeknownst	to	the	Rasmussens	was	the	fact	that	signing	an	individual	broadcast	contract	with	an	NCAA	participating	school	was	prohibited	until	the	NCAA	v.	Board	of	
Regents	decision	of	1984	which	will	be	discussed	more	below.	
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this analysis, this meant finding investors who would exert varying amounts of control on the 
vision and future of the original idea. In the case of the Rasmussens, however, their original idea 
was usurped even before they could cash out, not entirely unlike Daniel Okrent and his 
Rotisserie league co-owners. Instead of others capitalizing on your idea before you could figure 
out a way to monetize it, their primary investor, Getty Oil, actively pushed out them out. There 
were petty rivalries involved, to be sure. Getty’s man in charge, Stuart Evey, was notoriously 
fickle and vindictive. However, most of what got them exiled from their own kingdom shortly 
after ESPN’s launch was the basic concern of investors who wanted seasoned hands to steer the 
business into profit. But even the likes of broadcast sports legends like Chet Simmons (first 
sports programming director at NBC) and his NBC colleague Scotty Connal could not make 
ESPN profitable. Although they were able to legitimize the ESPN brand through their network 
pedigrees and bring in new ideas that would do much to revolutionize visual sports media, they 
were unable put the network in the black.  
  
In the first three years of ESPN’s existence (1979-81), the growth in the cable market was 
neither fast enough nor reliable enough to bring in consistent ad revenue. Furthermore, total costs 
of production (technology, on air and production talent, broadcast contracts with leagues, etc) 
couldn’t be fully offset by advertising revenue only. 6 million subscribers just weren’t large 
enough of a market. (Miller and Shales 2011:91) Something had to be done and Getty 
representatives called on omnipresent consulting firm McKinsey & Company to advise them as 
to how to move towards profitability. The company assigned Roger Werner, only 29 at the time, 
to take the project on as a bellwether of the cable industry writ large. Werner recognized that the 
ad revenue model from over the air broadcast wasn’t the model that would work for cable. By 
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1983, Getty’s consistent flow of cash into the company was beginning to dry up, although the 
incurring debt had been diffracted by a sale of a 10% stake to ABC. Contracts with many cable 
providers were up and Werner’s brought his new business plan on the road to cable providers 
nationwide. He approached the market with what he called a “survival pitch,” in order to survive 
ESPN was going to need providers to start paying for their content. This would become known 
as the per subscriber fee, or the amount of a cable bill that each patron paid for privilege of 
having ESPN in their package (whether they watched it or not). ESPN believed in itself enough 
to offer a kind of threat to the provider “If you come in voluntarily and do a new deal with us, 
we’ll start your rate to four cents in 1983 or ’84 and then we’ll go to six cents the next year, then 
eight cents.  Either rip up your old contract and have some protection for whatever the term of 
your new affiliation agreement is going to be, or pay the prevailing rate when your old deal 
expires. There was the specter that if were still around – and we intended to be – we’d be a much 
more expensive service.” (Miller and Shales 2011:111-112) And the threat worked. According to 
Werner, part of what opened up the door for the per subscriber fee to even be considered by 
cable operators was the general instability of the industry circa 1983.  “The failure of CBS cable 
was one of those watershed dates that opened a big window of opportunity for us. Cable stock 
fell dramatically within one or two weeks. It was an obvious reaction and the press was almost 
universally negative and predicting bad things for the cable industry.  If CBS can’t make it as a 
programmer, how could anybody else like ESPN hope to succeed? So a number of our affiliates, 
I think, were worried that another failure by another leading cable programming network in 1983 
or ’84 would be a terrible thing.”(Miller and Shales 2011:110-111) Even in 1983, ESPN had 
argued and proved that cable needed it as much as it needed cable.  Leveraging their importance 
to their clients, ESPN started out with nominal fees between 4 and 8 cents a month, which for 
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small providers across the country with less than a 1000 subscribers added up to less than 
$10,000 dollars a year. However, this established the precedent of the subscriber fee.   
 
The first major carrier to pay the fee was Long Island’s Cablevision (owned by the Dolan family 
who now, of course, owns the New York Knicks, New York Rangers, and Madison Square 
Garden as well as Cablevision). ESPN used a classic tactic of sports broadcasting, the blackout, 
in order to get Cablevision to relent. Getting one of the largest providers in the country to relent 
was huge and pushed some of the more recalcitrant holdouts around the country into new deals. 
In the self-mythology of former ESPN executives, this win was the moment that ESPN’s 
solvency was assured. Former ESPN CEO Steve Bornstein: [First ESPN CEO] Bill [Grimes] 
recognized we needed to make the change in order to survive, and Roger [Werner] had the balls 
to roll up his sleeves and take on the cable operators. I’m telling you right now, it was these guys 
who figured out the business. There were no ifs, ands, or buts. ‘Cause nobody else was doing it. 
Nickelodeon wasn’t doing it. MTV wasn’t doing it. Nor was CNN.” (Miller and Shales 
2011:113) Werner himself gives the per subscriber fee/ad sales dual revenue system even more 
credit: “The cable-programming business wouldn’t be what it is without the development of the 
two-revenue-stream business model.  Because of it ESPN has fueled growth of sports overall, the 
inflation of player salaries, the cost of thirty-second spots, and the cost of tickets to games. Its all 
interlinked. We in some ways opened a Pandora’s box. We certainly aggravated an inflationary 
situation that was already there.” (Miller and Shales 2011:114-115) ESPN’s new solvency 
allowed it to spend more freely on TV deals and as the size of these TV deals has had significant 
impact on the growth of sports leagues professional, collegiate, and Olympic. Those deals have 
grown exponentially because of the revenues that companies like ESPN bring in. And so, Werner 
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is certainly correct. However, this inflationary aspect is not limited to the world of sports, but 
very directly impacted the business of cable.  
 
A half year into the full institution of the per subscriber fee and fresh off a successful airing of 
the early rounds of the NCAA men’s basketball tournament, ESPN was the largest cable network 
in the country, reaching 28.5 million homes by October 1983 with ad revenue reaching $40 
million. (Miller and Shales 2011:117) However, this was still not enough to make the network 
profitable. By the time that ABC increased its 15% stake and bought ESPN outright for $230 
million from the Getty Corporation in 1985 (then selling a 20% stake to RJR Nabisco), ESPN 
had still yet to break even. However, a legal battle that began in 1981 and was settled in 1984 
notably increased the potential outlook for the company. In 1981, a sixty-two member group of 
major college football programs formed the College Football Association and began negotiating 
their own television deals as protest against the National Collegiate Athletics Association 
(NCAA) policy that all TV revenue would be shared equally amongst the member groups and 
negotiated for as a block. This policy resembled the same policy that major professional leagues 
had had in effect since Pete Rozelle’s grand deal with Congress.  This attempt by the CFA was 
akin to two of six NFL divisions attempting to make their own contracts with major networks. 
After the NCAA threatened to sanction the CFA for negotiating independently of the NCAA 
with NBC, the board of regents of two CFA member schools (the University of Oklahoma and 
the University of Georgia) filed an injunction to prevent the NCAA from enforcing sanctions. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. Okla. affirmed the lower 
courts’ ruling that the NCAA violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by restraining the market of 
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“live college football television.”14 The decision found that the NCAA couldn’t “limit the 
number of games that are broadcast on television” and barred it from creating a “noncompetitive 
price structure.” With the NCAA’s omnibus contract with major networks coming up in 1985 
and the CFA schools able to sell packages of games not already committed to that contract, 
ESPN was able to scoop up 48 games, a full four games every Saturday for a 12 week season. 
Previous to this, ESPN played football only on tape delay, a much less desirable product. Tape 
delay, like the highlights that made up Sportscenter, lacked the pull of live television even in this 
era when there was no meaningful competition for the reporting of nationwide results before the 
next day or perhaps for particularly important games on local TV news that night.  There was 
nothing that could pull in viewers and new subscribers like fully live sporting events. Now with 
these new live rights and a pre-existing deal with the NCAA that included college basketball, 
ESPN had put together a legitimate roster of live sports, one they would continue to meticulously 
build upon as they gained more and more viewers 
 
Armed with its dual revenue stream and a burgeoning set of contracts, ESPN (and the cable 
industry writ large) was further aided by the 1984 Cable Act. A legislative compromise between 
the cable industry and local governments, the Act removed rate regulations that existed at a city 
by city basis and set up a system by which rate regulation only occurred “in localities without 
‘effective competition’; however, ‘effective competition’ defined broadly enough to prohibit rate 
regulation for roughly 97% of U.S. cable systems.” (Corrigan 2015:43) By removing rate 																																																								14	Of particular note, is the Court’s rejection of the NCAA’s argument that their way of doing 
TV deals preserved ticket sales and its assertion that “by seeking to insulate live ticket sales from 
the full spectrum of competition because of its assumption that the product itself is insufficiently 
attractive to draw live attendance when faced with competition from televised games” (Anon 
1984) was a tacit admission of their own violation. This legal precedent against justifications for 
blackout policies would continue to be important going forward.	
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restrictions, cable television became a very popular investment for capital and the entertainment 
industry, which set productive forces to work and produced the cable boom of the 1980s. 
(Parsons 2008) This lack of regulatory power to control rate increases gave ESPN the ability to 
raise per subscriber rates as high as this unregulated market would allow. Hence, the 
deregulation of supply (contracts with college sports) combined with the deregulation of the 
means of distribution (cable itself) allowed ESPN to aggressively pursue new rights contracts, 
confident that they could increase revenues via per subscriber fees to offset any new right fees in 
the short term.  In addition, they wagered that advertisement revenue would increase with the 
new audiences brought in by their expanding rights packages. So, it is certainly fair to give 
Roger Werner and his ESPN executive colleagues credit for creating a viable business model for 
the cable industry, but it would never have attracted the capital investment it needed for growth 
without the state clearing the regulatory ground. This relationship between the dual revenue 
stream and a friendly, deregulation happy government was the blueprint for ESPN’s rapid 
expansion in the late 80s and early 90s. To wit, after signing a new contract with the NFL in 
1986 for half of the Sunday night football telecasts from 1987 to 1997, ESPN was able to 
increase their subscriber fees by 29-33% or from 27 cents to between 35 and 36 cents over the 
course of one year. (Miller and Shales 2011:150)  
 
Part of the justification of the 1984 Cable Act’s deregulation was that technological change in 
the form of new methods of video delivery (VCRs, satellite communication, etc.) would produce 
competition that would keep prices in check.15 These retardants on price increases never 
																																																								15	This	is	a	recurring	claim	of	FCC	and	legislative	deregulation	that	has	rarely,	if	ever,	materialized.	See	Susan	Crawford’s	excellent	overview	of	monopolization	in	the	communications	industries	Captive	Audience:	The	Telecom	Industry	and	Monopoly	Power	in	
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materialized and prices skyrocketed throughout the late 80s and early 90s, leading to another 
attempt at legislative intervention, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act of 1992. The 1992 Act actually required real price restriction and even required 10% roll 
backs of prices in markets deemed “uncompetitive.” (Parsons 2008:594-598) The cable 
companies responded by hollowing out their basic cable packages (the only packages subject to 
the regulation) and created new tiered packages which now housed some of the more popular 
cable programming like ESPN. (Corrigan 2015:45) In other words, to get ESPN, cable customers 
had to pay for an extra package. This created a way for profits to be sustained so that new costs, 
in ESPN’s case from new rights that became higher fees to carries, were once again passed onto 
the consumer.  This removal of things from view without further payment is merely a 
continuation of the blackout tactic discussed earlier, only now it has passed from teams 
(production) to cable programmers (retailers) to cable providers (distributors).  And even though 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act did away with the ’92 Act’s regulations, tiering did not 
significantly decrease as a tactic.  In addition to the tiering tactic, the 1992 Act’s had provisions 
that ESPN was also able to exploit. The Must Carry and Retransmission Consent provisions 
combined to allow broadcasters (i.e. over the air networks), covered under the long standing 
cable industry policy to be default included in packages, to waive their must carry privileges 
“and demand payment from a cable provider for carrying its signal.” (Corrigan 2015:45) The 
carrier had the right to turn down the broadcaster but the leverage was squarely in the 
broadcasters favor if they had a significant enough ratings share.  This interaction between the 
two clauses effectively normalized the per subscriber fee (retransmission fees, as fees for content 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
the	New	Gilded	Age.	Below	we	will	see	that	introduction	of	new	technologies	into	the	market,	when	they	do	occur,	do	nothing	to	control	prices	from	cable	providers	and	in	fact	may	have	in	certain	case	contributed	to	even	higher	prices.	
	 111	
were essentially the same thing as per subscriber fees) and also allowed ESPN’s parent 
companies (ABC, Capital Cities, and the Hearst corporation) to pool their leverage together and 
negotiate with carriers for either increased fees or to carry new channels produced by the 
conglomerate.  With this increased leverage for future negotiations, ESPN’s expansion into extra 
channels, the web, print, and new forms of entertainment was all but secured. In the heart of all 
this business maneuvering and deregulation, ESPN and ABC become so obviously profitable 
that Disney bought them for roughly $19 Billion in 1995. (Miller and Shales 2011:357) Former 
Disney CEO Michael Eisner thanked the legislation quite clearly in 2004: “Without ABC in our 
own stations, we would not have been able to achieve the major growth we have realized at 
ESPN and our other cable holding, because ABC offers the highly valued programming that 
cable operators need, i.e. Retransmission consent.” ( Corrigan 2015:47) 
 
So, with price restrictions out of the way and leverage created from their parent companies 
(Capital Cities Communications/ABC and the Hearst Corporation, and then Disney after its 1995 
purchase of CapCities/ABC) ESPN continued to buy up rights contracts throughout the 1990s 
and into the 2000s. This, in turn, forced their per subscriber fee up and up and up. In order to be 
able to the sign the 1998-2005 $8.8 billion NFL contract for both Sunday Night Football for 
ESPN and a renewal of ABC Monday Night Football, ESPN fought its cable providers tooth and 
nail to attain a 20% compounded annual increase of the per subscriber fee. According to Hearst 
CEO Vic Ganzi this was an exceptional deal for ESPN: “A 20 percent increase for the cable fees 
doubles in about three and half years, so if the number is one in the first year, it’s two just three 
and half years after that! So if I remember correctly, we were around forty cents at the beginning 
and the numbers just compounded up dramatically. All of a sudden you’re at $3.20.” (Miller and 
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Shales 2011:409) With that contract, ESPN had become a live sports juggernaut, steamrolling its 
way into the public consciousness and making Disney’s assets in ABC and ESPN the only places 
to see the most popular sport in the US on Sunday and Monday nights. Although CBS and FOX 
also had NFL contracts and access to more games (both the 1 pm and 4 pm Sunday start times), 
ESPN and ABC were the only channels to watch professional football during primetime. By 
guaranteeing the per subscriber increase at compounding levels across a growing industry, cable 
subscriptions increased from 51.7 million in 1990 to 66.7 million in mid 1999 (Federal 
Communications Comission 2000), and increasing ad revenue by gaining sustained access to 
primetime ad rates, the 1998 NFL rights deal thrust ESPN into the new millennium flush with 
rapidly increasing revenues to take on new formats and mediums, convinced of its dominance in 
sports not just on cable but in television writ large.  
 
ESPN in the 21st Century 
 
This dominance would continue throughout the 2000s as no real competition for sports rights 
existed beyond the 4 major networks (one of which was, of course, owned by its parent company 
and whose sports division had been dissolved into ESPN’s). Furthermore, these networks were at 
a distinct revenue disadvantage as they had only one source of revenue. Former CEO Steve 
Bornstein expressed that advantage: “By 1997 it was game, set, match. For every dollar I’m 
taking in, sixty five cents is coming from a subscription fee, thirty-five is coming from 
advertising, and the shmoe next door to me is getting everything from advertising. It’s over.” 
(Miller and Shales 2011:382) It might not have been “over” by 1997 as most sports rights in the 
late 90s and early 2000s still comfortably sat with broadcast incumbents.  The NFL changed 
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hands between FOX, CBS, and NBC for Sunday afternoon coverage. MLB baseball signed a 
$2.5 billion 6 year deal with FOX in 2000. (Raissman 2000) Major college sports events like the 
men’s NCAA basketball tournament and the New Year’s Day college football bowls remained 
on network television. However, the NBA contract starting in 2001 was split between ESPN, 
ABC, and TNT for a total of $4.6 billion for 6 years, the vast majority of these games airing on 
cable. (Inside Hoops n.d.) So, Bornstein was partly correct, in that cable sports, with its dual 
revenue stream, had a revenue advantage on the broadcast incumbents. If by his comments he 
meant that the beginning of a long end for the dominance of broadcast networks could be located 
in the late 1990s, he is also largely correct. But, as most CEO functions are often more 
ideological than practical, he may have overestimated his own firm’s role in that demise. By the 
late 90s and the early 2000s, new technologies and evolving league relationships to this 
technology had begun to enter the marketplace and changed two separate but intimately related 
fields that ESPN had come to lead in the sports media industry.  First, new technological forms 
came into the market starting in the late 1990s and proliferating greatly in the past 15 years that 
would both accelerate the value of live sports and push ESPN into rapidly escalating bidding 
wars for sports rights. Second, new technologies would also threaten ESPN’s other, long 
standing advantage as the singular place for sports fans to get access to the broadest range of 
asynchronous, renarrativized segments of video: highlights. In the following, the latter will be 
dealt with first as the erosion of ESPN’s dominance over the highlight has pushed it to adopt an 
all-in strategy for live sports.  
 
The role of ESPN as cultural phenomenon is often credited to its flagship program Sportscenter. 
Much intriguing work has been done in varying academic fields as to its cultural importance. 
	 114	
(Butterworth 2005; Farred 2000; Gamache 2010; Turner 2014) However, for the study of the 
political economy of the visual mediation of sport being conducted here, the aspect of 
Sportscenter that makes it of note is not unique to Sportscenter per se. Live rights were not the 
only reason that viewers tuned into ESPN and were only a part of the ESPN brand that had 
become synonymous with sports. The other, arguably equally important video form that built the 
ESPN brand was asynchronous and short, non-linear and renarrativized: the highlight. Any study 
of ESPN as a cultural phenomenon would be incomplete without a mention of the highlight and 
ESPN’s flagship shows Sportscenter, the first show the network ever ran. The show has been 
until recently primarily structured around reporting game results and highlights.  However, early 
in its run it had no highlights as even pre-recorded snippets of games are subject to the same 
strict rights contracts as live broadcasts. ESPN cobbled together varying sets of highlight rights 
as secondary contracts from original rights holders like NBC, CBS, and ABC for their first years. 
Although rights for highlights were not nearly as expensive as live rights, they were still a 
significant and separate cost. (Gamache 2010:194) Sportscenter, although of a distinctly lower 
budget then live sports production, still required capital investment to draw the ratings and 
cultural power that it gained. However, beginning in the late 1980s, leagues started to experiment 
with new deals that packaged live rights and highlights rights together. In the 1987 deal with the 
NFL, the one that several ESPN executives credit with making ESPN a truly legitimate 
household name, the NFL agreed to a new contract term: ESPN was granted unlimited usage of 
highlights. (Miller and Shales 2011:150) Although the buying of live rights entailed the capacity 
for retransmission of game content, they most often had restrictions that limited their use in 
certain timeframes (like several hours after the game had ended) and in certain quantities (like 
how long the highlight could be).  This was a new and very important development. 
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ESPN took their new bounty and not only strengthened Sportscenter, but built NFL Primetime 
which aired between the end of the late Sunday afternoon NFL games and the beginning of the 
Sunday night primetime game (half of which in this contract were slated to be on ESPN and then 
all of which were on ESPN from 1998-2005). NFL Primetime was consistently one of ESPN’s 
top rated shows, and in the context of late 1980s ESPN, this made a significant difference for a 
company still struggling to stay in the black. Not only is this a new step in the evolution of the 
political economy of the highlight, it in some ways makes up for the gap in the subscriber fee 
revenue stream as these highlight shows became more popular timeslots and could increase 
potential ad rates.  At a more abstract level, the lifting of the highlight restriction allows for a 
deeper engagement with the game itself as being able to see plays slowed down and the parts 
separated from the whole brought a deeper understanding of the game in a similar way as the 
disaggregation of statistical knowledge. As VP of Production Bob Rauscher says of the creation 
of NFL Primetime: “We were showing there, four, five minutes of highlights! The conceit was, 
don’t just show me Emmitt Smith’s touchdown, show me the key block that sprang Emmitt’s run 
as well.” (Miller and Shales 2011:151) This depth of game knowledge strengthened the bond 
between fans and ESPN, as for the duration of the 1987 contract ESPN was the only place where 
one could access this kind of video.  
 
This situation lasted until the end of the 2006 NFL contract when the NFL gave both the 
highlight show length highlight package to NBC (which took over Sunday night games) and 
began an aggressive campaign to take control of highlights in general. The first action crippled 
ESPN’s NFL Primetime, forcing it to move towards a talk and analysis format on Monday nights, 
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a much less rated format and timeslot.  This loss was compounded by the NFL’s move to put 
restrictive limits on networks and websites for how much highlight footage they could use. 
(McCarthy 2007) This move was to signal a growing effort by all the major leagues to serve their 
own highlights on multiple platforms including their websites and league owned cable television 
stations (by 2009 all of the big four sports leagues had their own networks and many college 
sports conferences followed in the 2010s).  Leagues saw the value in serving highlights on their 
own platforms as a) driving uptake of their stations with cable providers and b) ad revenue 
generators on their websites, the broad power that ESPN had built out of the highlight had begun 
to wane. This would only be worsened by the emergence of web 2.0 which allowed for easy user 
generated highlights to spread almost instantaneously around the web via social platforms and 
the explosion of mobile technologies that could serve short snippets of video wherever the fan 
happened to be. This dual movement of league enclosure and technologically enabled fan 
behavior hollowed out ESPN’s highlight empire, greatly troubling the Sportscenter franchise and 
drove ESPN into its “Embrace Debate” era of talking heads punditry a la cable news.  With its 
rating powerhouses weakened, it is no wonder that by the 2010s, ESPN had to double down on 
its commitment to live sports in order to maintain ad revenue.  However, as we have seen, this 
comes with increased costs which would by the middle of the 2010s start to cause serious 
problems for the network. 
 
ESPN’s dominance over nationally broadcasted16 live sports on pay TV was virtually unchecked 
for most of its first 20 years. Early in the 1980s, the USA Network (originally co-owned by the 
																																																								16	Unfortunately	the	very	lively	and	turbulent	history	of	regional	cable	sports	networks	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	study	at	hand.	They	contribute	much	to	the	political	economy	of	sports	and	to	the	general	ubiquity	of	synchronous	and	asynchronous	sports	video.	Of	
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Dolan family and Cablevision) had a similar portfolio of sports as ESPN but with less funding 
and a tumultuous ownership group, it pivoted out of sports programming by the mid 1980s. Ted 
Turner’s TNT and TBS were the only real competition as Turner pushed his Atlanta Braves on a 
national level and they had and continue to have NBA contracts.  However, no cable channel had 
the NFL and no cable channel had the array of college sports that ESPN had. In essence, then, 
when rights contracts came up for bidding, ESPN was bidding against networks who, as Steve 
Bornstein pointed out, were at a distinct revenue disadvantage. This kept overall growth in live 
sports rights relatively consistent with inflation. This began to change in the new millennium for 
a variety of reasons. First, the nature of television viewing had begun to change with the move to 
digital cable and satellite. Once digitized, the technological possibility of user-controlled 
asynchrononicity emerged and by the early 2000s several different digital video recording 
(DVR) devices were on the market.  The innovation of the DVR and the subsequent iterations of 
digital video delivery systems that allowed for asynchronous viewing created a rather obvious 
problem for television. When viewers can control the flow of what they are watching then why 
would they watch ads? By 2010, advertising industry analysis indicated that 86% of television 
ads were skipped by users watching via DVRs or other time shifting technology. (Plunkett 2010) 
Hence, when it comes to ad revenues, television that is more likely to be watched live (sports, 
awards shows, special events in general) becomes much more valuable and the competition 
amongst media outlets capable of paying for live rights intensified.   
 
In addition to the technological pressure on the market that increased the value of liveness, the 
aforementioned entrance into the picture of league owned media outlets reduced the amount of 																																																																																																																																																																																		particular	importance	is	that	many	of	them	are	part	of	larger	media	conglomerates	like	the	Fox	Sports	Networks,	Comcast	Sports	Networks,	and	Charter’s	LA	Sportsnet.		
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possible games available to the other television networks. With less supply and an even demand, 
prices are bound to increase. This situation was exacerbated by the creation of sports only cable 
channels by the major broadcast networks. Comcast, after merging with NBCUniversal in 2009, 
took their Versus channel and turned it into the NBC Sports Network in 2012 (renamed NBCSN 
in 2013). CBS purchased College Sports Television (an independent DirectTV only channel) and 
eventually renamed it the CBS Sports Network in 2011. Fox Sports, although already in charge 
of a large regional sports network (RSN) since its purchase of 50% stake in the Prime Ticket 
RSN in 1994 (renamed Fox Sports Network in 1996), was relatively late to the nationally 
distributed cable channel market. Generally content to syndicate centrally produced content like 
talk shows across its network, Fox didn’t introduce Fox Sports 1 until 2013. In addition to these 
new competitors, college sports conferences like the Southeastern Conference (SEC), the Big 
Ten, the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), the Pacific 12 (Pac 12), and individual schools like 
the University of Texas’s Longhorn Network took control of their live rights much in the same 
way that the professional leagues had, although several of them were in cooperative production 
deals with the likes of ESPN, Fox, and CBS.  So, not only was their less supply after the leagues 
and collegiate conferences exercised their muscle to remove some available games from the 
networks’ supply, the networks also operated more channels themselves thereby increasing 
demand. Given that price controls had been removed from the regulatory field and the demand 
for pay TV had not shown signs by the late ‘00s of weakening, it should come at no surprise that 
live sports rights contracts rose astronomically. The NFL’s 2006 deal with FOX, NBC, CBS, and 
ESPN represented a 27% increase over the 1998 deal (not that far off the rate of inflation in the 
US during the same period), (Sports Business Daily 2007) but the 2011 extensions of the 2006 
deal, which extended the deal an extra nine years, represented a 114% increase. (Badenhausen 
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2011) The NBA’s 2008 deal with ESPN/ABC and TNT represented a 60.9% increase over the 
2002 deal, a significant increase that probably owes to the slightly later date than the NFL’s 1998 
deal. (Gough 2001)  However, the 2016 deal, negotiated in 2014 during the rapid increase in 
demand and decrease in supply represented by the introduction of NBA TV, was a whopping 
224% increase over the 2008 deal. (Terlep and Sharma 2014) 
 
As these deals all had heavy ESPN involvement, the ESPN per subscriber fee rose apace during 
the early 2010s. And as this increase was passed onto cable subscribers, total cable bills 
continued to increase. ESPN’s share of this increase was becoming more and more notable.  
From 2012-2014, ESPN accounted for 13.3 percent of the increase in cable bill price calculated 
by taking the reported increase in ESPN per subscriber fees as a percentage of the increase in the 
FCC’s reported average “expanded basic” cable package fees. Overall per channel costs by the 
end of 2014 were .46 cents per channel. This is the average cost per channel (the mean) as 
determined by the total cost divided total number of channels in a “expanded basic” package. 
(Federal Communications Comission 2016) So, as ESPN’s per subscriber fee in 2014 was $6.04 
(Molla 2014) that means that ESPN’s cost per cable bill was 1400% greater than the mean. 
However, the median cost per channel was $0.14.  The next closest channel was TNT (which 
owns several sports right contracts including MLB regular season and playoff games and NBA 
regular season and playoff games) which charged $1.48.  That means that ESPN’s per subscriber 
fee was over 400% higher than its nearest competitor and over 4300% more than the median fee. 
ESPN’s “dominance” in cable television takes on a different character when considered in this 
fashion.  It should be noted that although industry wide data does not exist yet for 2017, the 
reported average per subscriber fee for ESPN had topped $9 per month (Gaines 2017), a roughly 
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50% increase in over a three year period necessitated by the new NBA television deal that went 
into effect for the 2016-17 NBA season.  
 
All of these increases also happened when cable subscriptions themselves were stagnant or 
mildly decreasing during the same time period. In 2012, total cable subscriptions in the US were 
97.4 million. By 2016, total cable subscriptions were at 96.8 million. A small decrease, to be sure, 
but steady growth is a prerequisite for continued capital investment and shareholder confidence 
and the growth of the cable industry until the end of the first decade of the millennium was 
reliably strong. (Schwindt 2016) What had been a growth industry at the time of the signing of 
the major NFL deal in 2008, had now significantly cooled off. On top of that decrease in total 
subscriptions, ESPN’s subscriptions decreased even more. Recall that through tiering, some 
cable providers were putting ESPN in premium tiers beyond basic cable; subscribers who didn’t 
cut the cable cord entirely could simply tier down. Hence while total cable subscriptions were 
down by 900,000 or a .92% change over a 5 period, ESPN subscriptions went down 4% in 2014, 
3.2% in 2015, and 2.2% in 2016. (Lieberman 2016) As the per subscriber fee was by 2014 60% 
of ESPN’s total revenue at $6.9 billion ($3 billion more than their total, across platform ad 
revenue) (Gaines 2015), it is not surprising that the per subscriber fee would either need to go up 
significantly to defray the losses in subscriptions or that ESPN’s revenue would take a significant 
hit. In addition, as the per subscriber fee became more and more public knowledge (reporting on 
this has taken a noted increase since 2014) and cable fees became higher and higher, the open 
secret of the per subscriber fee dual revenue model became more and more apparent: even if you 
don’t watch ESPN and have no interest in sports, if ESPN is your cable bundle, you are paying 
for it. It is with this as a backdrop that the problem of cord cutting took center stage.  
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Cord cutting, or cord shaving to denote a less drastic procedure or cord never to describe those 
who never signed up for cable, is the process by which former cable subscribers “cut the cord” 
and re-allocate their spending on entertainment programming to so called “Over The Top” 
(OTT) services like Netflix, Hulu, HBONow, AmazonPrime, Youtube, and Sling TV. OTT is the 
industry term that denotes video that is served via streaming technologies over the Internet, not a 
set-top box or a satellite. OTT services generally require either watching on different screens 
(laptops, phones, tablets) or the purchase of streaming device like a Roku, AppleTV, or Google 
Chromecast, Amazon Fire, Microsoft Xbox, Sony Playstation, or the purchase of an Internet 
connected Smart TV. These services have been wildly popular, Netflix counted 47.7 million 
paying subscribers (Dunn 2016) in the US in 2016, and have had notable negative impact on the 
cable industry writ large. However, this negative impact has been felt particularly intensely by 
ESPN as it reveals the aforementioned conundrum of the cable bundle. When consumers are 
given the option to stop paying for sports they don’t watch, they jump at the chance. This 
situation has raised the specter of the end of the cable bundle for cable providers. If subscribers 
are leaving cable because they incur costs that they don’t feel they should take on, then the 
solution for cable providers would be to offer custom bundles that allow subscribers to choose 
what they pay for. The so called “skinny bundle,” basically tiering by another name, is a attempt 
at giving consumers that option. However, for ESPN, having built their empire on the backs of 
non-watchers, the threat to the cable bundle is an existential threat to the dual revenue stream 
business model. The only way for them to combat this entirely would be explore their own OTT 
a la carte option. However, cable native channels who have begun to offer this can be counted on 
one hand: HBO and Showtime. These two, of course, are premium channels whose subscriber 
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base has always existed outside of the general cable bundle, so their per subscriber fees are based 
in consumers who actively want to pay for it. Not so for ESPN, hence making the OTT option 
seem less appealing both as a development level cost and for the implication that potential cable 
subscribers could circumvent the cable system, therefore making ESPN’s industry leading per 
subscriber fee seem less and less appealing to cable providers. ESPN understands the precarious 
position that its reliance on the subscriber fee has put it in.  Any indication that they can and even 
might go OTT could only deepen the demand for an ala carte option and raise the general 
animosity towards the brand that already exists. For cable, the loss of a significant fraction of 
ESPN subscribers would be an enormous loss of revenue. For an industry that has gone stagnant 
and is slowing bleeding consumers, any extra exodus would seem particularly onerous and the 
willingness to take on any increase (or even a maintenance) in per subscriber fees would be zero. 
Relatedly, for ESPN the potential of a standalone app could easily be biting the hands that feeds 
you that second revenue stream. So, the standalone app would only further upset the already 
disturbed balance of power between the cable companies and ESPN.  In a more direct way, the 
calculus of the system requires ESPN to maintain its highly expensive roster of sports rights 
within the existing cable infrastructure because the OTT option is a) not yet profitable enough or 
in demand enough and b) too damaging immediately to the already decreasing revenue stream 
coming from the per subscriber fee.  
 
In addition, in order to make a similar profit from their cable deal, an ESPN OTT ala carte option 
has been estimated to cost between as much as $36 month. (Pomerantz 2015) Compare to the 
most prominent OTT ala carte options of HBO Now ($15 month), Netflix ($10 a month), and 
Hulu ($7.99 a month) and we can see how this how cost might come with some sticker shock. If 
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we consider that average expanded basic cable package was $69.03 ((Federal Communications 
Comission 2016) then the upper end of the estimate actually equals nearly half of that same 
package. Also consider that internet access is required for an OTT option to function so the total 
cost of ala carte streaming ESPN would have to include the nearly $50 average cost of an 
internet connection (Seward 2014) effectively costing more for the cost of internet access and 
ESPN than it would for a full cable package and ESPN.  Cord cutting for sports fans would seem 
to be a losing proposition.17 In this way, ESPN sits atop cable television, an industry it dominates, 
but an industry in a crisis of its own making. It has created a product whose cost of production 
requires it to be subsidized by a toll paid by everyone who desires access to the media 
infrastructure on which it resides. This business model is by nature threatened by the political 
economy of the Internet, cable television’s competing media infrastructure, which for its entire 
duration has refused a business model where the owners of the distribution infrastructure pay for 
content.  
 
From Formal to Real Subsumption 
 
And why would Internet service providers (ISPs) pay for content? The Internet as it is 
constructed, as nodes of uploading and downloading information, is built for the decentralized 
production and display of content from as many users as possible. As a great deal of this content 
																																																								17	Also	important	to	this	discussion	is	the	fact	that	the	current	state	of	the	infrastructure	of	streaming	is	not	built	for	mass	market	live	viewing.	Speaking at Recode.net’s Code/Media 
conference, BAMTech (Baseball Advanced Media’s streaming spinoff company that handles 
streaming for MLB, the NHL, and HBO) CEO Bob Bowman made it very clear that major event 
live streaming as the primary option is still very far away.  At the February 2016 event, Bowman 
explained that BAMTech run HBONow’s concurrent viewer capacity is at 2 million.(Kafka 
2016)	
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is produced outside of wage relations (Terranova 2004), the advantage of ISPs over content 
providers is clear. In the cable model, the viewer is simply that, a relatively passive consumer 
who pays for access to the flow of television. As was shown in the history of the per subscriber 
fee, the political economy of cable television became stable only when both Roger Werner 
understood that the cable industry could be made to pay for content out of desperation and when 
the federal government lifted restrictions on prices allowing cable providers to pass that new cost 
onto consumers.  However, ESPN’s business innovation has been leveraged possibly too far, 
becoming a burden on the cable industry as it struggles to deal with new competition from both 
within and without that industry.   
 
The contemporary sports fan (both casual and fanatic) has access to more sports video then ever 
before. The sports media industry that ESPN came to shape and rule has been altered, just as 
every media industry has, by the Internet. The Internet’s archival qualities combined with its 
exponential capacities for the production of content both corporate and user generated has altered 
every media industry. These two qualities of digital production under capitalism produce a kind 
of overproduction of content that disperses the attention of spectatorship into an ever-expanding 
array of objects. In this overcrowded market, ESPN is but one provider of sports content and 
although liveness still provides great value for capital and has lately become a site of platform 
capital investment (Facebook Live, for example), ESPN’s oft stated emphasis on the live event 
(Kulwin 2016; Sharma and Ramachandran 2016; The Aspen Institute 2013) is no longer the 
statement of strength it used to be. As much as liveness breaks through the static of the archive, 
the overwhelming noise of all those records, the ad revenue produced by it will never make up 
for the 60% of revenue that the per subscriber fee created for ESPN. Hence, 60% of ESPN’s 
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revenue is tied to one access point and ultimately one kind of video experience, an interface and 
experience that have now become two amongst many.  As cable television loses its market share 
to the proliferation of internet connected screens and ESPN loses its dual stream revenue 
produced advantage in live sports rights, the balance of power in the political economy of sports 
media has begun to shift. Hence, ESPN faces the aforementioned problem of the ISPs 
unwillingness to pay for content, a situation born out of deregulation enabled monopoly power in 
the telecommunications industry.  
 
As Susan Crawford’s work has chronicled through a skillful telling of the conditions that led to 
the Comcast-NBCUniversal merger (approved by the FCC in 2011 and fully consummated in 
2013 when Comcast bought out General Electric’s remaining stake in NBCUniversal), Comcast 
is both the nation’s largest provider of cable television and internet access which gives it near 
monopoly leverage on content providers. (Crawford 2014) Through its ownership of sports 
franchises (the NHL’s Philadelphia Flyers and until 2011 the NBA’s Philadelphia 76ers), its 
large regional sports network CSN (which broadcasts in 9 major markets including New York, 
Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Washington DC), and its national cable sports 
channel NBCSN, Comcast presents a significant challenge to ESPN in the cable ecosystem. On 
top of that challenge, Comcast’s horizontal integration of infrastructure and content allows it to 
pool its capital in order to challenge ESPN’s negotiating position for live sports rights. And this 
is only the tip of the iceberg. If Comcast and the ISPs with whom it competes are successful in 
their long attempts to remove FCC regulations that ensure net neutrality, the policy that assures 
that content providers have equal access to the infrastructure of the internet regardless of the 
nature of their content, then the specter of flipping cable television’s per subscriber model 
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appears. If net neutrality is removed as a policy, what is to stop Comcast from protecting its 
horizontally integrated interest by charging rival content providers extra in order to be accessed 
via Comcast’s infrastructure? What is to stop them from creating their own dual income stream, 
one this time from both consumers and producers? In this instance, it should be no surprise that 
Verizon CEO Lowell McAdam was by the middle of 2017 floating the idea of a Disney/Verizon 
merger to combat the market power that Comcast has developed. (Moritz 2017) If Comcast can 
regulate the flows of information by creating fast lanes for its content and snarled heavy traffic 
for everyone else, even the attention advantage that a premium live event could bring would be 
lost. The advantage of liveness is in its synchronicity, its live connection between two places in 
the same time. Breaking this synchronicity by throttling the flow of information from live 
broadcast could only make the object being accessed less desirable. Making monopoly capital’s 
commodities easier to access than commodities not made by monopoly capital is a basic tactic of 
power consolidation.  To create this inequality in access, these differential speeds of access to the 
present, is to attempt to really subsume the attention of fans under monopoly capital’s logic. To 
submit attention to the logic of capital, to make the tools through which attention is able to work 
on its object vary in their quality depending on the fee that the laborer has paid to work. 
Throughout the history of the visual mediation of sport fandom the act of sports spectatorship 
was both expanded in space-time and subsumed through the progressive introduction of 
technological and political economic innovations creating both a greater amount of time that 
could be spent watching and an intensified degree of contact.  
 
Marx’s concept of subsumption is broken out into two related yet separate processes in the 
subordination of the labor process to capital: formal and real subsumption. (Marx 1990:1019-
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1038) First, in formal subsumption, the labor process must be made to serve the capitalist’s 
valorization process, ie. the production of surplus value from the labor power that capital has 
purchased. Second and following from the first, real subsumption is when capital subsumes the 
labor process by taking hold of it, managing and directing it, reshaping it, as the Endnotes 
Collective says (Endnotes 2010), in its own image. These two moments also closely reflect 
Marx’s twin concepts of absolute and relative surplus value, forms of value extraction from labor 
that rely on the extension of the work day (absolute) and intensification of the work process itself 
(relative). (Marx 1990) It is here that the real analytic power of subsumption becomes clear for 
an analysis of the political economy of sports spectatorship.  Leisure time, of which sports 
spectatorship is an extremely prevalent aspect, has been understood since the Frankfurt School as 
a grounds for the extension of absolute surplus value outside of the factory, formally subsuming 
it by making it valuable to capital. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007) For visually mediated sports 
fandom, the formal subsumption into capital logics does not necessarily change the process of 
watching. Yes, it is constrained by the television’s frame but the continuous broadcast feed 
merely resembles the linear experience of being at the event itself. Before the advent of pay TV 
and ESPN, this formal subsumption was valorized the networks by selling the attention power of 
fans to advertisers.  The argument here for attention as productive of value, as Dallas Smythe and 
later Sut Jhally and Bill Livant argued in the 1970s and 1980s when attempting to identify the 
processes of value production in the dominant ad supported media of their era, is particularly 
valid for this formally subsumed era of visually mediated sport fandom. (Jhally and Livant 1986; 
Smythe 1977) When formally subsumed, the fan watches the live event through a single 
interface, the television set. Sport media capital offers the fan the object, the event, the raw 
material to be worked on with attention and then sells that attention as a valorized commodity to 
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advertisers. As Jhally and Livant referred to it, the fan’s “watching-time” is the commodity and 
the wage that comes back to the worker is the event itself.  
 
Cable television adds an extra surcharge onto this process, valorizing the access to the event 
itself. In this way it resembles the ticket to the actual event, only if you had to pay for a ticket to 
the event even if you weren’t going.  But this ticket gave you access to the very possibility of 
utilizing your attention-time to create further value for capital. The fan consumes a commodity, 
access, and then becomes a commodity themselves. Capital has begun the process of real 
subsumption then, reshaping and redirecting, grabbing hold of the work process and valorizing it 
in new ways. The dual revenue stream is but the first step in the intensification of the 
valorization process, the multiplication of moments of valorization that indicates the onset of a 
regime of relative surplus value.  The next step towards real subsumption and the dominance of 
relative surplus value in the political economy of sports media is the proliferation of screens and 
access points. By creating new moments of contact, capital is pulling the attention of fans into as 
many places as possible. By proliferating interfaces from both hardware (our phones, tablets, 
streaming devices, etc.) and software (the mobile apps, websites, and platforms that serve us the 
images), capital has new ways to measure and therefore valorize attention. Christian Fuchs, 
building from Smythe, Jhally and Livant, and in a nod to the Italian Autonomists, has invoked a 
“social worker” (which builds on the Autonomist Marxist concept of the “social factory” 
(Cleaver 2000)) who goes online and creates value by generating data that is then sold to 
advertisers. This sale is what justifies the user’s status as a worker; it is the sale of attention 
power. 
 
	 129	
As Fuchs says, echoing Horkheimer and Adorno, this results in a “liquefaction of boundaries” 
between work time and non-work time, an expansion of absolute surplus value. (Fuchs 2014a, 
2014b) However, in order for real subsumption to occur their needs to be an attended 
acceleration of the work process, a new strategy must be enacted to increase relative surplus 
value. This is accomplished through the multiplication and intensification of possible moments 
of attention, moments that are logged and turned into rich data objects that become commodities. 
The process of the liquefaction of the boundaries between a labor time and a non-labor time, or 
time that produces value for capital or time that does not, is accomplished by proliferating the 
moments where attention power is valorized, moments that become these data objects as traces 
of attention paid. However, the problem for ESPN is that the cable model they passes on the cost 
of their content (that which is to be paid attention to) onto the infrastructure who in turn passes 
that cost onto the social worker. This presents a cost that many are unwilling (the cord cutter) or 
unable (the cord never) to pay for. Hence their ability to increase and therefore really subsume 
the process of sports spectatorship hits a limit as it can only intensify the work process for a 
limited number of workers who will never represent the whole workforce. The sports media 
industry is but one element of the culture industry. Ultimately, the history of ESPN represents 
one of the culture industry’s many attempt to transition from the formal subsumption of attention 
to its real subsumption. In the next chapter, we will discover that the limits of this process stretch 
far beyond the sports industry wing of the culture industry. The crisis at the end of the real 
subsumption of attention is forcing a reconfiguration of capital across the culture industry and 
the companies that own the infrastructure are leading. 
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Chapter 5 
All That is Solid Melts Into Content: Contentification and the Real 
Subsumption of Sport Fan Attention 
 
In the previous chapters, a clear, technologically produced pattern has emerged. As all of the fan 
practices and business case studies examined here have shown, the introduction of the Internet 
has drastically altered the political economy of sport fandom and, hence, the sports media 
industries that serve it. The Internet made blogging possible, upsetting the established field of 
newspaper sports reporting and punditry, but in the transition between the early, freewheeling 
blogosphere and the streamlined businesses of Bleacher Report that came to dominate, the logics 
of scale and attention inherent to the commercial internet created a semi-professionalized field 
rife with exploitation. When fantasy sports reached the Internet, it was only a matter of time 
before the speed and scale made possible by the Internet birthed something like DFS, shaping 
fantasy sports in the image of capitalism’s hegemonic statistical field and its risk management 
logics. The Internet has posed an existential threat to ESPN’s dominance of the cable sports 
ecosystem, diffusing irreparably the attention it had once laid claim to and laying bare the 
attention that it had valorized yet never actually held. Although these changes have played out in 
different ways, a consistent logic exists across them, a logic that drives a process inherent to the 
structure of the Internet.  I call this process “contentification”: the manner in which 
heterogeneous and disparate media objects, through their production, distribution and use, are 
rendered homogenous in order to produce value as objects that are worked on by users. This 
process and its internal logic has swept through not just the sports media industries but the digital 
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culture industries writ large, resulting in the exponential production of content. This exponential 
quantity, however, outstrips the capacity for human attention to take it in, resulting in a crisis of 
overproduction that threatens to force a reconfiguration of capital.  As we have seen in the case 
studies of Bleacher Report, DFS, and ESPN, this reconfiguration is already underway.  
 
To grasp the nature of contentification, an investigation into the implications of using the term 
“content” to describe a vast array of media, no matter its provenance, is required. What does this 
term, so rampant in the digital cultural industries denote and what is its ideological function? 
Leaning on Matthew Fuller and Andrew Goffey’s work on workflow, and Christian Fuchs work 
on the audience commodity, I’ll attempt to answer those two questions. I’ll also compare the 
contemporary, digital use of the word “content” to the other definitions of the word, particularly 
in the classic dichotomy between content and form, in order to get further at the ideological 
underpinnings of what drives “contentification.” Another binary split of particular importance in 
this discussion is that between “product” and “content.” In the digital publishing industries, 
software produced in-house is known as “product” while “content” is generally understood to be 
any media that is shaped and distributed by “product.” The largest, most well funded digital 
media companies (like B/R) have invested significant amounts of capital into their “product 
teams,” knowing that “content” need not necessarily be produced in-house. Product in these 
companies is a way to describe software interfaces that are used to both create and interact with 
content.  Product acts as the two-way tool that facilitates contentification. But as the management 
of content has been streamlined and regularized, as product has become the site of capital 
investment, product’s ability to collect and serve content has raised the threat of a bubble.   
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By theorizing the changes in sports fandom and sports media caused by the Internet as 
contentification, we can examine the mechanics of how capital and sport fans attempt to deal 
with the essential finiteness of the time and space of the sporting event itself. In order to expand 
profits and maintain growth, sports media’s reliance on the live event of sport requires the 
proliferation of contact points, new moments of interaction with the sport fan’s object of 
passionate interest. These contact points are “content” served to fans through a multitude of 
interfaces.  The problem of the finiteness of the event can only be partially solved by more 
events, a strategy with clear spatio-temporal limits. These limits are also not just spatio-temporal 
as the production of more events from sport also requires agreements between athletes and 
owners which are ruled by collective bargaining agreements and even then follow a law of 
diminishing returns as creating more events bumps up against a fandom’s ability to pay for 
attendance to extra events in an era of widespread wage stagnation. To submit the event of sport 
to contentification is to attempt to overcome these limits. This process creates a form of relative 
surplus value moving past the limits of the absolute surplus value of the event. As discussed in 
the conclusion of Chapter 4 in regards to live broadcast but argued more generally here, this shift 
from absolute surplus value to relative surplus value can also be understood as the shift from the 
formal subsumption of the live event of sport to the real subsumption of the experience of sport.  
 
But, first let us return to word itself. What does it mean to use the term content to signify an 
extremely disparate array of media objects? First, it connotes a process of abstraction that can 
turn pieces of video, still images, text, and numbers into simply different iterations of the same 
substance.  This squares partly with many different definitions of “content” itself. From the 
OED: “that which is contained in anything, a thing contained, the amount contained” or a 
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psychological definition: “the totality of the constituents of a person’s experience at any 
particular moment” or in regards to piece of writing: “the things contained or treated of in a 
writing or document” or finally, in the philosophical sense: “the sum of qualities, notions, ideal 
elements given in or composing a conception; the substance or matter (of cognition, or art, etc.) 
as opposed to form.” (Anon n.d.) Returning to the last portion more later, we first see that the 
elements of content are abstracted as similar once they are  “contained” within something else.  
When “contained or treated of” they become elements that express the larger whole. There may 
be elements that dominate the character of the whole, that determine the experience of the 
container itself, but in the last analysis, the “contents” are still the contents of something else.  
What this points to in contentification is the need to determine the nature of the container of the 
content. What is this form through which this content is expressed? And what is the nature of this 
form’s relationship to its content?  
 
In the digital cultural industries, content is a modular, iterable, constantly growing archive of 
media objects expressed through digital interfaces. But, what do we mean by “interface.” At one 
level, we mean both the screens we access content through and the software that makes that 
content intelligible.  Matthew Fuller and Florian Cramer define the interface as “the point of 
juncture between different bodies, hardware, software, users, and what they connect to or are a 
part of. Interfaces describe, hide, and condition the asymmetry between the elements conjoined.” 
(Fuller and Cramer 2008:149) This definition points to the inherent power imbalance that this 
asymmetry creates. The records produced from sport are expressed through interfaces, the points 
of juncture, and accessed by fans via those interfaces. When a fan came to Bleacher Report in its 
pre-TNT buyout form, the nature of the labor that produced the article they read was hidden. At 
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first glance, there was no way to know if the writer who produced the content being read was 
paid or trained or qualified.  What users could see were a writers profile page which listed basic 
statistics like number of articles written, number of pageviews, and various “achievements” 
medals which indicated articles that had reached certain page view milestones.18  Hence, the 
interface of Bleacher Report showed what had been determined as the most important aspect of a 
writer’s profile:  pageviews. The asymmetry of this interaction, “between the elements 
conjoined” is a function of the interfaces ability to reify the relations of both its own production 
and the commodities that are served by it. For DFS, in its dependence on the high frequency 
players (the sharks), the interface initially hid the advantage that the sharks had over less 
experienced players. It was only after legislation and legal pressure that DraftKings and Fanduel 
began to reveal the experience level of players. The interface can describe or choose not to 
describe the asymmetry between parties that meet through its logic. ESPN’s life as a lucrative 
cable television channel is dependent on the interface between cable and television. Breaking 
that juncture, a juncture that attaches ESPN to the larger bundle of channels that make up the 
cable model, would reconfigure the asymmetries built into the bundle and reveal the asymmetries 
that it relied on to build such a robust company.  In all these cases, the interface’s power 
asymmetry was able to occlude the nature of the content being accessed by users. The media 
objects that the Bleacher Report reader, DFS players, and ESPN watchers accessed via their 
interfaces, the experiences that they were able to have with these media objects, were structured 
																																																								18	These	pages	are	now	essentially	unreachable	in	their	previous	form.	Urls	for	individual	pages	now	generate	errors	pages	and	writer	profile	pages	archived	by	the	Internet	Archive’s	Wayback	Machine	don’t	share	the	statistics	as	those	statistics	were	being	pulled	live	from	a	server	that	is	no	longer	connected	to	the	Internet.	For	reference,	see	https://web.archive.org/web/20120518112826/http://bleacherreport.com/users/117701-mike-mcd		
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by knowledge deficits that allowed the companies that owned the interfaces (the means of 
interaction) to profit. 
 
The interface not only creates profit through knowledge deficits born of its power asymmetry, it 
also structures the content itself as value producing.  Media objects become content through the 
form of the interface which expresses it through its own logic. Matthew Fuller and Andrew 
Goffey, in their book Evil Media, argue that “the regularization of expression is . . . a . . . 
tendency evident in practices of the organization of people and things as and for data in 
computational culture, following the general principle that structured data are more tractable to 
processing than unstructured data.” ( 2012:111) Tractable and therefore abstractable data are 
organized (curated, as they) and put into circulation, expressed machinically.  Bleacher Report’s 
reliance on the slide show (a reliance not exclusive to them but rampant across the internet 
publishing industry) is an example of how the structure of an argument (Top 10 Reasons Why) 
can be made tractable to capital. The slideshow structure, which Bleacher Report became 
infamous for, is so popular a form for content because each click of the slideshow to the next 
element generates a data point of attention, as each slide has its own unique URL, marking the 
movement through the slideshow is easily traceable. Basic analytic software can track where you 
stopped for longer, which slide you came back to, how far into the slideshow you got. The 
content here has been structured “as and for data.” These data points are then packaged and sold 
as commodities to advertisers who use it to build advertising campaigns that sell your attention 
back to you. Hence, the interface collects the user’s interactions with content and reforms it as 
valuable to capital. Furthermore, Goffey and Fuller point out “what you can machinically 
enunciate must correspond with the arrangement of the data structure.” (112) In other words, you 
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can only speak in the same language as the machine. Hence, the interfaces (screens, platforms, 
websites, streaming devices, software) through which we access content always already 
“contain” it.  And as all of the interfaces through which sport fans access content are capitalist 
enterprises which seek to subsume this entire process under capitalist forms of relations, the 
nature of this making tractable is a process of subsumption, making the content not only valuable 
to capital but managing and directing it towards the real subsumption that is contentification.  
 
The interface accomplishes this subsumption through controlling the means of creating content.  
Fuller and Goffey, in their discussion of regularization of expression, go on to argue that “the 
event of communication – the fact that one speaks, that signs are emitted – is traduced and 
remains hidden behind what the software parse of what is said. In point of fact, the user need not 
really say much, since it is the form of expression, not its content, that satisfices.” Here Fuller 
and Goffey are describing the manner in which interfaces translate human action into tractable 
data “a rescripting of enunciation wherein speech or writing can be translated into scrolling, 
pointing, clicking, and data entry.” (112) Coming from a humanities tradition that analyzes 
software and the digital as language, however, they stop short of investigating what this act of 
translation does when it is submitted to capital’s logic. Although it is certainly true that 
technology shapes the labor process no matter if it is capital that owns it or not, a reckoning with 
the way that capital puts technology to use is essential to any analysis of how interfaces 
transform the social. With that in mind, a certain amount of translation is necessary in order to 
apply Fuller and Goffey’s thoughtful work to the task at hand. Following from the idea that the 
interface is a two-way tool, we can take their “event of communication” and replace the software 
that parses the speaker’s content and the user’s data with the product.  We can replace the 
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speaker/user with the content producer who uses the product by giving over expression to it and 
the audience who accesses the content through the product.  The product contains the content for 
both the content producer and the audience, regularizing expression and its reception to the point 
of formalism. In the content formalism of contentification, the function from which form follows 
is the regularization of expression, the making tractable of media objects, requiring content to 
submit to the form. In Bleacher Report’s rapid venture capital fueled rise before its Turner 
buyout, several high profile writers hired to help clean up the site’s reputation and elevate the 
quality of the content it produced promptly left within the first 6 months. (Bucholtz 2013) The 
primary complaint from these writers centered around having to use Bleacher Report’s custom 
CMS which forced much of their work into slideshow and other formalized formats that 
diminished their creative control.  This places content creators in a familiar position, that of the 
worker being deskilled. Control over the knowledge of the labor process once alienated into 
machines represents the impoverishment, in multiple ways, of the worker and the alienation from 
the product of their labor.  
 
This is, of course, not a new argument. Harry Braverman’s famous discussion of deskilling in 
Labor and Monopoly Capital extends Marx’s understanding of the role of machinery in the 
production process from Capital Vol. 1. (Braverman 1998; Marx 1990) A contemporary take on 
this that applies to the discussion of interfaces here is Michael B. McNally’s “Enterprise Content 
Management Systems and Application of Taylorism and Fordism to Intellectual Labor” 
McNally’s analysis centers specifically on business workflow software and the rhetoric 
employed by the companies that produce them, using a relatively straightforward deskilling 
argument that leans heavily on Braverman.  In short, McNally makes a claim for the continuing 
	 138	
relevance of Braverman in the age of “immaterial labor” or “cognitive capitalism” and 
foregrounds the negative impact on the worker control of the labor process by technology. 
(McNally 2010) To be sure, management as a technology of labor organization is certainly still 
alive and as obsessed with the efficiency of movement (both human and non-human) as ever. 
However, arguing about this through the lens of “labor” in the sense of labor in an office covers 
an increasingly small amount of value production in contemporary capitalism.  The interface 
extends far beyond the office. However, scholars of labor have in essence taken up the question 
of the interface whenever they discuss the role of technology in the changing labor process, 
specifically when they discuss the role of computerization. Aronowitz and DeFazio implicitly 
describe the role of the digital interface’s ability to abstract heterogenous labor and make it 
homogenous, a process that closely resembles contentification: “Knowledge itself, once firmly 
tied to specific labor processes such as steelmaking, now becomes a relatively free-floating 
commodity to the extent that it is transformed into information that requires no productive 
object. This is the real significance of the passage from industry-specific labor processes to 
computer mediated work as a new universal technology” (Aronowitz and DiFazio 1994:17). A 
similar approach to the informationalization of labor has been espoused by Antonio Negri and 
Michael Hardt in their trilogy of books Empire, Multitude, and Commonwealth (2001, 2005, 
2011) and Negri’s Autonomist Marxist colleagues like Maurizio Lazzarato (1996) and Christian 
Marazzi (2008) with again the emphasis being on both the radical break in the production 
process that the computer interface requires and the way that it homogenizes the heterogeneous 
activities that flow through it. This latter point is essential to Hardt and Negri’s theory of the 
multitude in that the multitude is produced by the universalization of all labor and therefore, in a 
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slightly simplistic Marxian teleology, creates a 21st century version of Marx’s industrial 
proletariat that can be led to revolutionary consciousness. 19  
 
In contrast, Aronowitz and DeFazio foreground the idea that this universalization creates the loss 
of human knowledge: “Knowledge becomes ineluctably intertwined with, even dependent on, 
technology . . . . “ (17). This is similar to arguments made by Bernard Stiegler in his work on 
hypomnesis and discretization. For Stiegler, the evolution of technology, or more broadly 
“technics” which includes not just tools but also practices, leads to the alienation of knowledge 
through its exteriorization into these tools and practices. This making-technical of memory is 
what he refers to as hypomnesis. Stiegler argues that in the Industrial Revolution the articulation 
of the motions of workers into machines, or what he calls the “discretizing of production,” was a 
process of proletarianization or in his terminology a loss of know-how. (Stiegler 2011, 2010) 
Similar to Aronowitz and DeFazio’s argument about the dependence of knowledge upon 
technology, Stiegler’s vision of the intertwining of technology with the production process is not 
best characterized by the homogenization of heterogeneous labors leading to revolutionary class 
like in Hardt and Negri’s formulation, but rather as a function of capital’s control over the 
process of production. For Stiegler, technology’s role in human society (not just under 
capitalism) is to supplement the finite memory of the human. As the retentional capacity of the 
human is limited, the knowledge that is required to build civilization is impossible without 
technology. However, under capitalism this “tertiary memory” in technology is alienated from 
the rest of society and put to work for surplus value production rather than greater societal ends.  																																																								19	Katie	Vann	offers	an	important	critique	of	Hardt	and	Negri’s	argument	about	the	universalization	of	labor	created	by	computerization	in	her	article	“On	the	Valorization	of	Informatic	Labor”	where	she	argues	that	far	from	a	break	from	modernist	managerial	practices,	computerization	is	merely	an	intensification	of	those	practices.	(2004)	
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As argued above, the interface, as power/knowledge imbalance fits this description quite well. 
The interface and the work it does in the process of contentification creates a knowledge 
dependency (and sometimes an engineered deficiency) for the user.  The loss of know how 
inherent to corporate, closed interfaces, where the process of retention is black boxed off from 
the user and the process of work is alienated from the worker, fits Stiegler’s vision.  The effect of 
contentification on the cultural object creators of the digital cultural industries is in effect the 
same as the dehumanization of all deskilling processes.  
 
However, deskilling and the attendant intensification of the labor process does not necessarily 
lead to a crisis, let alone one of overproduction. How does contentification lead to a crisis of 
overproduction? It is here that the other portion of the “event of communication” must be 
considered: the receiver. In the “event of communication” “the user need not really say much 
since it is the form of expression, not its content, that satisifices.” (Fuller and Goffey 2012:112) 
The user of the interface in the process of contentification is not only the content producer 
because the interface is a two way tool used by both content producer and the audience for 
access to the content. The term audience is preferable to “consumer” to denote the position of the 
receiver primarily because content is not “consumed” in the sense that it is used up in the way 
one consumes food or fire consumes something. (Williams 1985:78) There is no destruction at 
the point of “consumption,” no taking out of circulation even. This is part of what contributes to 
the glut of content in the current moment. Instead, using the term audience follows through on 
the sender/receiver model of the event of communication and centers the audience as a source of 
value. Advertisers have long conflated audiences and consumers and as mentioned in Chapter 4, 
advertising supported media was fertile ground for Marxist communication scholars to argue for 
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the act of being an audience as productive of surplus value. Christian Fuchs, in his book Culture 
and Economy in the Age of Social Media, points out that wherever there is culture to be paid 
attention to there must be cultural labor that produces the conditions of its performance. In the 
case of digitally mediated cultural practices like the ones examined in this dissertation, cultural 
objects require physical workers who make the cultural technology and “information workers” 
who use the cultural technology to produce the information that makes up the cultural product. 
This is essentially an argument for including a whole chain of workers into the cultural 
production process (particularly the digital cultural production process) from the miners in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo who mine the tantalum that fill capacitors on mobile devices, to 
Foxconn workers in Shenzhen who produce iPhones, to software engineers in Cupertino who 
design the operating systems on those iPhones. In the case of sports media, this chain would also 
include athletes, camera operators, web server administrators, trainers, statisticians, lawyers, and 
on and on. (Fuchs 2015) For example, for a site like B/R in its earlier incarnations you would 
also include the web developers in charge of their CMS and the TeamStream app, the editorial 
layer employees managing the bloggers, and the bloggers themselves. 
  
Fuchs then introduces Smythe’s concept of the audience commodity into this chain to include the 
users of the cultural objects, accessed through interfaces, which are often left out of accounts of 
the political economy of culture. (Smythe 1977) As these interfaces are increasingly parts of our 
everyday life both in and outside of the home, in and outside of the workplace, the terrain of 
everyday life is now subject to capital’s attempts to subsume it at a maximum level. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, this is the liquefaction of boundaries between work time and non-work 
time.  As formal subsumption, also a question of time, the only competition would seem to be 
	 142	
sleep, an argument that both art historian Jonathan Crary makes in his book 24/7 and Netflix 
CEO Reed Hastings made in a 2017 earnings call: “We’re competing with sleep, on the margin. 
And so, it’s a very large pool of time.” (Crary 2014; Kafka 2017) Real subsumption in the digital 
culture industries and the process of contentification intensifies the experience of the audience by 
the multiplication of interfaces through which the exponentially increasing content can be 
accessed.  The function of product, or what Fuchs calls “cultural technologies“ is to make both 
the sender and receiver of the event of communication readable to capital, commensurate to its 
M-C-M1 logic.  The fan-writer cum blogger laboring through the B/R “open network” CMS has 
their fandom mobilized to draw attention from a reader whose interest in the content the blogger 
creates is also logged by the CMS as data to be sold to an advertiser. The product (in)forms the 
content and produces surplus value from both the content producer and the audience worker. But 
what is the nature of what the product, the form, functionalizes from the audience? What does it 
transmute into labor? 
 
Fuchs has argued that at times Marxists are guilty of a “wage-labour fetishism” that refuses to 
give the honorary “labor” to anything unwaged. (Fuchs 2014a) By including all the activity 
contained in the cultural technology (waged or not, extracted under free conditions or not) and 
placing it in the chain of labor (that activity that produces surplus value), we can see the audience 
not just as “commodity” as Smythe puts it but as unwaged labor that produces surplus value, the 
move that Sut Jhally and Bill Livant make when they refer to “watching as working.” (1986) The 
audience’s labor power is the labor of attention. Or, as Marx insists that what the worker 
exchanges for wages is not the act of labor but labor power, the capacity for work, we can call it 
attention power, the capacity to have your presence with a cultural object recorded and directed. 
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That is what is sold.   The labor of attention is alienated via its recording by the vast analytic 
(product) infrastructure of the interfaces of the culture industry and this process, the process of 
recording the presence of attention power was totally revolutionized by the Internet and digital 
technology. The Internet offers an infinitely more precise and detailed measure of attention 
power than was ever possible before. Print always had the purchase of itself, the circulation 
numbers to prove to advertisers that someone was seeing the space they were buying.  Television 
required the development of a broad research apparatus (primarily by the famed Nielsen Media 
Research company) that was nonetheless reliant on sampling methodology that could never offer 
more than probabilities. The Internet, however, can constantly produce archives of presence, of 
proximities to cultural objects and interactions with them. The result of this process is a precise 
set of quantities abstracted from an ever-increasing list of qualities: the who, what, when, where 
and how of each piece of content was accessed. These data points are content in and of 
themselves that become the commodities sold to advertisers that are then sold as a service to 
producers of other commodities.  
 
However, as a content of the commodity form of contentification, attention is different from the 
labor of the cultural content producer.  Attention once contained is circulated and recombined, 
like the media object, placed next to other traces of attention that are associated with other bodies 
that are associated with other commodities, populations of bodies imbricated with the circulation 
of commodities. Elements of your presence (your demographics, for example) are combined with 
traces of the places that you’ve been (geolocation data) and the websites that you’ve visited to 
tailor ads to you, to take elements of your attention, recombine them and sell a commodity based 
on a semblance of that attention back to you.  However, attention is a finite human capacity and 
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no matter the increase in the intensity of attention time to as many screens and platforms as 
possible and new ways of recording attention (relative surplus value), and no matter the amount 
of “screentime” we allow ourselves in a day (absolute surplus value), there are limits. While the 
media objects of contentification proliferate at a seemingly endless pace, our physical selves 
limit our capacity as audience workers to receive and interact with these objects. The inherent 
contradiction of the sender/receiver communicative event contained by the cultural technologies 
of contentification is how the exponential increase in sent messages would always outstrip the 
available time with which to attend to them.  The dead labor of the product seeks to contain the 
living labor of attention, but so much product will remain incomplete in its contents. As much as 
the formal subsumption of attention has limits for growth, so to does its real subsumption.  
 
So where does that leave the sports media industries considered here? Sports are inherently 
recursive, repetitive at both the micro and marco levels. As finite as games and seasons are, 
there’s always next year as the saying goes. But at the more micro level, each game has a series 
of small events that are repeated. For example, in any given baseball game there at least 49 
instances where a pitcher throws to a batter. In a given baseball season a team plays at least 162 
games, so a fan following that team has at least 7,938 chances to see their team in action at a 
micro level. There are 30 teams in Major League Baseball making for 2430 games in a regular 
season (not including the playoffs). Hence, there are at least 119,070 plays that fans can witness 
a year. That number is, of course, the absolute lowest possible amount of potential events. In 
reality the number is exponentially higher, not to mention that within each play are each pitch 
and each swing or non-swing pushing the available number of moments exponentially further.  
Regardless of the actual number, each of these moments is potentially witnessed in person by 
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ticket paying fans and witnessed live via broadcast. Witnessed events, whether paid for via the 
sale of the ticket directly to fans or the sale of broadcast rights to networks or platforms who then 
either transfer that cost to viewers (like ESPN’s per subscriber fee) and/or advertisers (as in all 
ad-supported broadcast), are exceptionally lucrative, as ESPN’s dominant role in the sports 
media industry attests to. Events witnessed live are obviously not, however, the only source of 
value and are also not necessarily effected by the process of contentification as they are the 
occupation of large blocs of time sold as large blocs of time, and hence, not necessarily the 
intensification of that time. ESPN’s mission of a 24 hour sports network never included a 
constant slate of live sporting events. This is largely because the cost of the raw material (live 
sports) worked on by fans (through attention labor) never matched the amount of money that 
could be made from the sale of the attention commodity (to advertisers) and the per subscriber 
fee had to make up the difference. Liveness is lucrative, but the profits don’t necessarily belong 
to the distributor who must rely on the records of sport to make up the gap. 
 
Hence, to see the full impact of contentification on the sports media industry we have to move 
beyond the basic recursive liveness of sports and go back to what was dealt with explicitly in the 
discussion of statistical fandom and implicitly in the discussion of sports blogging and visually 
mediated fandom: the immanence of record keeping to organized sport.  Because records are 
always already a part of sport, contentification can take hold in sport as soon as the technological 
means are available, ie. a fully mature commercialized Internet. The records produced by these 
technological means, however, are of generally the same nature as they have always been, 
essentially forms of observation: qualitative and quantitative, textual, numerical, and visual. 
These observations beget more observations: new statistical measures, new arguments, and new 
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visual forms. These new forms of observation contribute to an ever-growing archive accessible 
through the interfaces of the Internet by an audience whose attention is recorded (observations 
themselves, of course) and then sold to advertisers. The observations of sports, the exponential 
records of liveness, are generally available for free as the ad-based revenue model continues to 
reign. This free availability drives the contentification of the sports media industry towards two 
poles, instantaneous feeds that update on the heels of liveness and vast databases of records with 
which to compare and contrast the minutiae of sports history of the 20th and 21st centuries. Each 
game and each play is nearly instantaneously accessed via the interfaces of contentification. Use 
Bleacher Report’s TeamStream app to access all the latest updates for your favorite team, 
updates that are almost entirely syndicated from other sources. Go to any number of websites 
(ESPN’s, CBS’s, Yahoo’s, MLB’s) and get a live updating box score. Follow the reporters from 
your favorite outlets on social media to get live updates from the game as it happens and the 
locker room after it ends. Go to your fantasy sports app of choice to see how the players on your 
fantasy team’s performances of the day match up with the players on your opponent’s team.  
Once a play is over for long enough to be uploaded to social media or a website, watch the 
homerun or the dunk or the touchdown or the goal that just happened even if you didn’t witness 
it live. Any major play is with little delay available to billions of eyeballs.  After every game and 
every season, the archive built from these records can then be put into conversation with past 
season’s archives and new records are created. New arguments can be had about whether Aaron 
Judge’s rookie season compares favorably to Lou Gherig’s rookie season or Derek Jeter’s or Don 
Mattingly’s, all readily available and comparable from baseball-reference.com (which operates 
extensive database sites for all the major sports). The records of a sport exist across space and 
time and can be recombined to produce more and more attention that exists far beyond the event 
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of the game. The happenings of a mid-summer night in Yankee Stadium extend far beyond the 
South Bronx almost infinitely.  This is the process of the recursive becoming-content of sport.  
 
Whole industries like the one’s examined in this dissertation have arose because of this recursive 
nature and its capacity to be distributed (to be expressed, as Fuller and Goffey might put it) as 
recombined elements, always creating new content in the process.  Fantasy sports and the 
industry built around it (the advice sites, the statistical modeling packages that predict which 
player will be the most valuable, the batch processing software that allows DFS sharks to load 
hundreds of entries at a time) is the recombination of statistical observations of sport into a 
competitive game that due to its popularity now supports a whole secondary industry aimed at 
optimizing participant success. Users of the interfaces of the sports media industry create not just 
attention metrics but whole new records themselves, creating almost infinitely recursive data sets 
on the level of a Mandlebrot fractal. As the sports media industry and sports fans revolve around 
the events of sport, spinning out records, which are then observed and become new records being 
observed and becoming the ground for even more records, the affinity for sports and sports 
media to contentification becomes clear.  
 
At the limit case of infinite recursion, all of these records outstrip the human capacity to attend to 
them. However, one need not go that far to understand that the proliferation of contact points 
with the live events of sport have reached economic and legal limits on their asymptotic march to 
the real subsumption of sport fan experience. In early 2017, Bleacher Report laid off almost all 
of its editorial staff and made a full break from King Kaufman and their Writer’s Program. 
(Casselberry 2017) Their stated reasoning was pivoting to video. This is not a unique move, as 
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many news organizations in the last 2-3 years have made similar moves. The economic 
reasoning for this is relatively clear: ad revenue from text (from banner ads and other ad forms 
that wrap around text) is notoriously low as the ad tech attached to these forms has shown them 
to be extremely ineffective. Ad companies much prefer to place ads on video and audio, formats 
that are both harder to avoid and harder to track, making them an easier sell to the industries 
buying the ads. (Trimble 2015) As attention to text has become easier and easier to track, the 
lack of attention paid has become more and more apparent. As ESPN’s share of the total cable 
bill was driven higher and higher by its dependence on live sports rights, the limit of this strategy 
was evidenced by the cord cutters and cord nevers who refused to pay for access to a thing they 
never paid attention to in the first place. Walling their content within the interface of the cable 
television bundle was lucrative, until audiences were given the ability to disaggregate that 
content from the bundle. Hence, ESPN found that the threat of not seeing live sports was 
effective for a far smaller group then they thought. DraftKings and Fanduel have found that their 
acceleration of the record keeping of fantasy sports has pushed at the edges of what the state is 
willing to accept. Even if financial firms are able to push the social logic of the derivative into 
everyday life (Martin 2015), DFS’s attempts to push its ideology of financialized fandom was 
not nearly as successful primarily because of its relationship to live sports and the specter of 
sports gambling (or perhaps because their lobbyists are not as successful or connected as those in 
finance). And if recent movements towards the legalization of sports gambling nationwide 
succeed, 20 states (including Nevada) now have either legalized sports betting in some form or 
have pending legislation in their state legislatures (Rodenberg 2018), then DFS might not even 
survive as the loophole they exploited would be blown wide open. 
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The various limits to achieving the real subsumption of sport fandom into the logic of 
contemporary capitalism have clearly different origins. For some it is a technological problem, 
for others it is a political problem, for others a combination of both.  However, the failures to 
really subsume sport fandom studied here have all been reacted to in similar ways: by 
conglomeration and movement towards vertical integration. As discussed in Chapter 2, Bleacher 
Report is now a part of Turner Sports, which is part of the Turner Broadcasting System, itself the 
subsidiary of Time Warner, who is in turn attempting to merge with AT&T. (Greve 2017)  
AT&T owns DirectTV, the satellite TV company generally understood to be the only real 
competition to the major cable companies for pay television distribution. Turner Sports also 
operates the NBA’s dedicated cable channel NBATV and their Internet streaming package NBA 
League Pass. The “open source sports network” of unpaid labor that Bleacher Report began from 
has now been fully subsumed as a minor wing of a sports media industry mega-corporation. As 
mentioned in chapter 4, ESPN is a major part of the Disney Corporation’s portfolio, and Disney 
has been rumored to be discussing a merger with Verizon, but this has yet to materialize.  Disney 
hasn’t been bought out by a larger infrastructure company like NBC was by Comcast, but it has, 
however, bought into a smaller infrastructure company itself.  In August of 2017, Disney bought 
a 75% controlling stake ($2.81 billion of a total $3.75 billion valuation) in BAMTECH, the 
streaming infrastructure company spun out from Major League Baseball’s digital production and 
distribution wing MLB Advanced Media (Perez 2017) BAMTECH specializes in streaming 
video, especially live video, and handles the technical side of the streaming operations for MLB, 
the NHL, Worldwide Wrestling Entertainment (WWE), Riot Games (the popular eSports 
league), HBO (for it’s popular HBO Now and HBO Go applications), and Sony’s over the top 
(OTT) television streaming service Playstation VUE. Disney’s play into the streaming business 
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opens the door for a true ESPN OTT option as they now have the infrastructure and experience 
in BAMTECH to develop an app but their new technology company also acts as a check on 
Comcast and AT&T’s vertical integration moves. As discussed in Chapter 3, DraftKings and 
FanDuel have been attempting to merge since 2016 although the FTC, in a decision marked as a 
surprise to many industry analysts, blocked the merger in June of 2017. (Heitner 2017)  The 
FTC’s decision was based largely on the 90% market share that the merged companies would 
have had in the DFS industry. Later that summer, Draft Kings and FanDuel called of the merger 
entirely, bowing to the FTC’s ruling. (Kirkham and Minaya 2017) The two companies’ duopoly 
would remain intact.  However, as mentioned above, 20 states are considering the legalization of 
sports gambling. This development stabilizes DFS, as the legalization of sports gambling 
obviates the troubles that the industry faced when being lumped in with gambling, but through 
that legitimization could cause a flood of capital to enter the industry.  Hence a larger gambling 
industry player could attempt to buy either company or a more traditional sports media industry 
player could make a bid, not a far-fetched concept as the venture capital rounds for both Draft 
Kings and FanDuel were full of players from leagues, ownership groups, sports media 
companies, and even players. 
 
These movements towards conglomeration and vertical integration described above are clear 
reactions to the political economic conditions of their wings of the sports media industry, and in 
the case of B/R and ESPN, reactions to the current situation in the telecommunications industry 
writ large. The mega-corporations that make up the sports media industry have increasingly 
come under the control of companies who stand to be deeply impacted by developing events in 
the telecommunications regulatory environment. There are indications that the FCC will fully 
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waive the longstanding policy of net neutrality, which opens the door for a massive advantage to 
these monopoly capital interests. Net neutrality is the policy that requires Internet service 
providers (ISPs) to treat all content that travels along their lines equally, a version of common 
carriage laws that governed the railroads and the telephone lines.  Hence, ending net neutrality 
means the ISPs no longer have to give all content equal access to their infrastructure and would 
incentivize ISPs like Comcast to give content from within their own conglomerates favored 
status while content from other origins would be harder to access. For Comcast, which along 
with Charter (now rebranded as Spectrum after its purchase of Time Warner Cable, which had 
been spun out as an independent entity from Time Warner in 200920) has a near duopoly on cable 
television and Internet access in the United States, this would mean making it much easier to get 
to Sunday night NFL highlights, nationally broadcast NHL highlights, and MLB, NHL, and 
NBA highlights from teams who broadcast on the NBC Sports Network affiliates in their 
markets than it would be for any other sports content (not to mention any other content not sports 
related).   
 
This presents a direct challenge to ESPN’s market position and a way for Comcast and its media 
empire to cut into Disney’s market share writ large.  Even worse for ESPN/Disney would be if a 
Time Warner/AT&T merger were to go through. This would integrate DIRECTV and AT&T’s 
mobile network with Time Warner’s content empire (which includes HBO, Turner, and Warner 
																																																								20	Spectrum	Sports,	a	division	of	the	Time	Warner	Cable/Charter	merged	company,	is	prominent	regional	sports	network	of	some	ill	repute,	primarily	for	its	purchase	of	the	exclusive	live	rights	to	LA	Dodgers	games	that	because	of	the	abnormally	high	per	subscriber	fee	spectrum	wanted	from	rival	cable	providers	in	the	Los	Angeles	area,	has	effectively	blacked	out	over	half	the	Los	Angeles	area	from	watching	the	team.	(Shaikin	and	James	2017)	See	also	the	short	documentary	MoneyBall,	Too	about	the	Dodgers	blackout.	(Wilson	2016)	
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Brothers), making it a clear rival to Comcast. DIRECTV owns the exclusive rights to NFL 
Sunday Ticket, the package that allows DIRECTV subscribers to watch all the NFL games of 
any given Sunday on any device (as long as they are also AT&T subscribers).21  Were a Disney 
and Verizon merger to happen, this would create a massively contracted ecosystem of vertically 
integrated companies, carving up the cable, satellite, broadband, fiber, and content industries 
amongst themselves. However, we can see that Disney’s controlling stake in BAMTECH gives 
them a chokepoint to pressure at least the TimeWarner/AT&T conglomerate as BAMTECH 
maintains the servers used to stream HBO’s immensely popular streaming platforms. Were 
DIRECTV or AT&T to attempt to throttle ESPN/Disney’s content or demand a decrease in a 
carriage fee, then Disney could throttle the speed with which HBO’s content is streamed through 
the servers that BAMTECH operates. Hence, what we are seeing is a reconfiguration of capital 
in the attempt to align infrastructure with content. Returning to the discussion of contentification 
and the difference between “product” and “content” from earlier in this chapter can help us to 
understand this reconfiguration as infrastructure’s role as interface becomes increasingly 
important.   
 
“Product” need no longer mean just “software,” as the relevant interfaces now become the 
interface between the cable and Internet lines and individual homes or cell phone towers and 
individual phones.  However, this is not all that different from the software and user interfaces of 
contentification already considered, in that they are still a relationship to the means of 
distribution and production, dictating through the inherent power imbalance of the interface what 																																																								21	The	ability	to	watch	live	television	on	any	device	connected	to	a	telecommunications	network	(generally	the	Internet)	is	referred	to	by	Spectrum	(formerly	Time	Warner)	as	TV	Everywhere,	a	rather	irony-free	state	of	the	attempts	at	the	real	subsumption	of	attention	by	the	telecommunications	monopoly	firms.		
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can and cannot be spoken. Something is always hidden or disallowed to occur, you can only 
machinically enunciate what corresponds to the data structure, as Fuller and Goffey say. The data 
structure of the contemporary culture industries, specifically all of it that happens through 
consumer devices, is being restructured rapidly, so the power imbalances of the interfaces 
between that data structure and the content it structures are rapidly changing as well. This 
imbalance inherent to the interfaces between infrastructure and content is different than that of 
the software and user in two important ways. First, the amount of capital required to build and 
maintain infrastructure far outstrips that required to build and maintain software. A drive towards 
the concentration of capital here makes sense as the need to guarantee the massive investment in 
the material infrastructure of the Internet creates the incentive to vertically integrate the contents 
of what flows through that infrastructure. The more fluid, lower cost process of distributed 
content production must offset the infrastructure’s high fixed capital costs. Hence, the drive 
towards the vertical integration of infrastructure with content is evidence of capital’s want to 
control both sides of this particular interface. Second, the power imbalance between 
infrastructure and content is more nakedly political than the power imbalance between software 
and user. Software is generally black boxed from the user, meaning that the processes of hiding 
and disallowing are hidden to the user, often making the user’s lack of agency seem more like 
user error than a non-democratic choice made by the software. The process by which the 
infrastructure allows and blocks certain content is more obvious. One notices when streaming 
video seems to degrade in quality, when content disappears from a database. And this choice 
must be sanctioned by the regulatory environment, hence the push by major telecommunications 
conglomerates to waive net neutrality and the protests from web companies like Netflix and 
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Google who do not own infrastructure but depend on Comcast and AT&T to continue to carry 
their content without discrimination.   
 
Netflix’s case for net neutrality is obvious. As a major distributor of high quality video streaming 
content, they represent one of the major clients of the infrastructure companies. A very simple 
outcome of the waiving of net neutrality could be a toll on companies who occupy large amounts 
of bandwidth on the cable lines and mobile networks. This could be disastrous to Netflix’s 
bottom line. Google’s case, however, is slightly more opaque unless you consider that Google 
owns 50% of the online advertising market.  (Ingram 2017)  ISPs can begin to charge companies 
like Google that run ad technologies on their infrastructure and in the massively growing mobile 
ad market, Verizon and AT&T, the virtual mobile carrier duopoly, each have their own ad 
divisions which incentivizes them to put tolls on Google’s ad tech. Verizon also owns Yahoo and 
AOL, both former stiff competitors to Google’s ad dominance. All of this, both the complaints of 
the content distributors and the ad companies, highlight how the essential problem is what will 
and won’t be paid attention to and how that attention can then be recorded and sold. By creating 
fast lanes for less content or making their content just generally easier to find and access, the 
telecommunications conglomerates could assure that their content is much easier to access and 
therefore much more likely to be paid attention to. There would no longer be any reason to be 
concerned with the “long tail,” or the tendency for the small amounts of attention given to an 
infinite amount of objects to equal the amount of attention give to the most popular objects. 
(Anderson 2008) The subtitle of the book that made the long tail thesis famous was “why the 
future of business is selling less of more.” If the reconfiguration of capital in the crisis of 
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attention is allowed to proceed as capital clearly wants, the future of business will be selling 
more of less.  
 
This contraction of the archive of content would be an attempt to reconfigure around the crisis of 
attention brought on by contentification. The labor of attention, diffused by a burgeoning 
commons of digital content production, must be brought into the major houses of the culture 
industry so that the surplus value from this labor can support the massive expenditures that both 
the infrastructure and the content require. Even though content can be produced and distributed 
for marginal costs (as seen throughout Chapters 2 and 3) the cost of the originary commodity of 
sports, the live event, has consistently increased (as seen in Chapter 4, particularly in the cost of 
live rights). Hence, as costs for the mega-corporations who buy these live rights increase, the 
need to maximize profit on the usage of these rights and on their in-house content that sits 
adjacent to these the usage of those rights is paramount. In the sports media industry wing of the 
culture industry, this movement likely means forcing eyeballs to the most lucrative platforms 
(cable television and streaming apps) and the continued purchase of and investment in new 
outlets that can monetize sport fan attention. The infinite recursion of sports and records of sport 
pushed at the limits of both what the human body could allow (attention is finite) and what the 
political economy of the sports media industry and the culture industry writ large could allow 
(the regulatory framework). Capital’s reaction is to rewrite the regulatory framework so as to be 
able to constrict the access to that recursion in an attempt to control the attention labor market 
that arises from it. This is their attempt at the real subsumption of sport fandom, to make sport 
fandom and the value it produces adhere to the logic of capital.  
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However,	this	dissertation	has	shown	that	the	generative	activity	of	non-subsumed	sport	fan	activity,	like	that	which	spawned	the	blogging	revolution	of	the	early	‘00s	and	fantasy	sports	in	the	1980s,	is	essential	to	the	sports	media	industry’s	health.		This	contradiction	between	the	need	for	the	infinite	recursion	of	sports	to	spawn	new	forms	of	observation	and	record	and	the	need	to	constrict	that	creativity	so	as	to	concentrate	attention	is	the	dialectical	dilemma	of	the	sports	media	industry.	The	reconfiguration	of	capital	occurring	now	in	both	the	sports	media	industry	and	all	of	the	culture	industry	is	the	attempt	to	maneuver	through	that	contradiction.		As	contentification	has	caused	the	records	of	sport	to	flow	at	such	a	rate	as	to	outstrip	human	capacity	to	take	them	in,	the	sports	media	industry	will	struggle	to	dam	that flow while maintaining growth. Capital’s obliteration of the 
boundaries between work and leisure that Horkheimer and Adorno pinpointed in the middle of 
the 20th century has become so prevalent in early stages of the 21st that it has produced a crisis.  
The reconfiguration in the face of that crisis discussed here is unfinished and the third term that 
will resolve the dialectical tension between the constant need for more content and finite nature 
of attention remains to be seen. However, it is clear that capital’s tactic for resolving this crisis is 
vertical integration and near monopolization no matter the impediments. 
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